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Chapter 1 
 
1 General Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
From July 1999 to July 2009, financial assets of private households in Germany increased by 
42.4 percent, from 3,260.2 billion Euro to 4,641.4 billion Euro.1
Empirical evidence disagrees with the neoclassical perspective that perceives investors as 
rational decision makers possessing all relevant information and processing it correctly. Ac-
cording to the expected utility theory, investors distribute their assets (including human capi-
tal) over their entire life span and react sensitively to external changes. In addition, markets 
are assumed to be perfect, so financial intermediaries and financial advice are irrelevant (see 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), Friedman (1957)). 
 Even though households al-
ways had to face the asset allocation problem, the responsibility for private savings for old 
age is as high as never before.  
In contrast, empirical evidence finds that financial literacy of private households is quite bad 
(see e.g. Cole and Shastry (2009)). Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) analyze U.S. household data 
from a specially designed module on planning and financial literacy for the 2004 Health and 
Retirement Study. They find that only half of the elderly participants (age 50+) could correct-
ly answer simple questions like “Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest 
                                                 
1 See German Federal Bank, Time series CEB00I: Financial assets D: Total C: Private Households (last updated 
July 2009). 
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rate was 2 percent per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the ac-
count if you left the money to grow: more than $102, exactly $102, less than $102?”. In a 
German study on behalf of the Commerzbank AG (see Brettschneider and NFO Infratest Fi-
nanzforschung (2003)), 1,032 participants aged between 18 and 65 were interviewed. 42 per-
cent of the people were not able to correctly answer even half of the 35 questions concerning 
general economic knowledge, monetary transactions, and financial investments; this seems to 
be the prevailing situation. An OECD study (2005) on financial literacy looks at several coun-
tries and finds low levels of financial understanding over all studies and countries. 
It is hence not surprising that many households are put off by the complexity of many invest-
ment products and ask for investment advice. In fact, the majority of private investors is rela-
tively uninformed and relies on professional investment advice (see e.g. Allen (2001), Guiso 
and Jappelli (2007)). In Germany, more than 80 percent of individual investors consult an 
advisor before making an investment decision (see Bluethgen et al. (2008)). Within this the-
sis, we refer to the term “financial advisor” as someone who professionally provides invest-
ment advice to individuals. In the broader sense, this definition also includes professionals 
acting on behalf of the investor (e.g. fund managers). Ideally, the financial advisor assists the 
investor in achieving an optimal asset allocation best suiting his preferences (basically risk, 
return, and liquidity preferences). However, empirically it is not clear whether investors are 
always better off making use of financial advice. Whether advice is beneficial or not to an 
investor depends on numerous factors, including investor’s financial sophistication and sensi-
tivity to cognitive errors, the costs of acquiring financial information and of getting access to 
financial products as well as the cost and quality of financial advice (see e.g. Bolton et al. 
(2007)).  
Regulation for investment services aims for an improvement of the quality of financial advice.  
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) by the European Parliament and the 
European Council (2004 and 2006) requires firms performing investment services and activi-
ties to elicit their customers’ financial situation (e.g. the purpose of the investment, risk prefe-
rences) to guarantee the appropriateness of any investment advice (see Article 35 of the Mi-
FID). In addition, the customer has to be made aware of any conflicts of interest, e.g. com-
missions paid by product providers. 
The present thesis contributes to an enhanced understanding of the relationship between indi-
vidual investors and financial advisors. Chapter 3 takes the perspective of the advisor. It in-
vestigates the question of whether a person is actually able to correctly evaluate the risk prefe-
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Empirical Analysis 
rences of others. Indeed, the MiFID requires investment firms to elicit the risk preferences of 
their investors but it does not say anything about the correct procedure of doing so. Chapter 4 
switches to the perspective of the investor and looks at household portfolios. By studying po-
tential determinants of investment decisions, it contributes to a better understanding of indi-
vidual households’ behavior. Finally, Chapter 5 analyses the interaction of advisor and inves-
tor. With the help of a unique dataset about real financial investment decisions, it considers 
determinants of the willingness to follow advice. Again, we go beyond current attempts by 
legislation or consumerists who aim to improve the quality of financial advice. There is ac-
tually more to it than this as the best piece of advice is of course useless if people are not will-
ing to follow it.  
1.2 Outline of the Thesis and Main Results 
Figure 1.1: Outline of the thesis 
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The following research questions are addressed in this thesis: 
1. Is it possible to correctly evaluate other persons’ preferences? Which factors drive the ego-
centric bias? (Chapter 3) 
2. What does the typical household portfolio look like? What are determinants of households’ 
investment behavior? (Chapter 4) 
3. Which factors drive the willingness to accept financial advice? (Chapter 5) 
Figure 1.1 illustrates how the respective chapters of this thesis are related. The remainder of 
the general introduction will shortly summarize each chapter. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis shortly summarizes evidence on typical behavior of individual and 
professional investors. Individual investors are prone to behavioral biases and investment mis-
takes, possibly making financial advice useful in principle. Nevertheless, professional inves-
tors’ behavior is biased as well. There is contradicting evidence if professionals have better 
investment skills compared to individual investors. We provide an overview of potential con-
flicts of interest existing between advisor and decision maker. These conflicts might cause the 
advisor not to act in the best interest of the investor. Different compensation models imply 
different conflicts of interest. The last section of Chapter 2 summarizes studies comparing 
portfolios of advised investors with portfolios of non-advised investors. Again, evidence 
about the usefulness of financial advice is mixed.  
Chapter 3 (joint work with Martin Weber) investigates the perspective of the advisor. As early 
as the 1930s, psychologists mentioned the tendency of people to see the self as the center of 
social judgment. This leads to egocentrically biased judgments when assessing others’ beha-
vior. Ross, Greene, and House (1977) demonstrated this social projection bias in four studies 
and called it the “False Consensus Effect”. In this chapter, we analyze the false consensus 
effect in a financial context. We investigate whether an advisor is able to abstract from his 
own preferences. In two studies, we use simple lottery questions and ask subjects to state cer-
tainty equivalents for the own person and also to predict the average certainty equivalent of 
all participants. We find a strong correlation between the own and the prediction of others’ 
certainty equivalents. As we use 50/50 lotteries and in addition use ambiguous probabilities in 
our studies, we extend the scope of Gilovich (1990) to financial decisions. We find a stronger 
effect in situations with ambiguity. We also ask participants to give an interval for the certain-
ty equivalents, i.e. a lower bound that they think will not be fallen short of by more than 5 
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percent of the participants and also an upper bound that is not exceeded by more than 5 per-
cent. We find that people strongly underestimate the variation in others’ risk preferences. 
Chapter 4 investigates the perspective of the decision maker. We contribute to the literature 
on positive household finance by analyzing a unique dataset of German households from the 
consumer center Baden-Wuerttemberg. The data stems from real counseling interviews deal-
ing with financial investments and old-age provisions. Compared to the whole German popu-
lation, we find that the average customer looking for advice at the consumer center is older 
and more likely to be female. Concerning the portfolios, the most prominent asset type is a 
savings account, with more than 80 percent of customers owning at least one. About 60 per-
cent hold some form of life insurance and about 40 percent own real estate. The participation 
in the stock market is pretty high in our dataset, with about 20 percent holding stocks and 
about 45 percent holding investment funds. We find that marital status, income, and financial 
literacy are determinants of the participation rate for most asset types. Compared to single 
households, couples have a higher participation rate for asset markets. Higher income and 
higher financial literacy have a positive influence on the participation rate as well. However, 
the influence of age is not clear. In addition to the single asset types, we analyze portfolio 
diversification. We find similar results as for market participation. Couples, older people, 
people with higher income and higher financial literacy are better diversified. Our results for 
German households are to a very large extent in line with international findings as well as 
with earlier studies of German household portfolios. Moreover, our dataset features an excep-
tional time dimension concerning the measurement of risk tolerance; people at the consumer 
center are explicitly asked about their risk preferences regarding their current investment, thus 
enabling us to analyze the influence of the existing asset types in the portfolio on the new in-
vestment choice. We find that people tend to have constant risk tolerance, e.g. those house-
holds with risk-free assets in the portfolio show a higher risk aversion than do those with risky 
assets. 
Chapter 5 (joint work with Markus Glaser, Niels Nauhauser, and Martin Weber) investigates 
the determinants of why people choose to follow or not to follow financial advice. We add to 
the existing literature by empirically analyzing this issue. We again make use of the data of 
the consumer center. Additionally, we set up a personalized questionnaire, which includes the 
specific recommendations for each household. We ask households about their action follow-
ing the interview with the consumer center, during which they received the advice. Did they 
choose to follow the advice or not? So far, there is very little empirical evidence about the 
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acceptance of advice, especially in relation to financial decisions. We find that person-related 
attributes, i.e. characteristics of the advisor (satisfaction with the advisor and the interview) 
influence the willingness to follow advice. Here, the likability of the advisor seems to be as 
important as his expertise. Person-related attributes of the decision maker are of only low sig-
nificance. The original motivation of asking for advice (concrete problem versus general need 
for information) plays a role. An already existing own investment strategy decreases the wil-
lingness to follow advice. We also find that option-related attributes of the advice, e.g. the 
specific asset, considerably influence the probability of acceptance. Pieces of advice concern-
ing call money, “Riester” savings plans, or insurance contracts are more likely to be followed. 
On the contrary, advice related to bonds or bond funds is less likely to be followed. In addi-
tion, we find that advice about one-time investments is more likely to be followed compared 
to advice about regular savings. Overall, option-related attributes have a higher influence on 
the willingness to follow advice than person-related attributes. Our results partly confirm 
theoretical predictions and experimental results. Furthermore, due to our unique dataset, we 
are able to provide new insights into real world decision making.  
 
  
 
Chapter 2 
 
2 Financial Advice 
2.1 The Need for Financial Advice - Individual Investor Behavior 
Financial decision making is not at all trivial. Typical precepts of standard financial theory 
concern diversification, how much to save to smooth consumption, and participation to risky 
asset markets (see e.g. Markowitz (1952), Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), Merton (1969), 
and Campbell (2006)). To prepare an investment decision, a household first needs a complete 
overview of the individual financial situation including all existing assets, for example stock 
holdings, real estate, and human capital (see e.g. Goetzmann (1993), Heaton and Lucas 
(2000a, b), Viceira (2001), and Yao and Zhang (2005)) as well as existing liabilities. Of 
course, the correlations between the assets are also important. Moreover, all factors that may 
have an influence on the financial situation, for example future salary increases or the birth of 
a child need to be taken into consideration. Ideally, to make an optimal decision, the individu-
al already has a complete scheme of his life in mind. Second, the household has to determine 
its preferences, for example risk tolerance, purpose of the investment, and investment horizon. 
Third, if the status quo and preferences are well defined, the mix of assets has to be chosen. 
Fourth, within the asset classes, the single securities have to be chosen. Fifth, the portfolio has 
to be adapted to changes (e.g. to preference changes or to changes in the financial situation) 
over time. 
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Looking at the above process of financial decision making, it is not surprising that people 
make a lot of mistakes and thereby lose welfare. The investment behavior of many house-
holds deviates from normative precepts.  
Kotlikoff et al. (2001) find evidence of bounded rationality in consumption choices. People 
make substantial errors in life cycle consumption choices; many of them undervalue future 
earnings. Benartzi and Thaler (2002) also find that investors do not have a well-defined idea 
of their preferences, as they on average prefer a model portfolio over their own portfolio. One 
essential part of a person’s preferences is the risk attitude. Camerer (1989) and Hey and Orme 
(1994) analyze the stability of risky choices. They find that from one point in time to another 
(less than ten days apart), individuals change their risk taking behavior in about 25 to 30 per-
cent of all cases. Other studies explicitly investigate the reasons for changes in risk taking 
behavior. It can change due to feelings (see e.g. Finucane et al. (2000) or Slovic et al. (2002)), 
due to prior outcomes (see e.g. Staw (1976), Thaler and Johnson (1990), Odean (1998), or 
Weber and Zuchel (2005)), or due to personal macroeconomic experiences (see e.g. Malmen-
dier and Nagel (2009)). It is also possible that the risk preference itself is stable but that 
changes in expectations lead to changes in risk taking behavior (see e.g. Nosic and Weber 
(2009)). The framing of investment alternatives can for example influence the risk perception. 
Different presentation formats can lead to different judgments of the riskiness of investment 
alternatives (see e.g. Weber et al. (2005) or Diacon and Hasseldine (2007)).  
The framing does not only influence the risk perception but the perception of the whole secu-
rity or the whole portfolio (see e.g. Langer and Weber (2001) or Karlsson et al. (2006)). Spe-
cific heuristics also lead to a biased perception of choice alternatives. For example, due to the 
representativeness heuristic, investors mistake company for stock characteristics (Solt and 
Statman (1989)). These biases can easily lead to investment mistakes. For example, people 
tend to invest in stocks that grab their attention because they are biased by the news (Barber 
and Odean (2008)). Here, the availability heuristic leads to a biased perception of the attrac-
tiveness of the stocks in the media. 
Another example is the tendency of people to think in separate mental accounts (see e.g. Tha-
ler (1985), Shefrin and Statman (1985), or Grinblatt and Han (2005)). Thus, when making 
decisions, they neglect interactions between different assets or concentrate on only a small 
part of their total wealth. Glaser and Weber (2007a) find that investors are not able to estimate 
their past portfolio performance correctly. Moreover, they tend to ignore background risks, 
e.g. risks from other financial investments, from housing, and from labor and entrepreneurial 
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income (see e.g. Goetzmann (1993), Heaton and Lucas (2000a, b), and Klos and Weber 
(2006)).  
When allocating their wealth to different asset classes, investors fail to form optimal portfo-
lios. Despite a high premium for equity (Mehra and Prescott (1985)) many investors do not 
hold stocks or investment funds at all (see e.g Haliassos (2002), Eymann and Boersch-Supan 
(2002), or Campbell (2006)). Moreover, many portfolios are not sufficiently diversified and 
people tend to apply naive diversification strategies (see e.g. Benartzi and Thaler (2001), 
Langer and Fox (2005)). Investors prefer securities they are familiar with (Hubermann 
(2001)), investments from their home country (French and Poterba (1991), Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999)), and stocks of their own company (Bernartzi (2001)). By their non-
participation in the risky asset markets, investors lose about 2 to 6 percent equity premium 
(Haliassos (2002), Calvet et al. (2007)). Missing diversification of the risky part of the portfo-
lio causes a reduction of the Sharpe Ratio (Guiso and Jappelli (2007), Calvet et al. (2007), 
Ivkovic et al. (2008)). However, Ivkovic et al. find a higher return for concentrated portfolios. 
Concerning trading behavior, investors tend to trade too much and by this excessive trading 
reduce their performance (Barber and Odean (2000)). One possible reason for this behavior is 
overconfidence (see e.g. Odean (1999) or Glaser and Weber (2007b)). In addition, investors 
exhibit the disposition effect, i.e. they prefer to sell winning stocks and hold losing stocks 
(Shefrin and Statman (1985), Odean (1998), Weber and Camerer (1998)). Again, this beha-
vior reduces performance as investors would be better off by selling losers instead of winners.  
2.2 Potential Benefits of Advice - Professional Investor Behavior 
Financial advice can be beneficial to a decision maker in several ways. The economic pers-
pective considers financial advisors acting as financial intermediaries which pool supply and 
demand. Financial intermediaries provide the transformation of risks, terms, and quantities. 
Moreover, they produce information and reduce problems emerging from asymmetric infor-
mation in financial markets (see e.g. Freixas and Rochet (2008)). As they gather and circulate 
information for many investors, advisors can exploit economies of scale. Investors hence be-
nefit from a reduction of information and transaction costs when consulting a financial advi-
sor. These costs can have a substantial impact on investment decisions. For example, Halias-
sos and Bertaut (1995) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) report that high entry or participation 
costs are the reason for many households not to participate in the stock market. The most 
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commonly stated reason (about 83 percent of investors) by German investors to use financial 
advice is a time reduction for information gathering (see Jansen et al. (2008)).  
The behavioral perspective considers the adequate modeling of preferences and the avoidance 
of investment mistakes. Financial advisors can support decision makers in clarifying their 
own preferences and in the investment process. As stated before, individual decision makers 
are prone to behavioral biases and investment mistakes. Jansen et al. (2008) find that for 76 
percent of German investors, the avoidance of investment mistakes is a reason to use advice. 
As professional investors have more knowledge and are much more experienced in financial 
matters, private investors can benefit from this expertise. Capon et al. (1996) show that know-
ledge is indeed important. They analyze mutual fund investors and find most of them to be 
naive. Especially those who seek advice from financial advisors (in contrast to those buying 
directly from fund companies) have only little knowledge about their investments. More than 
80 percent do not know whether they invested in an equity fund or a fixed income fund.  
On the level of the asset allocation decision (allocation to broad asset classes such as stocks 
and bonds), it is hardly possible to judge whether advice is rational or not as it depends on the 
data sets (see Canner et al. (1997) and Elton and Gruber (2000)). With empirical data of Ger-
man investors, Jansen et al. (2008) find that advisors’ recommendations are oftentimes not 
consistent with investors’ risk preferences; for instance, most of the portfolios contain high 
equity shares in spite of a high risk aversion of the investors. 
When deciding for a mutual fund, Jones et al. (2005a, b) find that the majority of investors 
consult financial advisors. The advice on average provides value to the investors because the 
advisors use a more sophisticated decision making process (a more objective set of fund cha-
racteristics). Furthermore, however, they also find that advisors do not seem to care about 
recommending funds with cheap expense ratios to the investors.  
Concerning behavioral biases, on the one hand, there is some evidence that education and 
experience may reduce behavioral biases. Shapira and Venezia (2001) find that the disposi-
tion effect is less pronounced for professional investors compared to independent investors. 
List (2003) finds that market experience leads to higher rationality; it eliminates a prominent 
market anomaly, the endowment effect. On the other hand, several other studies confirm the 
existence of the disposition effect for professional investors as well (Garvey and Murphy 
(2004), Coval and Shumway (2005), Locke and Mann (2005)). Kaustia et al. (2009) report 
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about unstable preferences of financial advisors, i.e. the advice varies with the framing of the 
question (related to required return versus expected return) the client asks.  
There is also mixed evidence about the stock picking abilities of financial experts. Copeland 
and Mayers (1982) analyze the value of stock recommendations made by security analysts; 
they do not find an excess return after costs. Metrick (1999) analyses stock recommendations 
by investment newsletters. He also finds no evidence for superior stock picking abilities. Bar-
ber et al. (2003) even find that the most recommended stocks substantially underperformed 
and the least recommended outperformed the market. Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) confirm that 
the potential profit from recommended trading strategies cannot compensate for transaction 
costs. On the contrary, Barber et al. (2001), Jegadeesh et al. (2004), and Green (2006) find 
higher returns for most recommended stocks than for least recommended stocks indicating 
that there is a potential benefit from experts’ recommendations.  
Jensen (1968) analyses the performance of mutual funds. He finds that the funds on average 
are not better than a simple buy and hold strategy. Recent studies widely agree that actively 
managed funds underperform passively managed funds after costs (see e.g. Malkiel (1995, 
2003a), Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), or Griese and Kempf (2003)). However, when looking 
at the performance of the stocks before costs, there is also evidence that mutual fund manag-
ers possess stock picking abilities (see e.g. Gruber (1996), Wermers (2000), or Kosowski et 
al. 2006)). Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) confirm that sophisticated investors (often profes-
sional managed funds or investment banking houses) outperform less sophisticated investors 
(domestic investors in Finland). In addition, the most sophisticated investors have relatively 
small transaction costs that lead to an even higher performance difference. 
Besides information, expertise, and the avoidance of investment mistakes, there are also gen-
eral motives to ask for advice. According to Harvey and Fischer (1997), people search for 
advice to accept help, improve judgment, and to share responsibility. Jansen et al. (2008) ask 
German investors for their reasons to use financial advice. Besides time constraints and the 
avoidance of investment mistakes, investors name higher convenience and safety. Shefrin 
(2007) confirms the importance of shifting the responsibility. If an investment turns out badly, 
people need a culprit to protect the own ego. Contrary, if the investment turns out well, the 
investor can attribute the profit to the own person. 
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2.3 Compensation Models and Conflicts of Interest 
One main obstacle for the advisors to provide advice in the best interest of the investor are 
conflicts of interest between advisor and investor (for the general principal-agent-model, see 
Ross (1973) and Holmstrom (1979), for a specialized principal-agent-model for financial ad-
vice, see Golec (1992)). A conflict of interest between two parties exists when one party can 
gain by taking actions that are harmful to the other party (see Mehran and Stulz (2007)). Re-
lating to an investment transaction, a conflict of interest exists when the advisor can take ac-
tions that are disadvantageous for the investor. Because of the information asymmetry be-
tween financial institutions and their representatives (e.g. the bank advisor) on the one side 
and private investors on the other side, financial institutions may try to bias the investor and 
not disclose all information. They have better information about financial products and the 
suitability for the investor. For the investor, it is difficult to ascertain the quality of advice. 
When receiving a product recommendation, he does not know whether there exists another 
product which better suits his interests (see e.g. Bolton et al. (2007)).  
There are different compensation models if a private investor asks for financial advice. The 
prevalent system in Europe is commission-based advice (see e.g. Bluethgen et al. (2008)). 
Especially for retail clients, most banks in Germany use this compensation model. The banks 
and hence the advisors are paid indirectly by commissions from product providers. If an in-
vestor does not buy anything, the bank gets nothing. The existing conflict of interest is ob-
vious: to maximize the bank’s and his own profit, the advisor has to recommend the product 
which pays the highest commission instead of the product that is in the best interest of the 
investor. In addition, advisors may recommend useless transactions to generate further in-
come.  
Ottaviani (2000) and Krausz and Paroush (2002) develop theoretical models of financial ad-
vice in the presence of conflicts of interest. Both models show that advisors maximizing their 
own income do not necessarily act in the best interest of the investors.  
Jones et al. (2005b) find that advisors making fund recommendations are more influenced by 
commissions and profits than by the knowledge of which is the best choice for the investor. 
Jansen et al. (2008) find that portfolios of advised clients are biased toward too much equity 
because the margins for equity-related products (stocks, funds, certificates) are the highest for 
the bank. 
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Zhao (2008) analyses mutual fund flows. He finds that high-commission funds receive higher 
flows compared to low-commission funds. Bergstresser et al. (2009) analyze funds sold by 
brokers; compared to direct-sold funds, they find lower risk-adjusted returns even before costs 
of distribution; brokers do not seem to have superior security picking skills. As a possible 
explanation for their findings, Bergstresser et al. argue that brokers simply act in their own 
interest, i.e. they sell the funds they get paid for most. They also find higher fund flows for 
funds with higher distribution fees.  
However, Bolton et al. (2007) show that conflicts of interest are reduced by competition. 
Competition leads to a disclosure of information by the advisor for reputational reasons and to 
differentiate the own product from competitors. Bentz (2001) finds that commissions may 
also serve as a signal of product quality in the sense that high commissions are a signal for 
high-quality products. 
Besides commission-based advice, other compensation models like fixed fees or asset-based 
fees are possible. In the fixed fee model, the advisor is paid directly by the investor (e.g. by a 
fixed fee per hour). The advice should thus be independent from commissions. But the fixed 
fee model is also not free of conflicts of interest; it can lead to shirking and over-billing. Un-
der the asset-based fee model, the compensation is tied to the performance. The advisor rece-
ives a small percentage of assets under management. Theoretically, this performance-based 
payment should align interests of advisors and investors as both parties are better off when the 
investment increases in value. But the advisor might also try to increase assets under man-
agement and thus decrease investments outside of the fee arrangement, e.g. cash.  
For life insurances, Gravelle (1994) finds that weak consumers will still be exploited in a fee-
for-advice system. Elton et al. (2003) empirically study the influence of incentives for fund 
managers (compensation as a function of fund performance relative to some benchmark) in 
the mutual fund industry. Elton et al. find that managers of incentive-funds exhibit higher 
stock picking abilities; the funds have lower expense ratios and higher risk-adjusted returns. 
Funds flows are larger than into non-incentive funds. However, incentive-funds take higher 
risk compared to funds without incentives and do not outperform their benchmark because of 
a beta lower than one. 
Massa and Patgiri (2009) also find evidence that incentives increase risk-adjusted returns but 
also increase risk taking as well. In addition, they find that higher incentives reduce the sur-
vival probability of the fund. 
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Robinson (2007) compares three different compensation models for financial advisors: com-
missions, asset-based fees, and fixed fees. He argues that there is no optimal compensation 
model as all three contain incentives that may lead to conflicts of interest.  
Regulation and consumerists try to stop the intended concealment of information by financial 
advisors. Since the enacting of “The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)” by 
the European Parliament and the European Council (2004 and 2006), firms performing in-
vestment services and activities are forced to reveal any conflicts of interest. But this act does 
not solve all problems. In an experimental study, Cain et al. (2005) find that the disclosure of 
conflicts of interest leads to an increase of the advice bias because advisors are released from 
moral concern and even feel encouraged to give wrong advice. Inderst and Ottoviani (2010) 
also find evidence for ambiguous welfare implications of a mandatory disclosure of commis-
sions. In their model, a disclosure indeed leads to a reduction of commissions but it may also 
lead to a sales increase of more costly products. 
Mehran and Stulz (2007) review the large literature concerning conflicts of interest in finan-
cial institutions. They conclude that the academic literature about conflicts of interest reaches 
weaker conclusions than those by journalists and politicians; for instance for reputational rea-
sons, financial institutions have incentives to weaken the influence of these conflicts. In addi-
tion, investors have an incentive to pay attention to existing conflicts and thus to adjust rec-
ommendations. Overall, the results of empirical studies are mixed; they depend on the type of 
conflict and on the sample period. 
2.4 Performance of Advised versus Non-Advised Investors 
So far, there are only very few empirical studies analyzing whether the benefits of financial 
advice outweigh the costs. These studies mainly use bank account record data to compare the 
portfolios of advised and non-advised investors.  
Bluethgen et al. (2008) analyze investment account record data from a German retail bank 
(01/03-10/05, 4,363 investors). They compare portfolios of clients advised by bank advisors 
with the portfolios of clients acting on their own. They find that advice leads to a higher di-
versification but also to higher turnover and thus higher transaction fees. Gerhardt and Hacke-
thal (2009) use data from a German online bank (02/06-07/07, 65,457 investors). They want 
to eliminate the influence of different characteristics of advised and non-advised clients. For 
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this, they construct a peer group for the advised subsample. For every advised client, a non-
advised “twin” is selected. The twin is the non-advised investor that is most similar to the 
advised client with regard to his socio-demographic variables. In addition to the peer group 
analysis, they conduct an event study with investors switching to financial advice. They find 
similar results for both analyses: advice seems to reduce speculative trading motives and the 
advised portfolios are better diversified. When clients switch to advisors, these advisors often 
re-structure the portfolio, resulting in higher trading activities. Gerhardt and Hackethal find no 
significant difference in Sharpe Ratios (net of fees) between advised and non-advised portfo-
lios. 
Hackethal et al. (2009) control for demographic variables and the endogeneity of the choice to 
consult an advisor. They use German online brokerage house data (01/01-06/06, 32,751 in-
vestors). They compare non-advised portfolios to those advised by independent financial ad-
visors. These advisors generate income almost exclusively from sales provisions or asset 
management fees (high-powered incentives). Hackethal et al. find that especially older and 
richer investors who would do better without help are more likely to consult a financial advi-
sor. A possible reason might be time constraints of these investor groups. Advised portfolios 
exhibit lower returns and higher risks, with a higher probability of a loss. They state overtrad-
ing and thus higher trading costs as a possible reason for the worse performance of advised 
portfolios.  
Kramer and Lensink (2009) compare portfolios of advised and non-advised Dutch investors 
using data from a retail bank (04/03-08/07, 6,758 investors). They find that advised clients 
tend to be better diversified; portfolio risk is lower but advised portfolios also have significant 
lower gross and net returns. 
 
 

  
 
Chapter 3 
 
3 False Consensus and the Role of Ambiguity in 
Predictions of Others’ Risk Preferences  
3.1 Introduction 
The tendency of people to see the self as the center of social judgment has been known for a 
long time (see e.g. Holmes (1968) or Ichheiser (1970)). This leads to egocentrically biased 
judgments when people are asked to predict the behavior of other people. Ross, Greene, and 
House (1977) find confirmative evidence in four studies. They called the tendency of people 
to project their way of thinking onto other people the “False Consensus Effect”. In a hypothet-
ical questionnaire, they ask subjects about 35 different issues about for instance personal 
traits, beliefs, preferences, or activities (e.g. “Are you shy?”). They find evidence for a false 
consensus effect in 33 of the 35 items in the questionnaire. In another study, they confronted 
subjects with real conflict situations. For example, students were asked to carry a sandwich 
board sign saying “Eat at Joe’s” and should predict how many of their fellow students would 
accept or refuse to carry the board. Again, they find confirmative evidence for the effect. 
Overall, people tend to see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common 
and appropriate to a specific situation while alternative responses are considered to be un-
common, deviant, and inappropriate. In various follow-up studies, Ross et al. find the false 
consensus effect to be especially strong in political expectations, personal traits and views, 
and personal problems. 
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After 1977, a lot of other studies followed showing the false consensus effect in different con-
texts and it became a widely accepted phenomenon.2
Marks and Miller (1987) present an empirical and theoretical review of ten years of research 
on the false consensus effect. Their goal was to summarize possible explanations for the ef-
fect. In order to do so, they present four general theoretical perspectives. The first perspective 
explains the bias with a selective exposure to others that are similar. People associate with 
other people that are similar rather than dissimilar to themselves. This leads to a biased and 
restricted sample of information. The second explanatory approach stresses salience and focus 
of attention. People tend to put their focus of attention on their preferred position and this act 
of engagement makes the position more salient than it might actually be. The third approach 
emphasizes the tendency of people to attribute the cause of their own behavior to situational 
(in contrast to dispositional) forces. They thus conclude others to behave alike in similar con-
texts. Finally, the fourth explanation assumes a motivational explanation. The overestimation 
of similarity between the own and other persons may have a functional value, e.g. to maintain 
self-esteem. Marks and Miller were not able to identify one approach that causes the effect 
but instead find evidence for each of the four theoretical perspectives. 
 Mullen et al. (1985) provide a meta-
analysis of 115 hypothesis tests. Their results show that the false consensus is a very stable 
effect. It could be demonstrated in behaviors (e.g. people watching TV or playing tennis think 
this behavior is more common than people with other hobbies), in decisions (e.g. eating ham 
or eggs for breakfast, painting a room blue or yellow), and in opinions (e.g. political state-
ments, women’s rights). Moreover, the effect was found in evaluations (e.g. thinking to die 
before the age of 70, thinking to be better off in later life than the own parents) and also in 
characteristics (e.g. shy people think this characteristic is more widespread than it actually is). 
Several studies attribute the false consensus bias to an insufficient adjustment from the anchor 
of the own perspective (see e.g. Gilovich et al. (1998, 2000), Nickerson (1999), or Epley et al. 
(2004)). They suggest that people adopt others’ perspectives by using their own perspective as 
an initial anchor and subsequently adjust for differences between themselves and others.3
                                                 
2 Under some circumstances people show the opposite effect, i.e. they perceive their own attitudes, beliefs etc. as 
relatively uncommon. This effect is called the “False Uniqueness Effect” (see e.g. Mullen et al. (1992), Suls and 
Wan (1987), or Perloff and Brickman (1982)). 
 As 
these adjustments tend to be insufficient, they give rise to egocentric bias. 
3 See Tversky and Kahnemann (1974) for a description of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. 
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Gilovich (1990) shows that the false consensus effect is stronger in situations with greater 
latitude for subjective construal. Divergence of opinions can stem not only from differences in 
the “judgment of the object” but may also be due to differences in the “object of judgment”. 
For example, the question “Are you competitive?” allows a higher diversity in interpretation 
compared to “Are you a first-born or a later-born child?”. In a first study, Gilovich makes use 
of the different issues originally reported in Ross et al. (1977). 32 of the 35 items used in the 
original questionnaire were rated based on their latitude for construal. Gilovich finds a posi-
tive correlation between latitude for construal and the strength of the false consensus effect. 
Moreover, he performs a study where two versions of the same choice problem were given to 
subjects. For example, one group was asked the question whether they prefer an American or 
a European snack. In contrast, the other group was asked the more specific version of the 
problem whether they prefer apple pie or chocolate mousse. Obviously, the room for interpre-
tation is limited in the latter version. Gilovich finds that participants exhibit a significant con-
sensus effect for the broadly specified problems. In contrast, he only finds a significant effect 
for one of three specific problems. In this case, the effect is still smaller in the specific version 
than in the general version. Griffin et al. (1990) show that in an ambiguous situation, people 
generally make one single specific construal and fail to recognize that the construal of others 
may differ from their own. Kunda and Sherman-Williams (1993) find that people judge an 
ambiguous behavior (e.g. hitting someone) depending on the stereotypicality of the source 
(e.g. a housewife or a construction worker) for this behavior. The ambiguous description leads 
to different judgments of the same behavior but this difference disappears with a more de-
tailed description of the behavior.4
Despite the high number of studies analyzing the false consensus effect, to our knowledge 
there is little evidence of the effect in financial decisions. 
  
In an experiment by Engelmann and Stroebel (2009), subjects had to choose whether all four 
members in their group play a lottery or not and at the same time estimate how many of the 
subjects in other groups would choose to play the lottery. They find that without any addition-
al information, the false consensus effect appears. If information about choices in the own 
group is explicitly provided, the false consensus effect disappears in the estimation of the oth-
er groups. However, if the information about the own group is only implicitly provided (in 
                                                 
4 Again, there is also some contradicting evidence. Bosveld et al. (1995) show that under certain circumstances 
differential construal can also result in a false uniqueness effect. 
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form of payoffs for subjects) the false consensus effect in predicting other groups’ behavior 
again reappears.  
Roszkowski and Grable (2005) study real financial advisors’ estimates of risk tolerance of 
their clients. In contrast to the previous studies where subjects had to give a consensus esti-
mate, the advisors in this study have to state their own risk tolerance and to estimate the prefe-
rences of individual well-known clients. Advisors were graduates of the American College‘s 
Master‘s in Financial Services program. Each advisor was asked to pick two of his clients and 
all answered a risk tolerance questionnaire developed by the college. Own risk tolerance was 
measured on a seven-point scale and the client‘s risk tolerance was measured on a ten-point 
scale. Roszkowski and Grable do not find a positive correlation between own risk tolerance 
and estimated risk tolerance of the clients. 
Besides the literature strand on the false consensus effect there are also studies analyzing the 
prediction accuracy made by a group of people. We only mention those in the financial con-
text that are relevant for our study. 
Hsee and Weber (1997) find a general prediction error in predictions of others’ risky choices. 
They used 50/50 lotteries and participants had to choose between the lotteries and sure op-
tions and in addition had to predict the choice concerning the same lottery by another subject. 
The other subject was described in three different ways: as the average American, the average 
student on campus, and as the person sitting next to the participant in the classroom. Hsee and 
Weber find that the risk preference of the average American and the average student on cam-
pus is overestimated in the sense that the prediction is not sufficiently risk averse. This predic-
tion error vanishes if the other person becomes more tangible, i.e. if participants are asked to 
predict the preferences of the person sitting next to them in the room; in this situation, there is 
no overall prediction error. 
Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) performed another study of the accuracy of people’s predic-
tions of others’ risky choices. Like Hsee and Weber, they use financial lottery questions but 
with different probabilities to construct choices in which people typically choose more risk 
averse or more risk seeking. On the basis of the fourfold pattern of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1986) they expected risk seeking for a lottery with a small winning probability (0.001) in the 
gain domain and risk aversion for a high probability (0.99). In the domain of losses, they ex-
pected risk aversion for the small probability prospect and risk seeking for the large probabili-
ty loss. In the prediction condition, participants are asked to indicate the certainty equivalent 
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of a randomly selected University of Chicago MBA student. They detect a systematic inaccu-
racy; the predictions of others’ choices are too regressive, meaning that predicted certainty 
equivalents are closer to risk neutrality than they actually are. When people tend to be risk 
seeking in a situation, they also predict that others are risk seeking but substantially less so. 
Vice versa, when they tend to be risk averse, the prediction of others is less risk averse. 
Our analysis also investigates predictions of others’ risky choices in financial decisions. As 
private savings, e.g. for retirement, become more and more important, these decisions are of 
great importance. But, at the same time, financial literacy of private investors is quite bad (see 
e.g. Cole and Shastry (2009) or Lusardi and Mitchell (2006)). Thus, it is not surprising that 
many people ask for advice or even completely delegate these decisions to professionals (see 
e.g. Allen (2001) or Guiso and Jappelli (2007)). Our study investigates the ability of a finan-
cial professional to put himself in the position of an average other person. This ability is ne-
cessary to decide in another person’s interest. We use risk tolerance as an example as it is a 
crucial factor for the investment decision. Moreover, the task of predicting risk preferences 
for an average individual is quite common in reality. Think of a fund manager who has to 
decide on behalf of many investors, or a bank that has to decide about the variety of offered 
products. In our questionnaires analysis, we present subjects with simple lotteries and ask 
them for their own certainty equivalents. In addition, they are asked to predict the average 
certainty equivalent of all participants. The certainty equivalent of a lottery is the guaranteed 
payoff for which a person is indifferent between accepting the guaranteed payoff and playing 
the lottery. In the presentation of the lotteries, we vary in the description of the probabilities; 
we use 50/50 probabilities as well as ambiguous probabilities.  
With this chapter, we want to contribute to both mentioned strands of the literature. First, fol-
lowing Hsee and Weber (1997) and Faro and Rottenstreich (2006), we analyze the aggregated 
prediction of the group. We hypothesize that we will find an overall prediction bias in the 
sense that people overestimate the risk tolerance of others. As we analyze lotteries in the gain 
domain, we expect risk averse decisions for the own person. We hypothesize that we will find 
a prediction error in the sense that we expect inadequately high certainty equivalents when 
participants are asked to predict others’ preferences.  
Second, we analyze the predictions on an individual level. According to the literature on the 
false consensus effect, we hypothesize that we will find substantial variation in the individual 
predictions. Subject to the false consensus effect, people tend to be biased in their judgments 
about others. Thus, we expect subjects who state low certainty equivalents for the own person 
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to give low predictions for the average other as well. On the contrary, we expect subjects with 
high certainty equivalents to state high equivalents for others as well. 
Besides 50/50 probabilities, we also use ambiguous probabilities. This vague description of 
the probabilities implies greater latitude for construal (for a detailed explanation of ambiguity, 
see Ellsberg (1961)). With our study, we extend the scope of Gilovich (1990) to financial de-
cisions. Ambiguity is omnipresent in financial decisions; think of the future development of a 
stock price. Following Gilovich’s results, we hypothesize that we will find a higher false con-
sensus effect for the ambiguous lotteries than for the specific lotteries. 
3.2 Methodology 
We conducted a paper-based questionnaire (Study 1) as well as a computer-based question-
naire in our experimental lab (Study 2). 
3.2.1 Study 1 
The participants in the paper-based questionnaire were 84 students from the University of 
Mannheim attending the graduate course in banking. We have 23 female and 61 male partici-
pants who are between 19 and 31 years old. In the paper-based questionnaire, we use a with-
in-subject design. Participants first stated their own certainty equivalents and afterwards pre-
dicted the average choice of all participants. They were asked to consider hypothetical lottery 
questions. Lotteries consisted of a fifty-fifty chance of winning 100 or 0 Euro and a fifty-fifty 
chance of winning 200 or 50 Euro. The same outcomes were used for the ambiguous lotteries 
where subjects had no information about the probabilities except for them being between 0 
and 100 percent. To display probabilities, we used the classical illustration of an urn contain-
ing white and yellow balls (see Ellsberg (1961)). As an example, Figure 3.1 shows the first 
question of the questionnaire (the whole questionnaire is displayed in Appendix A). The in-
structions read as follows: The following lottery either pays 100 € or 0 €. Imagine an urn con-
taining 100 balls, 50 of them are yellow and 50 of them are white. One ball is drawn, if it is 
yellow the lottery pays 100 €, if it is white the lottery pays 0 €. All students answered the 
same questionnaire. They were first asked for their own certainty equivalent and subsequently 
for their prediction of the average certainty equivalent of all participants. The second question 
shows the same lottery but with ambiguous probabilities. Again students were supposed to 
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give their own certainty equivalent first and afterwards predict the average choice of all par-
ticipants. The instructions in this case are as follows: The following lottery either pays 100 € 
or 0 €. Imagine an urn containing 100 balls. The balls are of yellow and white color, but the 
proportions are unknown. One ball is drawn, if it is yellow the lottery pays 100 €, if it is white 
the lottery pays 0 €. Students answered the questionnaire in class during an exercise session. 
To motivate students to participate, we randomly drew 5 questionnaires and paid 10 Euro to 
the respective participants. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) show that incentives sometimes im-
prove performance, but often they do not. Moreover, we know from our course evaluations 
that students enjoy participating in experiments and questionnaires during the course. 
Figure 3.1: Extract from the paper-based questionnaire 
The figure shows an extract from the paper-based questionnaire for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 100 
with 50/50 probabilities. 
The following lottery either pays 100 € or 0 €. Imagine an urn containing 100 balls, 50 of 
them are yellow and 50 of them are white. One ball is drawn, if it is yellow the lottery pays 
100 €, if it is white the lottery pays 0 €. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state for which amount that you would receive for sure you would be indifferent be-
tween receiving the sure amount and playing the lottery.                    ________  € 
 
What do you think, for which amount the participants in this questionnaire (thus students 
attending the exercise course in Banking) are on average indifferent between receiving the 
sure amount and playing the lottery?          ________  € 
 
 
 
 
white ball 
yellow ball 
100 € 
0 € 
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3.2.2 Study 2 
Figure 3.2: Screenshot from the computer-based questionnaire 
The figure shows a screenshot for the computer-based questionnaire for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 
1000 with 50/50 probabilities. 
 
 
The participants in the computer-based questionnaire were 199 graduate and undergraduate 
students from the University of Mannheim from various schools. 75 of them were female as 
opposed to 124 males, in age between 18 and 35 years. Participants were randomly assigned 
to two different groups to allow a between-subject design, allowing us thus to control for or-
der effects. One group (group self) states own certainty equivalents in the beginning whereas 
another group predicts the average choice of all participants (group other). In addition, the 
group self afterwards was asked to predict the average and the group other was asked to state 
own preferences but they did not know this in advance when answering the first questions. 
Lotteries in the lab consisted of a fifty-fifty chance of winning 1000 or 0 Euro, a fifty-fifty 
chance of winning 200 or 0 Euro, and a fifty-fifty chance of winning 50 or 0 Euro. Again, the 
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same outcomes were used for the ambiguous lotteries. Figure 3.2 shows a screenshot of the 
first 50/50 lottery question in the group self.5
In the treatment other in the lab we also asked for an interval. Participants were asked to state 
a lower bound of the certainty equivalent that they think is not fallen short of by more than 5 
percent and also an upper bound that is not exceeded by more than 5 percent of the partici-
pants. Students received a flat payment of 5 Euro for their participation. We decided to have a 
flat payment in order to have the same incentive structure in the treatments self and other. 
Moreover, as mentioned before, we do not think that payment is crucial. 
 
3.3 Results and Discussion 
3.3.1 Analysis of Average Effects 
Descriptive statistics of the two studies are displayed in Table 3.1. People on average decide 
risk aversely and also show ambiguity aversion. For a risk averse person, the certainty equiva-
lent is lower than the expected value of the lottery because the person prefers to reduce uncer-
tainty; lower certainty equivalents correspond to higher risk aversion. An ambiguity averse 
person prefers known risks over unknown risks (see Ellsberg (1961)). Table 3.1 shows that 
certainty equivalents are on average lower than expected values of the lotteries and the cer-
tainty equivalents belonging to the lotteries with unknown probabilities are still lower than 
those with fifty-fifty probabilities. 
First, we want to test whether there is an effect on the level of the group (aggregated level). 
There is a clear standard for assessing the accuracy or inaccuracy of predictions: in case of an 
accurate prediction, the mean predicted certainty equivalent would be equal to the mean stated 
own certainty equivalent. Our questionnaire data follows somewhat skewed distributions. We 
will therefore use nonparametric tests of statistical significance. Looking at the paper-based 
questionnaire results in Panel A of Table 3.1, there is no overall prediction bias as in Hsee and 
Weber (1997) or in Faro and Rottenstreich (2006). Considering the mean (median), people do 
not seem to make a difference between stating own and evaluating others’ certainty equiva-
lents. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test of matched pairs shows that there are no significant dif-
ferences between the certainty equivalents for the own person and the predicted ones for the 
                                                 
5 To conduct the computer-based questionnaire, we used the software z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade 
Economic Experiments). 
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other participants. On average, people do not overestimate the willingness of others to take 
risks or predict them to be closer to risk neutrality than they actually are.  
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics  
The table shows descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum value, maximum 
value) of the certainty equivalents. Panel A states results for the paper-based questionnaire and Panel B 
for the computer-based questionnaire. In addition, own certainty equivalents (CE self) and predicted cer-
tainty equivalents (CE other) are compared. Wilcoxon matched pairs test states the probability that CE 
self equals CE other. 
Panel A: Paper-based Questionnaire (84 observations)
Lottery outcomes (€) (100,0) (200,50) (100,0) (200,50)
Probabilities (%) 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Certainty Equivalent Self
Mean 44.46 110.19 34.33 90.46
Median 50.00 113.50 30.00 90.00
Std.Dev. 12.94 23.82 21.40 31.93
Min. 20.00 50.00 0.00 20.00
Max. 80.00 170.00 100.00 200.00
Certainty Equivalent Other
Mean 42.55 106.82 35.12 90.06
Median 45.00 106.00 30.00 90.00
Std.Dev. 11.86 23.29 18.97 28.03
Min. 1.00 50.00 1.00 20.00
Max. 70.00 150.00 100.00 150.00
CE self > CE other 34 25 29 34
CE self < CE other 27 30 26 25
CE self = CE other 23 29 29 25
Wilcoxon matched pairs test not sig not sig not sig not sig
Panel B: Computer-based Questionnaire (199 observations)
Lottery outcomes (€) (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0) (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0)
Probabilities (%) 50/50 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? ?/?
Certainty Equivalent Self
Mean 440.33 93.37 25.99 362.48 81.61 23.00
Median 500.00 100.00 25.00 350.00 80.00 24.00
Std.Dev. 186.62 33.88 8.38 229.29 44.89 11.00
Min. 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 1.00 0.10
Max. 1000.00 200.00 50.00 1000.00 200.00 50.00
Certainty Equivalent Other
Mean 424.34 93.13 24.89 390.35 81.44 22.34
Median 500.00 100.00 25.00 400.00 80.00 20.00
Std.Dev. 164.70 28.19 7.64 226.99 39.69 9.79
Min. 20.00 10.00 3.00 10.00 2.00 1.00
Max. 1000.00 150.00 50.00 1000.00 200.00 50.00
CE self > CE other 66 64 75 69 75 77
CE self < CE other 62 62 41 79 77 60
CE self = CE other 71 73 83 51 47 62
Wilcoxon matched pairs test not sig not sig p<0.01 not sig not sig not sig  
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Our results may be compared with the third treatment in Hsee and Weber where participants 
were asked to predict preferences of the person sitting next to them in class. With this very 
concrete description of the other person, the prediction bias disappeared. We conducted our 
questionnaire during an exercise class and asked the students for their own certainty equiva-
lents and afterwards to predict the average choice of all participants. As the students were able 
to look around in the room at the other participants, it is likely that we find the same con-
creteness effect as in Hsee and Weber (1997). 
Panel B of Table 3.1 shows similar results for the computer-based questionnaire. As we do 
not find strong order effects (see Appendix B), we use all 199 observations regardless of 
whether participants stated their own certainty equivalents first or whether they predicted 
those of others first. Only one out of six differences between self and others is significant. For 
the 50/50 lottery (50,0), the participants are more risk seeking for the own person than for 
others. This is in line with Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) who find that people are closer to 
risk neutrality when evaluating certainty equivalents of others compared to their own. The 
other five differences are - like the differences in the paper-based questionnaire - not signifi-
cant. We hence cannot find evidence for an effect on the aggregated level. Again, this result is 
comparable to the third treatment of Hsee and Weber (1997). During the experiment, students 
were sitting in the lab together with other participants. Up to 20 students did the experiment at 
the same time. As in the classroom situation, they were thus able to look around and thereby 
get a concrete view of the other participants. 
3.3.2 Individual Level Analysis 
So far we found that the average predicted certainty equivalent is not significantly different 
from the average own certainty equivalent. But does this necessarily mean that individuals are 
also capable of making good predictions? 
The financial analyst Paul Johnson (2004) found an interesting effect. From 1995 to 1999, he 
asked his students (studying at the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University) to 
predict the winners in 12 Oscar categories. His results over the years have been pretty consis-
tent, in all but one year; the consensus view has never lost to the average individual student. 
For instance, in 1997 (a year in which 125 students voted) the average student was right on 
only 4.83 predictions, but the consensus got 11 out of 12 correct. The consensus seems to be a 
better predictor than an individual prediction, as the prediction mistakes cancel each other out. 
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In the following, we go beyond the aggregated analysis and also look at individual predic-
tions. We hypothesize that we will find a false consensus effect on the individual level. The 
more risk averse a person is herself, the more risk averse she evaluates others and - vice versa 
- a more risk seeking person sees others also as more risk seeking. To get a first idea of the 
data, we perform a median split of the data, thereby obtaining two halves, the relatively more 
risk averse whose certainty equivalent is smaller than the median and the relatively more risk 
seeking people who have a certainty equivalent greater than the median. 
Table 3.2: Median split 
The table shows the results of a median split of the data. Panel A states results for the paper-based ques-
tionnaire and Panel B for the computer-based questionnaire. The last column (Wilcoxon) states the prob-
ability the two subgroups are drawn from the same distribution. 
Observations equal to the median are dropped from the analysis (see Appendix C for an inclusion of these 
observations). 
Total (CE self < Median CE self) (CE self > Median CE self) Wilcoxon 
CE self CE other CE self CE other Obs. CE self CE other Obs. (p-value)
Panel A: Paper-based Questionnaire
Lottery (100,0)
50/50 Mean 44.46 42.55 33.73 37.33 40 63.29 52.50 14 <0.01
Median 50.00 45.00 35.00 40.00 60.00 50.00
?/? Mean 34.33 35.12 13.46 21.75 28 52.97 48.17 36 <0.01
Median 30.00 30.00 10.00 15.00 50.00 50.00
Lottery (200,50)
50/50 Mean 110.19 106.82 90.88 103.02 42 129.50 110.62 42 <0.06
Median 113.50 106.00 100.00 100.00 125.00 120.00
?/? Mean 90.46 90.06 64.35 70.43 40 119.58 111.06 36 <0.01
Median 90.00 90.00 65.00 70.00 120.00 114.00
Panel B: Computer-based Questionnaire
Lottery (1000,0)
50/50 Mean 440.33 424.34 292.74 375.87 91 674.65 454.43 40 <0.01
Median 500.00 500.00 350.00 400.00 650.00 500.00
?/? Mean 362.48 390.35 140.47 261.67 75 532.37 491.90 105 <0.01
Median 350.00 400.00 150.00 200.00 500.00 500.00
Lottery (200,0)
50/50 Mean 93.37 93.13 64.77 77.54 81 134.11 109.02 45 <0.01
Median 100.00 100.00 75.00 80.00 125.00 100.00
?/? Mean 81.61 81.44 43.32 60.51 88 118.15 101.16 93 <0.01
Median 80.00 80.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 100.00
50/50 Mean 25.99 24.89 21.21 20.54 58 34.10 28.87 69 <0.01
Median 25.00 25.00 20.00 20.00 30.00 25.00
?/? Mean 23.00 22.34 16.98 17.99 98 31.14 26.60 98 <0.01
Median 24.00 20.00 15.00 20.00 27.00 25.00
Lottery (50,0)
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Table 3.2 reveals first evidence for a false consensus effect. Panel A shows the results for the 
paper-based questionnaire and Panel B for the computer-based questionnaire. First, we per-
form a median split according to the stated own certainty equivalent.6 Second, we compare 
the predicted certainty equivalents for others given by the subgroups. P-values (for the Wil-
coxon rank-sum test)7
Despite the significant differences in the predicted certainty equivalents for others between 
the subgroups, the differences in the stated own certainty equivalents seem to be still higher. 
It hence seems to be the case that people adjust their own certainty equivalent when asked for 
a prediction of the average of all participants. We also compare the own certainty equivalents 
with the predicted certainty equivalents within the subgroups.
 stated in the last column test the hypothesis that the predictions of the 
two subgroups are the same. For the 50/50 lottery (100,0) the relatively risk averse group 
states a mean certainty equivalent for others of 37.33 (median 40.00). In contrast, the relative-
ly risk seeking group states a mean certainty equivalent of 52.50 (median 50.00). The differ-
ence is significant at the 1 percent level. This result is very robust as we also find significant 
differences in all of the other 9 lotteries. The relatively more risk averse people always give a 
more risk averse prediction compared to the risk seeking subgroup. 
8
                                                 
6 In Table 3.2, answers equal to the median drop out of the analysis. In some lotteries this is a considerable part, 
e.g. in the computer-based experiment when asked for the certainty equivalent for the 50/50 lottery (1000,0), 68 
participants gave the median answer 500 €. Nevertheless, the results remain unchanged if the median observa-
tions are added to the relatively more risk averse or to the relatively more risk seeking subgroup (see Appendix 
C). 
 For example, the relatively 
risk averse group in the questionnaire states a mean own certainty equivalent for the 50/50 
lottery (100,0) of 33.73 (median 35.00) while the mean predicted certainty equivalent is 37.33 
(median 40.00). The prediction is significantly higher than the own certainty equivalent at the 
5 percent level. The result that people adopt their own preferences is robust. In all but the am-
biguous (200,50) lottery within the risk averse subgroup, the prediction is significantly differ-
ent (at least at the 5 percent level) from the own certainty equivalent. The results in Panel B 
confirm the results from the paper-based questionnaire. The difference between own and pre-
dicted certainty equivalent in the relatively risk seeking subgroup for the ambiguous (1000,0) 
lottery is significant at the 5 percent level, all other differences are significant at the 1 percent 
level. In general, participants seem to make regressive predictions. More risk averse people 
7 We are not able to use the classical test of false consensus that Ross, Greene, and House (1977) define. This 
would be a test of the difference between the estimates of consensus for position A made by subjects who hold 
position A and the estimates of consensus for position A made by subjects who hold position B. As the certainty 
equivalent is a continuous variable with a lot more than two possible parameter values, we have to use different 
statistics in the following. 
8 P-Values (Wilcoxon signed-rank test of matched pairs) are not reported in the table. 
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estimate the average participant as less risk averse compared to themselves and the more risk 
seeking predict that others on average are less risk seeking and both groups are correct con-
cerning the direction of the adjustment. 
The median split is useful only for a first understanding of the data. In the following we will 
thus review the previous results with more sophisticated analyses. In addition, we investigate 
the influence of ambiguity. 
Figure 3.3: Plot of the (100,0) lottery  
The figure shows a plot of own (self) versus predicted (other) certainty equivalents for the lottery with 
outcomes 0 and 100. The hollow circles and the dashed regression line picture the prediction for the lot-
tery with 50/50 probabilities and the black squares and the solid regression line picture the prediction for 
the lottery with ?/? probabilities. 
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Figure 3.3 shows a plot of own and predicted certainty equivalents of the (100,0) lottery with 
50/50 probabilities and with ambiguous probabilities (for plots of the other lotteries, see Ap-
pendix D). In addition to the data points, regression lines for the 50/50 case and for the am-
biguous case are added to the figure. A flat regression line would indicate no false consensus 
effect at all, i.e. the prediction would be independent from the size of the own certainty 
equivalent whereas a slope of 1 would indicate a “perfect” false consensus effect, i.e. the pre-
diction would be equal to the own certainty equivalent. Both regression lines in the figure are 
not as steep as the 45-degree line, indicating that individuals adjust their own certainty 
equivalent in the right direction for the prediction of others. Nevertheless, the relatively more 
risk averse participants tend to predict the average other to be too risk averse and the rela-
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tively more risk seeking vice versa (positive slope of the regression lines). For the 50/50 
probabilities, the adjustment is stronger than for the ambiguous probabilities; the regression 
line is steeper in the latter case, suggesting that the own preferences are even more crucial if 
uncertainty is higher. 
Table 3.3: Correlation coefficients 
The table shows correlation coefficients of the own certainty equivalent with the predicted certainty 
equivalent. Panel A states results for the paper-based questionnaire and Panel B for the computer-based 
questionnaire. The last column compares the non-ambiguous to the ambiguous case. It states the probabil-
ity that correlations are the same. 
Probabilities (%) 50/50  ?/? Corr. equal?
Panel A: Paper-based Questionnaire (84 observations)
Lottery (100,0) 0.5447 0.7667 (p< 0.05)
Lottery (200,50) 0.2746 0.7266 (p< 0.01)
Panel B: Computer-based Questionnaire (199 observations)
Lottery (1000,0) 0.3212 0.5733 (p< 0.01)
Lottery (200,0) 0.4996 0.7124 (p< 0.01)
Lottery (50,0) 0.6463 0.7522 (p< 0.10)  
 
A correlation analysis confirms these results. Table 3.3 displays Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients. Panel A shows the lotteries of the paper-based questionnaire and Panel B those of the 
computer-based questionnaire. As expected, all correlations are significantly different from 0 
at the 1 percent level. This supports our hypothesis that a false consensus effect is present in 
financial decisions. The predictions of the average strongly depend on the own preferences. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that correlations between own and predicted certainty equiva-
lent are higher in the case of ambiguous lotteries. For example, the correlation in the (100,0) 
lottery with 50/50 probabilities is equal to 0.5447 while the correlation with ambiguous prob-
abilities is equal to 0.7667. The difference of the correlations with and without ambiguity is 
significant in all cases (paper-based as well as computer-based questionnaire); p-values are 
stated in the fourth column.9 It hence seems to be the case that in situations with higher uncer-
tainty (ambiguity), people rely more heavily on their own preference in order to predict cer-
tainty equivalents of other people.10
                                                 
9 We used the stata module “cortesti” by Herve M. Caci created in 2000. The test is an approximation (to be used 
when both samples are larger than 10). 
 
10 Unreported Spearman rank correlation coefficients show similar results. 
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To control for other effects, we use an OLS regression model and regress the predicted on the 
own certainty equivalent and further control variables. Table 3.4 shows the results for the pa-
per-based questionnaire. In the paper-based questionnaire, we control for gender (dummy: 1= 
male, 0 = female) and age. The results show that predictions are not driven by age (however, 
as the studies were performed with student participants, we have little variation in age in our 
dataset); gender is significant in only one regression. The age of the person thus cannot ex-
plain how someone predicts the average of others’ preferences. In the ambiguous (200,50) 
lottery, men predict a smaller certainty equivalent for the average other. This result does not 
contradict the frequent observation that women are in general more risk averse than men (see 
e.g. Dohmen et al. (2010a), Weber et al. (2002), or for a meta-analysis Byrnes et al. (1999)) 
because this is already included in the variable own certainty equivalent. It may simply be that 
our participants know about this observation and thus men adjust their own risk tolerance 
downwards because the whole group of participants consists of both women and men. An-
other reason for this adjustment may be that men perceive the average other to be less risk 
seeking compared to themselves because they consider risk seeking as an admirable charac-
teristic and at the same time they think they are better than others (risk-as-value hypothesis, 
see Hsee and Weber (1997)). Biernat et al. (1997) provide a similar explanation. They say that 
the false uniqueness effect is more likely to appear in judgments of talent, ability, or other 
desirable characteristics. If risk tolerance is such a desirable characteristic especially men may 
perceive their own high risk tolerance as relatively uncommon. For the own certainty equiva-
lent we find a highly significant coefficient in all regressions. In addition, the coefficient and 
the R-squared are higher for ambiguous predictions. This supports our hypothesis that the 
prediction depends on the own preference and that the influence of the own preference is es-
pecially strong for ambiguous situations. 
Table 3.5 shows the results for the computer-based questionnaire. Participants in the lab were 
asked to state gender, age, semester, and their subjective knowledge concerning financial 
markets. Moreover, we included a dummy considering order (0 = group “self” at the begin-
ning, 1 = group “other” at the beginning). Similar to the paper-based questionnaire, predic-
tions are not heavily driven by control variables. Age is significant only in the (200,0) lottery 
with ambiguous probabilities. For two lotteries, men stated lower predictions than women. A 
higher semester also leads to a lower prediction in two cases. Financial knowledge (self as-
sessment from 1 = very good to 6 = very bad) has a weakly significant effect in the (50,0) 
lottery with 50/50 probabilities. Order is significant for 3 lotteries in the sense that the pre-
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dicted certainty equivalent is lower if participants first predicted the average certainty equiva-
lent before they were asked to state their own certainty equivalent. For the other 3 lotteries, 
we do not find an influence of order. Biernat et al. (1997) find an influence of order but only 
if the form of judgment (objective versus subjective) changes between self-judgments and 
other-judgments. For the form we use in our study (objective self versus objective other), they 
do not find an effect of order. Again, the coefficient of the own certainty equivalent is highly 
significant for all predictions and the coefficients are higher for lotteries with ambiguous 
probabilities. 
Our main results from the regressions can be summarized as follows: We document a highly 
significant effect of the own certainty equivalent on prediction of others. Moreover, this effect 
seems to be stronger under ambiguity. 
Table 3.4: Regression results, single lotteries, paper-based questionnaire 
The table reports determinants of the predicted certainty equivalent (linear regression model OLS).  
Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 
10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
 Lottery (100,0) 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.6233 -3.4770
(2.5200) (3.0573)
Age 0.1022 0.5346
(0.5418) (0.6611)
Own CE 0.4992 0.4966 0.6797 0.6651
(0.0849)*** (0.0868)*** (0.0629)*** (0.0639)***
Constant 20.3532 18.4492 11.7823 1.8821
(3.9288)*** (13.7387) (2.5387)*** (15.8429)
Observations 84 84 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.2881 0.2711 0.5828 0.5814
 Lottery (200,50) 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -1.1746 -9.7995
(5.6197) (4.6871)**
Age -0.7991 -0.6655
(1.2164) (1.0220)
Own CE 0.2685 0.2708 0.6378 0.6380
(0.1038)** (0.1051)** (0.0666)*** (0.0657)***
Constant 77.2369 97.1545 32.3640 55.5530
(11.7004)*** (31.4117)*** (6.3849)*** (24.7655)**
Observations 84 84 84 84
Adjusted R2 0.0641 0.0469 0.5222 0.5401  
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Table 3.5: Regression results, single lotteries, computer-based questionnaire 
The table reports determinants of the predicted certainty equivalent (linear regression model OLS).  
Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 
10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
 Lottery (1000,0) 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -46.1384 -24.4010
(24.9462)* (30.3754)
Age 5.1042 3.0765
(5.7108) (6.9610)
Semester -2.5663 -3.1869
(5.2514) (6.3376)
Knowledge -18.4568 -9.1434
(10.6352)* (12.9579)
Order -44.4205 -56.8291
(22.3085)** (27.1557)**
Own CE 0.2835 0.3016 0.5531 0.5685
(0.0595)*** (0.0600)*** (0.0585)*** 0.0593)***
Constant 299.53 293.8568 189.88 205.0605
(28.4680)*** (117.3651)** (25.0740)*** (141.5260)
Observations 199 199 199 199
Adjusted R2 0.0986 0.1168 0.3086 0.3098
 Lottery (200,0) 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -7.1683 -4.0683
(4.0029)* (5.0227)
Age 1.0012 2.5320
(0.9159) (1.1577)**
Semester -1.5902 -1.3643
(0.8435)* (1.0497)
Knowledge -2.5309 -2.3452
(1.7061) (2.1448)
Order -4.3603 -10.3753
(3.5586) (4.4708)**
Own CE 0.3873 0.4134 0.5361 0.5564
(0.0525)*** (0.0529)*** (0.0501)*** (0.0502)***
Constant 56.9594 55.6570 37.6950 -0.0590
(5.2112)*** (18.9701)*** (4.6642)*** (23.9770)
Observations 199 199 199 199
Adjusted R2 0.2126 0.2265 0.3643 0.3822
 Lottery (50,0) 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.5713 1.5170
(1.0744) (1.2228)
Age 0.0070 0.3852
(0.2444) (0.2792)
Semester -0.1328 -0.4272
(-0.2242) (0.2551)*
Knowledge 0.1582 0.1304
(0.4577) (0.5220)
Order 0.5781 -0.3589
(0.9654) (1.0872)
Own CE 0.4611 0.4680 0.5647 0.5680
(0.0560)*** (0.0579)*** (0.0490)*** (0.0496)***
Constant 12.9057 13.0455 9.3514 1.8635
(1.5301)*** (5.0641)** (1.2491)*** (5.7787)
Observations 199 199 199 199
Adjusted R2 0.2519 0.2633 0.3994 0.3987  
 
Chapter 3: False Consensus and the Role of Ambiguity 35 
To include explicitly the effect of ambiguity in our regression analysis, we use combined re-
gressions with data from several lotteries (with and without ambiguity). We control for clus-
tering in participants. To aggregate the data in one regression, we cannot use the absolute val-
ues but need to normalize them. Predictions are normalized by the expected value of the lotte-
ries, so the dependent variable is given by 
valueectedexp
valueectedexpequivalentyintcertapredicted − . Ac-
cordingly, the own certainty equivalent as an independent variable is given by 
valueectedexp
valueectedexpequivalentown − . Thus, instead of the absolute certainty equivalents, we use 
the relative deviations from the expected value.11
Figure 3.4: Plot of combined lotteries, paper-based questionnaire  
  
The figure shows a plot of own (self) versus predicted (other) certainty equivalents (combination of 2 lot-
teries from the paper-based questionnaire, certainty equivalents normalized by the expected value). The 
hollow circles and the dashed regression line picture the prediction for the lotteries with 50/50 probabili-
ties and the black squares and the solid regression line picture the prediction for the lotteries with ?/? 
probabilities. 
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In a first step, the 50/50 lotteries and the ambiguous lotteries were aggregated in one respec-
tive regression. Results are stated in Panel A of Tables 3.6 (paper-based questionnaire) and 
3.7 (computer-based questionnaire). For demonstration purposes, Figure 3.4 shows a plot of 
                                                 
11 In addition, we perform a robustness check using the mean stated certainty equivalents instead of the expected 
values for normalization. Our basic results, i.e. the significant coefficients, do not change when we use the mean 
instead of the expected value. Thus, the specific form of the normalization does not seem to have a big impact on 
the results.  
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the normalized data from the paper-based questionnaire (see Appendix D for the same figure 
for the computer-based questionnaire). 
Table 3.6: Regression results, several lotteries, paper-based questionnaire 
The table reports determinants of the predicted certainty equivalent (normalized by the expected value, 
linear regression model OLS with clustering). Panel A: Separate regressions for 2 lotteries with 50/50 
probabilities and 2 lotteries with ambiguous probabilities. Panel B: Regressions with all 4 lotteries. 
Standard errors are adjusted for 84 participant clusters. They are reported underneath the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 
1% level by ***. 
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
Panel A: 2 Lotteries included
Lotteries 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.0166 -0.0742
(0.0385) (0.0424)*
Age -0.0022 0.0026
(0.0079) (0.0095)
Dummy Ambiguity
Own CE * Dummy Ambi
Own CE 0.4178 0.4160 0.6682 0.6582
(0.0840)*** (0.0857)*** (0.0724)*** (0.0725)***
Constant -0.0994 -0.0336 -0.0916 -0.1044
(0.0194)*** (0.1928) (0.0280)*** (0.2267)
Observations 168 168 168 168
R2 0.1983 0.2001 0.5721 0.5833
Panel B: 4 Lotteries included (50/50 and ?/? combined)
Gender -0.0139
(0.0215)
Age -0.0018
(0.0045)
Dummy Ambiguity -0.0341 0.1335 0.1327
(0.0202)* (0.0189)** (0.0188)**
Own CE * Dummy Ambi 0.6608 0.8239 0.8209
(0.0616)*** (0.0519)*** (0.0519)***
Own CE 0.6109 0.5948 0.2352 0.2057 0.2062
(0.0566)*** (0.0625)*** (0.0612)*** (0.0556)*** (0.0564)***
Constant -0.0928 -0.0791 -0.0744 -0.1237 -0.0710
(0.0194)*** (0.0192)* (0.0142)** (0.0189)*** (0.1096)
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
R2 0.4706 0.4742 0.6908 0.7314 0.7321  
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Table 3.7: Regression results, several lotteries, computer-based questionnaire 
The table reports determinants of the predicted certainty equivalent (normalized by the expected value, 
linear regression model OLS with clustering). Panel A: Separate regressions for 3 lotteries with 50/50 
probabilities and 3 lotteries with ambiguous probabilities. Panel B: Regressions with all 6 lotteries. 
Standard errors are adjusted for 199 participant clusters. They are reported underneath the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 
1% level by ***. 
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
Panel A: 3 Lotteries included
Lotteries 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.0647 -0.0096
(0.0333)* (0.0517)
Age 0.0073 0.0156
(0.0078) (0.0132)
Semester -0.0092 -0.0124
(0.0077) (0.0107)
Knowledge -0.0182 -0.0122
(0.0160) (0.0171)
Order -0.0414 -0.0771
(0.0307)* (0.0415)*
Dummy Ambiguity
Own CE * Dummy Ambi
Own CE 0.3881 0.3963 0.5521 0.5608
(0.0531)*** (0.0522)*** (0.0650)*** (0.0675)***
Constant -0.0559 -0.0524 -0.0712 -0.2738
(0.0151)*** (0.1464) (0.2660)*** (0.2388)
Observations 597 597 597 597
R2 0.1956 0.2119 0.3634 0.3766
Panel B: 6 Lotteries included (50/50 and ?/? combined)
Gender -0.0371
(0.0361)
Age 0.0114
(0.0092)
Semester -0.0108
(0.0079)
Knowledge -0.0152
(0.0142)
Order -0.0592
(0.0313)*
Dummy Ambiguity -0.0314 -0.0153 -0.0148
(0.0218) (0.0241) (0.0245)
Own CE * Dummy Ambi 0.1729 0.1640 0.1612
(0.0572)*** (0.0623)*** (0.0615)***
Own CE 0.4961 0.4901 0.3854 0.3881 0.3960
(0.0512)*** (0.0533)*** (0.0541)*** (0.0531)*** (0.0524)***
Constant -0.0660 -0.0510 -0.0631 -0.0559 -0.1550
(0.0175)*** (0.0152)*** (0.0175)*** (0.0151)*** (0.1711)
Observations 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194
R2 0.3055 0.3072 0.3145 0.3149 0.3265  
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Looking at the results from the paper-based questionnaire (Table 3.6, Panel A) gender yields a 
weakly significant effect in the regression with the ambiguous lotteries in the sense that men 
predict the average certainty equivalent to be smaller. Age has no explanatory power. In every 
regression the predicted certainty equivalent is highly significantly driven by the own certain-
ty equivalent. Moreover, the regression coefficient and the R-squared are higher for the ambi-
guous case. 
The results from the computer-based questionnaire (Table 3.7, Panel A) confirm the previous 
findings. For the 50/50 lotteries, men’s predictions are lower. Age has no significant influ-
ence. The predicted certainty equivalents are lower if participants first gave their prediction of 
the average before stating their own certainty equivalent. The order effect is even stronger 
than in the 50/50 regression. However, it is noteworthy that all independent significant va-
riables expect for the own certainty equivalent show only very low regression coefficients. A 
change in these variables thus does not have a strong effect on the predicted certainty equiva-
lent. The coefficient for the own certainty equivalent and the R-squared are again higher in 
ambiguous situations, i.e. a greater part of the prediction can be explained by the explanatory 
variables, especially by the own certainty equivalent.  
In Panel B of Tables 3.6 and 3.7, we aggregate all observations in a single regression and add 
dummy variables indicating whether ambiguity is involved or not.  
As the effects of own certainty equivalent and ambiguity do not need to be of a simple addi-
tive form, we also allow for interaction in our regression. The regression model (without con-
trol variables and residuals) is given by: 
DummyCECEDummyCE SSO **** 2121 ββαα +++=  or 
SO CEDummyDummyCE *)*(* 2121 ββαα +++= , 
with:  CEO: CE other: Predicted certainty equivalent (normalized by the expected value), 
CES: CE self: Own certainty equivalent (normalized by the expected value), 
Dummy: 1 for ambiguous predictions, 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors are adjusted for participant clusters. 
Again, we find highly significant coefficients for the own certainty equivalent. Adding a sim-
ple dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the ambiguous predictions and 0 otherwise reveals 
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an effect in the paper-based questionnaire data only (see Table 3.6, Panel B). However, the 
interaction term is highly significant (on the 1 percent level) for both questionnaires regard-
less of whether the simple dummy is included in the regression or not. The coefficient of the 
interaction term captures the difference in prediction power of the own certainty equivalent. 
This prediction power is significantly higher for ambiguous lotteries. The coefficient for the 
own certainty equivalent is now given by )*( 21 Dummyββ + , so in lotteries with fixed prob-
abilities it is just 1β  but for ambiguous lotteries the coefficient is equal to 21 ββ + . The pre-
dicted certainty equivalent is thus higher if the own certainty equivalent is higher, and with 
ambiguity, this relationship is even stronger. 
The constant term in the regression is given by Dummy*21 αα + ; it is simply 1α  for the 50/50 
probabilities and 21 αα +  for the ambiguous cases. 2α  is significant for the paper-based data 
only (see Table 3.6, Panel B, columns 5 and 6), the constant term is higher with ambiguity. 
For the lab data 2α  is not significant (see Table 3.7, Panel B, columns 5 and 6). 
To summarize our results, the previous analyses very clearly show that the false consensus 
effect is present also in financial decisions. Even if the group seems to be able to give a good 
prediction, the predictions of a single individual are egocentrically biased. We confirm the 
results from earlier studies (e.g. Carlson (1990), Nickerson (1999), or Epley et al. (2004)) 
finding that people are able to adjust from own preferences, but at the same time these ad-
justments are insufficient. Participants in our studies seem to be aware of the fact that they are 
more or less risk seeking than the average and adjust their own certainty equivalent in the 
right direction. Thus, the prediction is not equal to the own certainty equivalent but the ad-
justment is still insufficient.  
In addition, we extend the scope of Gilovich (1990) to a financial context. Gilovich finds a 
greater false consensus effect in situations with greater latitude for subjective construal. In our 
analysis, the egocentric bias is stronger for the case of ambiguous lotteries. If the level of un-
certainty increases, participants seem to rely more heavily on the own preferences when asked 
to predict average preferences. 
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3.4 Interval Analysis 
In this section, we report the results from the interval predictions. In the computer-based ques-
tionnaire participants were asked to state a lower bound that they think is not fallen short of 
by more than 5 percent of the participants and also an upper bound that is not exceeded by 
more than 5 percent. We are interested if people are aware of the variety of others’ prefe-
rences. Are they able to imagine that others might have absolutely different preferences com-
pared to their own? It may be that they are wrong in predicting the average but aware of the 
range of preferences. In contrast, it may also be the case that they are right in predicting the 
average but fail to imagine individual differences. 
Figure 3.5 shows a histogram of stated certainty equivalents for the 50/50 lottery (1000,0). 
The vertical lines include the true 90 percent interval. The true lower bound is 50 and the true 
upper bound is 750. Histograms of the other lotteries can be found in Appendix E. 
Figure 3.5: Histogram of own certainty equivalents, (1000,0) lottery with 50/50 prob-
abilities 
The figure illustrates the distribution of own certainty equivalents for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 
1000 with 50/50 probabilities. The vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (50-750). 
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Figure 3.6 shows the predicted intervals by the participants for the 50/50 lottery (1000,0). The 
intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to high). If 
several participants state the same own certainty equivalent, the interval predictions are dis-
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played side by side instead of one upon the other. Figures for the other lotteries are included 
in Appendix E. 
Figure 3.6: Twoway graph of predicted 90 percent intervals, (1000,0) lottery with 50/50 
probabilities  
The figure illustrates the predicted 90 percent intervals for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 1000 with 
50/50 probabilities. 
The intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to high). The hori-
zontal lines indicate the true 90 percent interval (50-750). 
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Table 3.8 summarizes the results for all six lotteries. The table displays the true 90 percent 
interval and the predicted lower and upper bounds. The bottom of the table displays the pro-
portion of correct estimates. As an example, take the 50/50 lottery (1000,0). The true 90 per-
cent interval ranges from 50 to 750. The average predicted lower bound is 239.75 (median 
200), and the average predicted upper bound is 646.11 (median 600). Only 29 of 199 partici-
pants predicted the lower bound to be equal or below 50. 74 participants stated an upper 
bound equal to or above 750. Only 11 participants were able to state a lower bound low 
enough and at the same time an upper bound high enough, i.e. to give an interval that contains 
the true 90 percent interval. 
The true 90 percent intervals are larger for the ambiguous lotteries; for the (1000,0) lottery 
only the upper bound is higher, for the other two lotteries the upper bounds are higher and 
simultaneously the lower bounds are lower for the ambiguous lottery. This is in line with the 
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descriptive statistics (see Table 3.1). In the case of ambiguity, the standard deviation is higher 
for the stated own certainty equivalents as well as for predicted certainty equivalents. 
The results obviously show that the vast majority is not able to predict the variation in others’ 
certainty equivalents correctly. Others are predicted to be too consistent in their decisions; the 
90 percent intervals are too tight. The effect is slightly stronger for ambiguous predictions. 
Table 3.8: 90 percent intervals 
The table shows true and predicted 90 percent intervals, i.e. lower and upper bounds. 
The first part shows true bounds, the second states the mean and median predictions. The last part gives 
the number (and percentage) of correct predictions (lower bound correct, i.e. low enough, upper bound 
correct, i.e. high enough, both bounds correct). 
Computer-based Questionnaire (199 observations)
Lottery outcomes (€) (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0) (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0)
Probabilities (%) 50/50 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? ?/?
Lower bound 50 25 10 50 10 5
Upper bound 750 150 40 800 188 50
Prediction 90 percent interval
Lower bound mean 239.75 53.37 14.84 203.87 44.55 12.37
Lower bound median 200 50 15 150 40 10
Upper bound mean 646.11 137.28 35.31 632.95 131.68 35.47
Upper bound median 600 140 35 600 125 35
Prediction correct?
Lower bound 29 (14.57%) 49 (24.62%) 88 (44.22%) 54 (27.14%) 39 (19.60%) 64 (32.16%)
Upper bound 74 (37.19%) 93 (46.73%) 80 (40.20%) 64 (32.16%) 28 (14.07%) 27 (13.57%)
Both 11 (5.53%) 21 (10.55%) 35 (17.59%) 12 (6.03%) 9 (4.52%) 7 (3.52%)
True 90 percent interval
 
 
Table 3.9 displays the results of the regression analysis. The structure of the table is analog-
ous to Table 3.5 but this time the dependent variables are predicted lower and upper bounds 
instead of predicted average certainty equivalents. Again, the own certainty equivalent is a 
highly significant explanatory variable. The higher the own certainty equivalent, the higher 
the predicted lower and upper bounds. Again, the effect seems to be greater in situations with 
ambiguity as the regression coefficient of the own certainty equivalent as well as the adjusted 
R-squared are higher in ambiguous situations.  
We also perform a regression analysis with the total size of the interval (upper bound - lower 
bound) as the dependent variable (results are not reported). We cannot find a significant effect 
of the own certainty equivalent on the total size of the interval. 
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Table 3.9: Regression results, lower and upper bounds, single lotteries 
The table reports determinants of the predicted lower and upper bounds (linear regression model OLS). 
Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 
10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
 Lottery (1000,0) Lower bound Upper bound
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -33.8767 -35.1811 -105.7721 -19.2885
(24.7856) (27.3241) (36.2247)*** (34.7715)
Age -0.2500 7.9861 16.9950 -5.0586
(5.6740) (6.2618) (8.2927)** (7.9685)
Semester -1.2204 -6.5716 -8.4151 5.3848
(5.2176) (5.7010) (7.6256) (7.2548)
Knowledge -22.3995 -9.1407 -9.9690 5.3234
(10.5668)** (11.6562) (15.4436) (14.8332)
Order -7.3730 -26.5674 -73.1291 -78.2999
(22.1648) (24.4279) (32.3944)** (31.0858)**
Own CE 0.1173 0.1208 0.3708 0.3838 0.2717 0.3184 0.4466 0.4642
(0.0586)** (0.0596)** (0.0525)*** (0.0533)*** (0.0881)*** (0.0871)*** (0.0675)*** (0.0679)***
Constant 188.1038 291.2794 69.4733 -18.0166 526.4613 292.4890 471.0715 587.2674
(28.0190)*** (116.6093)** (22.4834)*** (127.3095) (42.1365)*** (170.4271)* (28.9146)*** (162.0085)***
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199
Adjusted R2 0.0150 0.0165 0.1982 0.1945 0.0412 0.0958 0.1778 0.1912
 Lottery (200,0) Lower bound Upper bound
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -13.5292 -2.4383 -9.5377 -3.4628
(4.6558)*** (4.9438) (5.8122) (6.1002)
Age -0.5167 1.6518 1.5745 1.4060
(1.0653) (1.1396) (1.3299) (1.4061)
Semester -0.8017 -1.0655 -1.4270 0.1204
(0.9811) (1.0332) (1.2248) (1.2749)
Knowledge -4.8133 0.9612 1.1515 0.9565
(1.9844)** (2.1112) (2.4773) (2.6050)
Order 2.5484 0.4594 -10.6736 -16.5047
(4.1390) (4.4006) (5.1671)** (5.4300)***
Own CE 0.2971 0.3166 0.3882 0.4007 0.3860 0.4162 0.4195 0.4433
(0.0615)*** (0.0615)*** (0.0484)*** (0.0494)*** (0.0764)*** (0.0768)*** (0.0612)*** (0.0610)***
Constant 25.6296 38.0452 12.8701 -21.8121 101.2382 78.9073 97.4495 69.4424
(6.1060)*** (22.0643)* (4.5013)*** (23.6005) (7.5911)*** (27.5448)*** (5.6928)*** (29.1209)**
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199
Adjusted R2 0.1014 0.1301 0.2426 0.2344 0.1101 0.1314 0.1887 0.2193
 Lottery (50,0) Lower bound Upper bound
50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/?
Gender -0.9379 1.2455 -2.6568 2.2452
(1.3634) (1.3251) (1.3018)** (1.4163)
Age -0.2460 0.2828 0.1225 0.1078
(0.3101) (0.3026) (0.2961) (0.3234)
Semester 0.0597 -0.2474 -0.1120 -0.0215
(0.2845) (0.2764) (0.2716) (0.2955)
Knowledge 0.0105 0.5872 0.5148 1.0223
(0.5808) (0.5657) (0.5545) (0.6047)*
Order 2.9916 1.9034 -0.6318 -1.0801
(1.2251)** (1.1782) (1.1698) (1.2593)
Own CE 0.2862 0.3150 0.4150 0.4224 0.4265 0.4041 0.4341 0.4436
(0.0722)*** (0.0734)*** (0.0533)*** (0.0537)*** (0.0690)*** (0.0701)*** (0.0568)*** (0.0574)***
Constant 7.4004 11.0535 2.8227 -5.9198 24.2234 23.1387 25.4898 19.0449
(1.9697)*** (6.4261)* (1.3575)** (6.2622) (1.8838)*** (6.1357)*** (1.4480)*** (6.6935)***
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199
Adjusted R2 0.0693 0.0815 0.2316 0.2352 0.1581 0.1719 0.2246 0.2250  
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Table 3.10: Regression results, lower and upper bounds, several lotteries 
The table reports determinants of the predicted lower and upper bounds (normalized by the expected 
value, linear regression model OLS with clustering). 
Panel A shows the results for the lower bound, Panel B for the upper bound. Standard errors are adjusted 
for 199 participant clusters. They are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients 
significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
Panel A: Lower bound (50/50 and ?/? combined)
Gender -0.0487
(0.0410)
Age 0.0065
(0.0104)
Semester -0.0071
(0.0087)
Knowledge -0.0127
(0.0173)
Order 0.0237
(0.0351)
Dummy Ambiguity -0.0423 -0.0275 -0.0280
(0.0201)** (0.0233) (0.0237)
Own CE * Dummy Ambi 0.1666 0.1507 0.1439
(0.0529)*** (0.0592)** (0.0599)**
Own CE 0.3436 0.3355 0.2368 0.2417 0.2478
(0.0490)*** (0.0511)*** (0.0557)*** (0.0553)*** (0.0566)***
Constant -0.4683 -0.4481 -0.4655 -0.4526 -0.6027
(0.0203)*** (0.0193)*** (0.0203)*** (0.0193)*** (0.2154)***
Observations 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194
R2 0.1631 0.1666 0.1724 0.1738 0.1804
Panel B: Upper bound (50/50 and ?/? combined)
Gender -0.0663
(0.0447)
Age 0.0106
(0.0113)
Semester -0.0040
(0.0109)
Knowledge 0.0125
(0.0196)
Order -0.1081
(0.0417)**
Dummy Ambiguity 0.0292 0.0368 0.0389
(0.0225) (0.0235) (0.0238)
Own CE * Dummy Ambi 0.0563 0.0775 0.0877
(0.0639) (0.0657) (0.0645)
Own CE 0.4096 0.4152 0.3735 0.3670 0.3694
(0.0467)*** (0.0476)*** (0.0632)*** (0.0622)*** (0.0612)***
Constant 0.3933 0.3793 0.3942 0.3770 0.0829
(0.0197)*** (0.0219)*** (0.0197)*** (0.0220)*** (0.2243)
Observations 1194 1194 1194 1194 1194
R2 0.1580 0.1592 0.1588 0.1605 0.1876  
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To test whether the influence of ambiguity is significant for predicting the interval, we use 
combined regressions again with data from all six lotteries (see Table 3.10). The regression 
models (analogous to Table 3.7, Panel B) are given by: 
S2121O CE*)Dummy*(Dummy*LB ββαα +++=  (Panel A) and 
S2121O CE*)Dummy*(Dummy*UB ββαα +++=  (Panel B), 
with:  LBO: LB other: Predicted lower bound of others’ certainty equivalents (normalized by 
the expected value), 
UBO: UB other: Predicted upper bound of others’ certainty equivalents (normalized by 
the expected value), 
Dummy: 1 for ambiguous predictions, 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors are adjusted for participant clusters. 
As expected, the influence of the own certainty equivalent is highly significant for the pre-
dicted lower (Panel A of Table 3.10) as well as for the predicted upper bound (Panel B of Ta-
ble 3.10). Adding a simple dummy variable that is 1 for ambiguous predictions and 0 other-
wise yields a significant effect only for the predicted lower bound. This effect is not robust to 
the inclusion of the interaction term. The model including the interaction term shows that the 
influence of the own certainty equivalent on the lower bound is higher for the ambiguous 
case, i.e. 2β  is significant. The effect is also robust to the inclusion of control variables. For 
the upper bound, a simple ambiguity dummy and an interaction term have no significant ex-
planatory power. The predicted upper bound is lower if participants first gave a prediction of 
other certainty equivalent as well as an interval prediction before stating their own certainty 
equivalent. 
The results from the interval analysis can be summarized as follows. People are not able to 
correctly estimate the variance of others’ risk preferences. The participants in our studies 
make overconfident predictions, i.e. the predicted 90 percent intervals are much too tight (we 
refer to overconfidence as “miscalibration”, for the different forms of overconfidence see e.g. 
Glaser et al. (2005)). The finding that people specify too narrow intervals is in line with the 
literature. Dunning et al. (1990) ask people to predict the range of others’ responses to various 
situations and find that people are overconfident in both self and social predictions. Vallone et 
al. (1990) confirm these results in a follow-up study. In addition to the finding that intervals 
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are too tight, we find that the relatively more risk averse people give smaller lower as well as 
smaller upper bounds and the relatively more risk seeking people give higher lower and upper 
bounds. There is at least the tendency that the influence of the own certainty equivalent is 
stronger in ambiguous situations. 
3.5 Conclusion 
We analyze predictions of others’ risk preferences in two studies, a paper-based and a com-
puter-based questionnaire. 
In contrast to Hsee and Weber (1997) in their first two treatments and Faro and Rottenstreich 
(2006), we do not find an effect on the aggregated level. In both studies, our participants as a 
group are able to predict the average preference of all participants quite well. The group pre-
diction (that is the average of the individual predictions) is not significantly different from the 
true average certainty equivalent.  
On the individual level, we find strong evidence for a false consensus effect in financial pref-
erences. Participants suffer from an egocentric bias when making predictions of others’ pref-
erences; their predictions are highly correlated with their own preferences. Nevertheless, the 
correlation is less than 1, indicating that people are to some extent aware of their egocentric 
bias. Our participants adjust their own preferences in the correct direction, but their adjust-
ment is not strong enough. We find that relatively more risk averse people adjust their predic-
tion in the right direction, i.e. they predict the average certainty equivalent to be higher than 
their own certainty equivalent. Still, this prediction is too risk averse, i.e. the predicted cer-
tainty equivalent is too low. On the contrary, the relatively more risk seeking subjects predict 
that others are relatively more risk averse compared to themselves and they are right. But 
again, the adjustment is not strong enough; the prediction is still too risk seeking. With our 
findings, we confirm the results from previous studies (see e.g. Carlson (1990), Gilovich et al. 
(1998, 2000), Nickerson (1999), or Epley et al. (2004)). 
Moreover, our study extends the scope of Gilovich (1990) to financial decisions as we do not 
only analyze 50/50 lotteries but also lotteries with ambiguous probabilities. As expected, we 
find the false consensus effect to be even stronger for these ambiguous lotteries. The explana-
tory power of the own preference is higher for lotteries with ambiguous probabilities. 
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In the computer-based questionnaire, we also asked participants to state a 90 percent interval. 
Only very few participants are able to state a correct interval. The majority makes overconfi-
dent predictions, i.e. their intervals are too tight. Again, we find a significant influence of the 
own preference. The higher the own certainty equivalent, the higher the predicted lower and 
upper bounds. For ambiguous lotteries, the influence of the own certainty equivalent tends to 
be stronger. 
In practice, assessing the real preferences of people whom one does not know or assessing the 
average individual is quite a common task. Think of a fund manager investing money for a 
group of investors or of a medical firm that develops a new medicine and has to decide on the 
trade-off between efficiency and adverse effects. If individuals have difficulties to abstract 
from their own risk preference, this leads to an egocentrically biased prediction of others’ 
preferences and decisions on behalf of others may be suboptimal. The inability to estimate the 
spread in others’ preferences correctly could also lead to practical problems. For a financial 
advisor, for example, this underestimation of variety of opinions could lead to a too standard-
ized advice concept. 
The finding that the egocentric bias is stronger in situations with higher uncertainty is espe-
cially important for financial decisions as in the real world the majority of these decisions 
imply a high degree of uncertainty (risky outcomes, risky probabilities, risky environment 
(e.g. legal regulation) etc.). Thus, a person acting on behalf of another in financial affairs, e.g. 
a financial advisor or a fund manager has to be especially careful. A systematic adjustment of 
the own preference is essential in order to decide in the best interest of the clients. 
As ambiguity is omnipresent in financial decisions, an interesting follow-up study to our work 
could clarify its exact influence. What is the reason behind the egocentric bias being higher in 
ambiguous situations? Gilovich (1990) attributes his findings to a particular interpretation of 
an ambiguous stimulus. In our setting it may be the same underlying process, i.e. participants 
project the particular interpretation of the probabilities, but it could also be a projection of 
their feelings about ambiguous probabilities, or both. One possible way to find out about dif-
ferent interpretations would be to ask participants to state their “best guess” of the ambiguous 
probabilities. 
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3.6 Appendix A: Paper-Based Questionnaire 
The following section provides a translation of the cover letter and the paper-based question-
naire. Cover letter and questionnaire were originally in German. 
Dear participants, 
 
Before starting with the questionnaire please carefully read the following instructions. 
 
In the questionnaire we will show you different lotteries. We will ask you for indifference 
statements. 
Indifference between two alternatives means that you do not care which of the alternatives 
you receive. For example, image you sit in front of two sundaes, one with strawberry the oth-
er one with vanilla ice cream. If you don’t care which sundae you get you are indifferent be-
tween the alternatives strawberry sundae and vanilla sundae. 
Hence indifference between a lottery and a payment for sure means that you do not care if you 
play the lottery (and get the resulting outcome) or if you receive the payment for sure.  
 
As a thank you for taking part in our survey, we randomly draw 5 participants who receive 10 
€ each.  
 
If you want to take part in the drawing please fill in your matriculation number. 
Matriculation number: _______________ 
This cover sheet will be removed before the analysis. We assure that your data is analyzed 
anonymously. 
 
 
Thank you very much for your assistance and enjoy the questionnaire. 
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The following lottery either pays 100 € or 0 €. Imagine an urn containing 100 balls, 50 of 
them are yellow and 50 of them are white. One ball is drawn, if it is yellow the lottery pays 
100 €, if it is white the lottery pays 0 €. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state for which amount that you would receive for sure you would be indifferent be-
tween receiving the sure amount and playing the lottery.                 ________  € 
 
What do you think, for which amount the participants in this questionnaire (thus students 
attending the exercise course in Banking) are on average indifferent between receiving the 
sure amount and playing the lottery?          ________  € 
 
 
The following lottery either pays 100 € or 0 €. Imagine an urn containing 100 balls. The balls 
are of yellow and white color, but the proportions are unknown. One ball is drawn, if it is 
yellow the lottery pays 100 €, if it is white the lottery pays 0 €. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state for which amount that you would receive for sure you would be indifferent be-
tween receiving the sure amount and playing the lottery.                    ________  € 
 
What do you think, for which amount the participants in this questionnaire (thus students 
attending the exercise course in Banking) are on average indifferent between receiving the 
sure amount and playing the lottery?          ________  € 
white ball 
yellow ball 
100 € 
0 € 
white ball 
yellow ball 
100 € 
0 € 
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The following lottery either pays 200 € or 50 €. Imagine an urn containing 100 balls, 50 of 
them are yellow and 50 of them are white. One ball is drawn, if it is yellow the lottery pays 
200 €, if it is white the lottery pays 50 €. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state for which amount that you would receive for sure you would be indifferent be-
tween receiving the sure amount and playing the lottery.                    ________  € 
 
What do you think, for which amount the participants in this questionnaire (thus students 
attending the exercise course in Banking) are on average indifferent between receiving the 
sure amount and playing the lottery?          ________  € 
 
 
The following lottery either pays 200 € or 50 €. Imagine an urn containing 100 balls. The 
balls are of yellow and white color, but the proportions are unknown. One ball is drawn, if 
it is yellow the lottery pays 200 €, if it is white the lottery pays 50 €. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state for which amount that you would receive for sure you would be indifferent be-
tween receiving the sure amount and playing the lottery.                    ________  € 
 
What do you think, for which amount the participants in this questionnaire (thus students 
attending the exercise course in Banking) are on average indifferent between receiving the 
sure amount and playing the lottery?          ________  € 
white ball 
yellow ball 
200 € 
50 € 
white ball 
yellow ball 
200 € 
50 € 
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Some final questions about you: 
 
Gender: 
female  
male 
 
Age: __________  years 
 
Line of studies: ________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your assistance! 
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3.7 Appendix B: Order Effects 
The table shows differences in certainty equivalents subject to the order of the questions (self before oth-
er: predictions follow statements of own certainty equivalents, other before self: statements of own cer-
tainty equivalents follow predictions). Panel A shows differences in stated own certainty equivalents, 
Panel B in predicted certainty equivalents. 
Computer-based Questionnaire (199 observations)
Lottery outcomes (€) (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0) (1000,0) (200,0) (50,0)
Probabilities (%) 50/50 50/50 50/50 ?/? ?/? ?/?
Panel A: Certainty Equivalent Self
self before other
Mean 419.83 91.38 27.52 336.17 79.77 23.17
Median 500.00 100.00 25.00 300.00 75.00 22.50
Std.Dev. 184.50 30.50 9.23 250.69 48.61 12.19
Min. 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 2.00 0.50
Max. 1000.00 200.00 50.00 1000.00 200.00 50.00
other before self
Mean 457.95 95.08 24.67 385.10 83.19 22.85
Median 500.00 100.00 25.00 400.00 85.00 25.00
Std.Dev. 187.48 36.59 7.35 207.69 41.59 9.92
Min. 0.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 1.00 0.10
Max. 1000.00 200.00 50.00 1000.00 200.00 50.00
Wilcoxon rank-sum test not sig not sig p<0.10 p<0.05 not sig not sig
Panel B: Certainty Equivalent Other
self before other
Mean 442.42 94.39 25.28 405.67 85.79 22.49
Median 500.00 100.00 25.00 400.00 80.00 20.00
Std.Dev. 161.13 31.67 8.15 241.17 43.85 10.21
Min. 50.00 20.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.00
Max. 1000.00 200.00 50.00 1000.00 200.00 50.00
other before self
Mean 408.79 92.04 24.56 377.18 77.71 22.21
Median 500.00 100.00 25.00 400.00 75.00 20.00
Std.Dev. 166.90 24.92 7.19 214.32 35.52 9.46
Min. 20.00 10.00 3.00 10.00 2.00 1.00
Max. 750.00 150.00 50.00 1000.00 200.00 50.00
Wilcoxon rank-sum test not sig not sig not sig not sig not sig not sig  
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3.8 Appendix C: Median Split 
The table shows the results of a median split of the data. Panel A states results for the paper-based ques-
tionnaire and Panel B for the computer-based questionnaire. The last column (Wilcoxon) states the prob-
ability the two subgroups are drawn from the same distribution. Observations equal to the median are in-
cluded in the first group.  
Total (CE self ≤ Median CE self) (CE self > Median CE self) Wilcoxon 
CE self CE other CE self CE other Obs. CE self CE other Obs. (p-value)
Panel A: Paper-based Questionnaire
Lottery (100,0)
50/50 Mean 44.46 42.55 40.70 40.56 70 63.29 52.50 14 <0.01
Median 50.00 45.00 40.00 40.00 60.00 50.00
?/? Mean 34.33 35.12 20.35 25.33 48 52.97 48.17 36 <0.01
Median 30.00 30.00 25.00 21.00 50.00 50.00
Lottery (200,50)
50/50 Mean 110.19 106.82 90.88 103.02 42 129.50 110.62 42 <0.06
Median 113.50 106.00 100.00 100.00 125.00 120.00
?/? Mean 90.46 90.06 68.63 74.31 48 119.58 111.06 36 <0.01
Median 90.00 90.00 70.00 70.50 120.00 114.00
Panel B: Computer-based Questionnaire
Lottery (1000,0)
50/50 Mean 440.33 424.34 381.38 416.77 159 674.65 454.43 40 <0.08
Median 500.00 500.00 444.00 500.00 650.00 500.00
?/? Mean 362.48 390.35 172.71 276.91 94 532.37 491.90 105 <0.01
Median 350.00 400.00 200.00 250.00 500.00 500.00
Lottery (200,0)
50/50 Mean 93.37 93.13 81.47 88.48 154 134.11 109.02 45 <0.01
Median 100.00 100.00 90.00 100.00 125.00 100.00
?/? Mean 81.61 81.44 49.55 64.15 106 118.15 101.16 93 <0.01
Median 80.00 80.00 50.00 60.00 100.00 100.00
50/50 Mean 25.99 24.89 23.31 23.99 130 34.10 28.87 69 <0.01
Median 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 30.00 25.00
?/? Mean 23.00 22.34 17.18 18.20 101 31.14 26.60 98 <0.01
Median 24.00 20.00 15.00 20.00 27.00 25.00
Lottery (50,0)
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The table shows the results of a median split of the data. Panel A states results for the paper-based ques-
tionnaire and Panel B for the computer-based questionnaire. The last column (Wilcoxon) states the prob-
ability the two subgroups are drawn from the same distribution. Observations equal to the median are in-
cluded in the second group.  
Total (CE self < Median CE self) (CE self ≥ Median CE self) Wilcoxon 
CE self CE other CE self CE other Obs. CE self CE other Obs. (p-value)
Panel A: Paper-based Questionnaire
Lottery (100,0)
50/50 Mean 44.46 42.55 33.73 37.33 40 54.23 47.30 44 <0.01
Median 50.00 45.00 35.00 40.00 50.00 50.00
?/? Mean 34.33 35.12 13.46 21.75 28 44.77 41.80 56 <0.01
Median 30.00 30.00 10.00 15.00 40.00 40.00
Lottery (200,50)
50/50 Mean 110.19 106.82 90.88 103.02 42 129.50 110.62 42 <0.06
Median 113.50 106.00 100.00 100.00 125.00 120.00
?/? Mean 90.46 90.06 64.35 70.43 40 114.20 107.91 44 <0.01
Median 90.00 90.00 65.00 70.00 100.00 105.00
Panel B: Computer-based Questionnaire
Lottery (1000,0)
50/50 Mean 440.33 424.34 292.74 375.87 91 564.69 465.19 108 <0.01
Median 500.00 500.00 350.00 400.00 500.00 500.00
?/? Mean 362.48 390.35 140.47 261.67 75 496.77 468.19 124 <0.01
Median 350.00 400.00 150.00 200.00 500.00 450.00
Lottery (200,0)
50/50 Mean 93.37 93.13 64.77 77.54 81 113.01 103.82 118 <0.01
Median 100.00 100.00 75.00 80.00 100.00 100.00
?/? Mean 81.61 81.44 43.32 60.51 88 111.96 98.04 111 <0.01
Median 80.00 80.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 100.00
50/50 Mean 25.99 24.89 21.21 20.54 58 29.45 27.79 141 <0.01
Median 25.00 25.00 20.00 20.00 25.00 25.00
?/? Mean 23.00 22.34 16.98 17.99 98 30.93 26.55 101 <0.01
Median 24.00 20.00 15.00 20.00 26.00 25.00
Lottery (50,0)
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3.9 Appendix D: Lottery Plots 
The figure shows a plot of own (self) versus predicted (other) certainty equivalents for the lottery with 
outcomes 200 and 50. The hollow circles and the dashed regression line picture the prediction for the lot-
tery with 50/50 probabilities and the black squares and the solid regression line picture the prediction for 
the lottery with ?/? probabilities. 
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The figure shows a plot of own (self) versus predicted (other) certainty equivalents for the lottery with 
outcomes 1000 and 0. The hollow circles and the dashed regression line picture the prediction for the lot-
tery with 50/50 probabilities and the black squares and the solid regression line picture the prediction for 
the lottery with ?/? probabilities. 
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The figure shows a plot of own (self) versus predicted (other) certainty equivalents for the lottery with 
outcomes 200 and 0. The hollow circles and the dashed regression line picture the prediction for the lot-
tery with 50/50 probabilities and the black squares and the solid regression line picture the prediction for 
the lottery with ?/? probabilities. 
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The figure shows a plot of own (self) versus predicted (other) certainty equivalents for the lottery with 
outcomes 50 and 0. The hollow circles and the dashed regression line picture the prediction for the lottery 
with 50/50 probabilities and the black squares and the solid regression line picture the prediction for the 
lottery with ?/? probabilities. 
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The figure shows a plot of own (self) versus predicted (other) certainty equivalents (combination of 3 lot-
teries from the computer-based questionnaire, certainty equivalents normalized by the expected value). 
The hollow circles and the dashed regression line picture the prediction for the lotteries with 50/50 prob-
abilities and the black squares and the solid regression line picture the prediction for the lotteries with ?/? 
probabilities. 
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3.10 Appendix E: Histograms and Twoway Graphs 
The figure illustrates the distribution of own certainty equivalents for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 
1000 with ?/? probabilities. The vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (50-800). 
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The figure illustrates the predicted 90 percent intervals for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 1000 with ?/? 
probabilities. 
The intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to high). The hori-
zontal lines indicate the true 90 percent interval (50-800). 
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The figure illustrates the distribution of own certainty equivalents for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 200 
with 50/50 probabilities. The vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (25-150). 
90 percent interval
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Certainty Equivalent Self
 
 
The figure illustrates the predicted 90 percent intervals for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 200 with 
50/50 probabilities. 
The intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to high). The hori-
zontal lines indicate the true 90 percent interval (25-150). 
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The figure illustrates the distribution of own certainty equivalents for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 200 
with ?/? probabilities. The vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (10-188). 
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The figure illustrates the predicted 90 percent intervals for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 200 with ?/? 
probabilities. 
The intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to high). The hori-
zontal lines indicate the true 90 percent interval (10-188). 
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The figure illustrates the distribution of own certainty equivalents for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 50 
with 50/50 probabilities. The vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (10-40). 
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The figure illustrates the predicted 90 percent intervals for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 50 with 50/50 
probabilities. 
The intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to high). The hori-
zontal lines indicate the true 90 percent interval (10-40). 
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The figure illustrates the distribution of own certainty equivalents for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 50 
with ?/? probabilities. The vertical lines indicate the 90 percent interval (5-50). 
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The figure illustrates the predicted 90 percent intervals for the lottery with outcomes 0 and 50 with ?/? 
probabilities. 
The intervals are ordered by the size of the own certainty equivalents (x-axis from low to high). The hori-
zontal lines indicate the true 90 percent interval (5-50). 
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Chapter 4 
 
4 German Household Portfolios  
4.1 Introduction 
The responsibility of German households for private savings for old age is as high as never 
before, as demographic changes of the population structure cause financing problems of the 
social pension fund. The good news is that financial assets of private households are indeed 
increasing.12
Hence, it is not surprising that many investors ask for investment advice. In fact, the majority 
of private investors is relatively uninformed and relies on professional investment advice (see 
e.g. Allen (2001), or for German investors e.g. Bluethgen et al. (2008)). However, when doing 
so, most of the people are not really aware of the costs of advice. In a questionnaire study 
from 2008 with 111 German participants, more than 60 percent of respondents indicated that 
they thought, financial advice was without costs, not realizing the commissions they had to 
pay when buying a product.
 In addition, the legislator is trying to support private savings with the help of 
governmentally subsidized pension plans such as the German “Riester-Rente” (a private 
pension plan that is state-aided by financial and tax benefits; the labeling “Riester” goes back 
to the German politician Walter Riester). The bad news is that most households are unsure 
about financial matters (see e.g. Cole and Shastry (2009) or Lusardi and Mitchell (2006)).  
13
                                                 
12 See German Federal Bank, Time series CEB00I: Financial assets D: Total C: Private Households. 
 
13 Master thesis supervised by Borgsen and Weber (2008). 
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This biased perception combined with a lack of financial knowledge provides a basis for poor 
advice. The predominant compensation system in Germany is commission-based advice. 
There are only few fixed fee offers, e.g. where people pay per hour independently of the con-
clusion of a contract. One example for an alternative advice concept is the advice offered by 
consumer centers. These consumer centers exist in all German federal states and deal with all 
kind of consumer affairs. They offer financial advice concerning asset allocation and retire-
ment savings. We have obtained data about these counseling interviews from the consumer 
center in Baden-Wuerttemberg for the years 2006 to 2008. With our study, we want to add to 
the literature on positive household finance, more concretely on the determinants of why 
people ask for advice and on the correlates and determinants of participation in asset markets. 
With our unique dataset, we are able to study German household portfolios. This is especially 
interesting as there are only very few studies using German data. Financial affairs are a highly 
sensitive issue, making relevant data hard to obtain. Most of the existing studies analyze 
household portfolios in the U.S., especially the data from the Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF) is popular.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: First, we give an overview of related 
literature and our hypotheses in Section 4.2. We summarize the results of studies analyzing 
household finance with the focus on actual investment behavior of individual investors. Sec-
tion 4.3 describes our dataset and the role of the consumer center. Section 4.4 includes the 
results concerning the portfolios of German households. First, we give some descriptive sta-
tistics of our sample and deal with the question of which people are aware of the advice of-
fered by the consumer centers and which people ask for advice. Second, we analyze the com-
position of the typical portfolio and participation decisions in specific asset types, e.g. partici-
pation in the stock market and determining factors. Third, we look at household diversifica-
tion over asset types. Section 4.5 analyses the influence of the existing portfolio on the risk 
preferences concerning a new investment. Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
We want to describe German household portfolios and provide answers to the following ques-
tions: What does the typical portfolio look like? Which asset types are often and which only 
rarely held? How do demographic characteristics influence the structure of the portfolio? 
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What are the determinants for the decisions of holding a specific asset type and diversifying 
over several asset types?  
Asset allocation decisions belong to the wide domain of household finance. There are two 
approaches to household finance: On the one hand, there is normative research aiming to de-
rive how people should rationally behave. On the other hand, there is positive household 
finance which looks at empirical data and investigates people’s actual behavior. With our 
study we want to contribute to the latter field of research. Nevertheless, we first want to give a 
short overview on some current challenges of normative household finance.  
The asset allocation decision is very complex as the financial planning is not a single period 
decision but households have to plan over their whole lifetime. In contrast to the traditional 
mean-variance framework Merton (1971, 1973) uses a framework for long-term planning 
with investment opportunities varying over time. In this framework, reinvestment opportuni-
ties are risky, so people should hedge against shocks to any state variable that affects expected 
returns of investment opportunities. The literature using the complex Merton model focuses 
on several branches: on shocks to the real interest rate as the one variable that captures all 
changes in investment opportunities (Wachter (2003), Campbell and Viceira (2002)), on the 
equity premium following an exogenous time-series process (Campbell and Viceira (1999), 
Kim and Omberg (1996)) or on general multivariate processes that determine both interest 
rate and equity premium (Campbell and Viceira (2003), Lynch (2001)). These models help in 
understanding differences between predictions of the mean-variance model and real world 
decisions. For example, contrary to the mutual fund separation theorem (Tobin (1958)), con-
servative investors often hold a higher fraction of bonds than stocks in their portfolio (Canner 
et al. (1997)). Campbell and Viceira (2001) show that this can be a rational strategy if the 
bonds serve as a hedge against varying interest rates.  
In addition, in contrast to short-term investments, the risk properties of long-term investments 
depend critically on the assumptions about inflation. If inflation is a random variable, then 
bonds are also a risky investment. 
Another assumption that does not hold in reality is that all wealth is liquid and easily tradable. 
Especially for younger people, human capital is the largest component of their wealth. The 
literature disagrees about how to deal with this non-tradable asset and its risk properties. In 
the special case of perfect correlation with tradable assets, labor risk is hedgeable (Bodie et al. 
(1992)). But the typical risk associated with labor income is idiosyncratic and therefore not 
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hedgeable. This can lead to a higher risk aversion in investing (e.g. Viceira (2001)) or it may 
increase risk tolerance when households have the flexibility to increase their labor supply 
when investment returns decrease (e.g. Farhi and Panageas (2007)). Recent studies also con-
sider education as a risky asset that is chosen together with risky financial assets (Saks and 
Shore (2005), Palacios-Huerta (2003)). 
In addition to normative research, there are a lot of empirical studies about positive household 
finance. Most of these studies analyze U.S. households based on data from the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF). There are taxable and tax-deferred accounts in the U.S., and con-
sequently, one strand of the research focuses on tax-minimizing portfolio strategies rather 
than on asset location. For an overview of literature about tax-minimizing strategies, see for 
example Poterba (2002). Bodie and Crane (1997) find in a survey with TIAA-CREF14
Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) use data from the SCF plus aggregated data from the Fed-
eral Reserve Board‘s Flow of Funds accounts. They find that the typical portfolio consists of a 
checking account, a savings account, and a tax-deferred retirement account. In 1998, less than 
50 percent of account holders owned some form of stocks (either directly or indirectly via 
stock mutual funds or amounts of stock in retirement accounts).  
 mem-
bers that households choose similar assets in their taxable and tax-deferred account. Our 
study, however, is focused on asset allocation, the research field of which can be split into 
studies considering the total wealth composition or at least several asset types on the one hand 
and studies using data from a single bank or broker and thus focusing on the investment port-
folio on the other hand.  
The SCF 2001 indicates that only 52 percent of U.S. households hold stocks (either directly or 
indirectly, Gomes and Michaelides (2005)). In 2004, the survey reports a participation rate of 
49 percent (Bucks et al. (2006)). 
Carroll (2002) analyses portfolios of the rich (defined as the top one percent of households by 
net worth) and finds that these are heavily skewed toward risky assets, particularly own pri-
vately held businesses. From 1962 to 1995, on average 74 percent of the rich households 
owned stocks (compared to 16 percent of the rest) and 38 percent held mutual funds (com-
pared to 8 percent). Campbell (2006) studies household participation decisions over quartiles 
of the wealth distribution. Households in the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution hold 
                                                 
14 TIAA-CREF is a Fortune 100 financial services company that is the leading retirement system for people who 
work in the academic, research, medical and cultural fields. For further details see http://www.tiaa-cref.org/. 
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only liquid assets and vehicles. Only few households hold private equity and real estate. In the 
upper quartile, the share of households participating in the private equity market increases 
significantly but is far from universal. Ownership of real estate increases to a participation of 
over 90 percent.  
The results for other countries are similar. The German Institute for Share Promotion annually 
publishes the amount of stock holders. At the end of 2008, there were only 3.584 million di-
rect stock holders in Germany and 6.601 million people that owned investment funds15, yield-
ing a total of 8.792 million investors owning stocks and/or investment funds. This number 
reached its maximum in 2001, when 12.853 million people in Germany owned stocks and/or 
investment funds. This corresponds to very low shares of participating households. In 2008, 
about 5.5 percent of the population directly hold stocks and about 13.5 percent hold stocks 
and/or investment funds. Calvet et al. (2007) study Swedish households with data supplied by 
the government’s statistical agency (Statistics Sweden). The dataset contains disaggregated 
wealth and income data of the entire population of Sweden. They find two main sources of 
inefficiency in the portfolios: on average, the risky assets are under-diversified and many 
households do not participate in risky assets at all. Guiso and Jappelli (2002) use the Bank of 
Italy Surveys of Household Income and Wealth and confirm the low participation share for 
Italy. They find that transaction accounts (e.g. checking and savings accounts), short-term 
government bonds and bonds issued by the national postal service are most popular. In 1998, 
only 18.7 percent of the households participated in the stock market - either directly (7.3 per-
cent) or indirectly. Banks and Tanner (2002) analyze U.K. households with data drawn from 
the Family Expenditure Survey and find that in 1998 a share of 31.4 percent holds stocks (di-
rectly only: 21.6 percent). In France, 17 percent of the households held stocks directly in 2000 
(Arrondel and Masson (2003), data from the EPCV16
                                                 
15 See Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2009). 
). Alessie et al. (2002) use the Center 
Saving Survey for the Netherlands. They find that in 1998, 35.1 percent participated in the 
stock market (directly only: 15.4 percent). Iwaisako (2003) uses data about Japanese house-
hold asset allocation from three different data sources. In contrast to the United States and 
Europe he shows that stock market participation by Japanese households is also very low but 
additionally followed a declining trend in the last decade: in 1990 30.2 percent held stocks 
(directly only: 26.5 percent) compared to 25.2 percent in 1999 (directly only: 23.6 percent). 
16 Survey included as part of the continuous surveys on household living conditions (Enquête Permanente sur les 
Conditions de Vie des Ménages). 
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The literature identifies several determinants of the participation decision: Among others, 
stock market participation is increasing in income as well as education (e.g. Bertaut and Starr-
McCluer (2002)), age (e.g. Cole and Shastry (2009)), gender and marital status (e.g. Agnew et 
al. (2003)), financial literacy (e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007)), experience with the stock 
market (e.g. Malmendier and Nagel (2009)), familiarity (Massa and Simonov (2006)), and 
awareness (Guiso and Jappelli (2005)). The determinants are similar to those of the diversifi-
cation decision: Age, income, and financial literacy explain a considerable part of the extent 
of portfolio diversification (see e.g. Alessie et al. (2002), Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002), 
Eymann and Boersch-Supan (2002)).  
The non-participation rate in the stock market (the so-called stockholding puzzle) is criticized 
by normative theory.17
Apart from the above-mentioned studies, there are also studies with datasets from a special 
bank or broker that focus on the securities portfolio. We only mention a few studies, which 
might be interesting for our analyses as they use German datasets.  
 According to Mehra and Prescott (1985), every investor should invest 
a part of his wealth into risky assets because historical returns and thus expected future re-
turns far exceed those of other asset types. Campbell (2006) also states that every investor 
should own some equity as long as a premium for the incurred risk is paid. Haliassos and Ber-
taut (1995) consider several determinants such as risk aversion and belief heterogeneity, but 
these factors cannot explain the departures from expected utility maximization. Guiso et al. 
(2008) claim that a lack of trust may explain the non-participation in financial markets. How-
ever, a limited participation may also have rational reasons. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) finds 
that already small fixed costs of participation (275 USD in 2003) would be sufficient to ex-
plain the non-participation decision of 75 percent of the households.  
Glaser (2007a) studies data from a German online broker implying that almost all investors in 
this sample trade stocks. The median investor is under-diversified with only five stocks in his 
portfolio, but diversification is increasing from 1997 (3 stocks) to 2001 (8 stocks). 
Dorn and Huberman (2005) use data from a German retail broker plus responses to an addi-
tional survey. They find that more risk tolerant and less experienced investors hold less diver-
sified portfolios. 
                                                 
17 For empirical evidence see e.g. Haliassos (2002) or Guiso et al. (2008). 
Chapter 4: German Household Portfolios  69 
Bluethgen et al. (2008) differentiate between advised and non-advised clients from a German 
retail bank. The portfolios are in general too concentrated, investors hold only few stocks and 
investments are geographically concentrated. In contrast, advised clients are better diversified: 
their allocation to funds is larger than to individual stocks and, additionally, they are more 
diversified into international equities than self-directed clients. As advised clients also pay 
higher transaction costs, it is not possible to say ex ante whether they are better off or not. 
Being male, risk tolerance, and income are all positively correlated with the equity fraction of 
the respective portfolios. Contrarily, wealth is negatively correlated with equity holdings. The 
findings in other countries are similar to those in Germany, e.g. for U.S. households Goetz-
mann and Kumar (2008) also show that the portfolios are under-diversified. The level of un-
der-diversification is higher for younger, low-income, less educated, and less sophisticated 
investors.  
We expect to find some of the above results in our dataset as well. We hypothesize that the 
majority holds safe assets, e.g. in form of a call money or savings account. A sizable part 
owns real estate. Less than half of the people participate in the stock market, either by holding 
shares directly or indirectly through investment funds. 
Furthermore, we want to analyze the influence of demographic variables, knowledge, expe-
rience, and risk attitude on the allocation. We for instance hypothesize that stock market par-
ticipation (either directly or indirectly through investment funds) is positively correlated with 
being a couple or male, age, income, and financial literacy measured through know-
ledge/experience. Higher background risk (self-employed households) should also influence 
the stock market participation decision.  
4.3 Data 
The Federation of German Consumer Organisations is the umbrella organisation of consumer 
centers, making up a network promoting consumers’ interests with more than eight million 
individual members. Member organisations include the consumer centers in the 16 federal 
states and 25 other associations dealing with consumer policy. The Federation is part of an 
international network of consumer organisations and one of Europe’s largest consumer lob-
bies. It represents consumers’ interests vis-à-vis politicians and policy makers, the private 
sector, and the public sphere. The consumer centers are non-profit organisations. Their work 
is supported by federal state funding, municipal, and district support for the individual advice 
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centers and by project funding from the national government. The consumer centers also con-
tribute to this funding with charges for consultation services and the sale of consumer advice 
guides. Consumer centers are located in all the German federal states and offer their services 
in about 200 advice centers, providing consumers with information and consultation. The goal 
of their work is to inform, advise, and support consumers with regard to issues of private con-
sumption as well as providing an overview of the market and helping consumers deal with 
complex market conditions. They also identify health and environmental aspects that could 
influence purchasing decisions. Their consultation offer includes advice in the centers and via 
telephone or internet on legal and economic issues affecting the private household, with a 
focus on credit law, debtor arbitration, and insolvency declaration, on banking and invest-
ment, on insurances, on patients‘ rights, and health services, on passenger rights, on building 
finance, on energy, on nutrition, and on telecommunications. More concretely, they for in-
stance provide information on contracts of sale and service agreements or false promises 
made by prize game organisations, the legitimacy of telecommunications and energy charges, 
the best pension plans, health insurance, and other types of insurance. Note, however, that it is 
not the intention of the consumer center to compete against the market offer; they rather want 
to raise public attention for possible market frictions, e.g. information asymmetry. On the in-
dividual level, consumer counseling is aimed at solving the concrete problem of the consum-
er. On the aggregated level, the consumer center aims to contribute their experience gained 
through the counseling to the lobby group. If necessary, they also aim to influence the legisla-
tion (see Benner and Weiser (2009)). 
Our data is provided by the Verbraucherzentrale Baden-Wuerttemberg e. V. (consumer center 
Baden-Wuerttemberg). In the financial sector, they offer general insurance advice, construc-
tion loan advice, and a general counseling interview dealing with financial investments and 
old-age provisions. During these general interviews, a protocol containing all relevant infor-
mation is written. We use these protocols to generate a new unique dataset. We have personal 
information about the person or couple seeking for advice, e.g. age, occupation, monthly net 
income etc., and information about the holdings in different asset types. 
The demand in Germany for this independent advice is high. In the beginning of 2008, the 
waiting time for an interview was several months. One obvious reason for this is the currently 
high uncertainty among investors because of the financial crisis. Additionally, the general 
need for private savings for retirement is high as the state is retreating more and more from 
the responsibility. The advice offered by the consumer center seems to be reliable to the con-
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sumers. In contrast to most private institutions, they do not offer commission-based advice 
but advice that is independent from the typical conflict of interest.  
The ideal dataset (see Campbell (2006)) would be representative for the entire population. 
The observations should especially vary in wealth and age as these are important explanatory 
variables for financial behavior. In addition, the data would include information about total 
wealth and its breakdown into subcategories to measure diversification among asset types. 
Diversification within asset types would be measurable with a further breakdown of the asset 
types to individual assets. Finally, the dataset would not only be a one shot observation but 
contain panel data over time. It is also important that the data is as exact as possible. A typical 
problem with bank or brokerage data is that many households are clients of different financial 
institutions simultaneously so that account record data typically does not cover the house-
hold’s total wealth. 
Fortunately, our data includes information about total wealth. Note, however, that our data is 
self-reported by the consumers coming to the agency. It is therefore not as exact as account 
record data from a bank would be, for example; especially the data on different asset types is 
not very detailed. People are asked on a general basis, without further specifications, how 
their existing financial wealth is invested. Obviously, this method is quite error-prone, e.g. 
people (purposefully or not) forget about special asset types or are unsure about the amounts. 
Moreover, in many cases the answers are not specified, e.g. answering “investment funds” 
does not help decide whether this is an investment fund investing into stocks, bonds, real es-
tate, or a mix of several asset types. The category of “stocks” does not specify the name of the 
company nor the number of different stocks in the portfolio. As we have this problem with all 
asset types, the classes are rather broad and overlapping. Thus we are unfortunately not able 
to analyze portfolio diversification within different asset types and instead use a simple naive 
measure of diversification over asset types.  
The main benefit of our data set is that we principally have information about all components 
of wealth, in contrast to data from a single bank or broker, thus allowing us to add to the very 
few empirical studies about household portfolio choices in Germany.  
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4.4 Household Portfolios: Results and Discussion 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
The table reports descriptive statistics of our dataset: age, risk1 (maximum percentage of loss tolerated 
over the investment period), risk2 (maximum percentage of loss tolerated at the end of the investment pe-
riod), monthly net income and expenditures for single women, single men, couples, other households 
(siblings), and for all households together.  
Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Women
Age 315 45.38 44.00 12.81 19.00 89.00
Risk1 313 10.69 10.00 12.32 0.00 80.00
Risk2 314 2.12 0.00 5.62 0.00 50.00
Income 296 2,055.57 1,833.50 1,014.41 493.00 6,881.00
Expenditures 289 1,611.36 1,420.00 793.98 100.00 6,805.00
Men
Age 198 41.52 39.00 12.44 19.00 74.00
Risk1 196 15.45 15.00 13.86 0.00 70.00
Risk2 199 3.27 0.00 6.21 0.00 30.00
Income 195 2,509.83 2,087.00 2,332.10 300.00 30,000.00
Expenditures 184 1,816.00 1,500.00 1,829.73 0.00 23,000.00
Couples
Age 309 47.37 45.50 12.00 23.00 78.50
Risk1 308 11.41 10.00 13.97 0.00 100.00
Risk2 310 2.28 0.00 5.72 0.00 40.00
Income 298 3,856.02 3,476.00 1,939.16 500.00 15,000.00
Expenditures 279 2,818.67 2,600.00 1,121.03 807.00 9,123.53
Other
Age 2 23.00 23.00 2.12 21.50 24.50
Risk1 2 12.50 12.50 17.68 0.00 25.00
Risk2 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income 2 1,160.00 1,160.00 622.25 720.00 1,600.00
Expenditures 2 1,160.00 1,160.00 622.25 720.00 1,600.00
Total
Age 824 45.14 43.75 12.64 19.00 89.00
Risk1 819 12.10 10.00 13.45 0.00 100.00
Risk2 825 2.45 0.00 5.81 0.00 50.00
Income 791 2,843.59 2,400.00 1,946.28 300.00 30,000.00
Expenditures 754 2,106.84 1,800.00 1,350.64 0.00 23,000.00  
 
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics of our dataset. Out dataset consists of 827 household 
observations, more precisely we have obtained interview notes from 316 women, 199 men, 
310 couples, and 2 siblings. The interviews took place from 2006 to 2008. The mean age in 
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our sample is 45.14; the age of a couple is determined as the average age of both partners. If 
we count every individual regardless of marital status, the mean age is 45.74 (as married 
people in our sample are on average older than singles). Compared to the mean age of the 
German population in 2007, which is 42.9, our sample is some years older.18
Mean household net income is 2,843.59 Euro per month, net expenditures 2,106.84 Euro. 
Couples earn significantly more than do single men or women and single men earn more than 
single women (all t-tests significant at the 1 percent level). It is also plausible and significant 
that a couple’s expenditures are higher than for a single person. The difference between men 
and women here is not significant. The mean net income of our sample seems to be represent-
ative, as the mean household net income in Germany in 2007 was 2,839 Euro.
 There are also 
more women than men in the whole population (51.02 compared to 48.98 percent) but the 
proportion of women in our sample is significantly higher than in the whole population. 
19
The above results are in line with the findings of Bluethgen et al. (2008) who analyze a data-
set from a large German retail bank also acting as a brokerage house. When a customer places 
an order, the advisor has to specify whether the order is related to a recommendation or not, 
allowing for a differentiation between advised and self-directed clients. Self-directed clients 
are on average 52.31 years old, their mean income is 2,302 Euro and the percentage of women 
is 50 percent. Advised clients are significantly older at 57.23 years on average but their mean 
income is about the same at 2,299 Euro. The percentage of women in the advice sample is 
significantly higher at 57 percent.  
 
Table 4.2: Reasons for the interview 
The table reports the reasons for the counseling interview at the consumer center. Multiple answers were 
permitted. 
Interview reason Obs. Percentage
Retirement 685 82.83%
Government aid 428 51.75%
General savings 339 40.99%
Real estate 190 22.97%
Purchase 138 16.69%
Generate income 132 15.96%
Children's education 81 9.79%
Other 61 7.38%  
 
                                                 
18 Figures from the Federal Statistical Office, see Statistisches Bundesamt (2010). 
19 See Statistisches Bundesamt (2009). 
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Table 4.2 shows the reasons why people use the advice offer of the consumer center, with 
multiple answers being possible. About 83 percent want to be informed about possible in-
vestments for retirement savings. About 52 percent want to make use of governmental aid. 41 
percent state “general savings” as the motive. Other reasons are less popular: 23 percent want 
to save for real estate, 17 percent for another large purchase. 16 percent require regular in-
come from their investments. Only ten percent want to save for their children’s education and 
seven percent state other reasons. 
In the counseling interviews at the consumer center, the risk preference of the consumer is 
measured via two different questions. The first asks for the maximum loss in percent of the 
investment amount that could be tolerated over the investment time (risk1) and the second 
asks for the maximum loss in percent that could be tolerated at the end of the investment pe-
riod (risk2). Woman in our sample are significantly more risk averse than men (t(risk1men-
risk1women) = 3.93, t(risk2men-risk2women) = 2.13). Couples have a risk preference somewhere 
in between, which is plausible as it is half her risk preference plus half his risk preference. 
The risk preferences of women and couples are not significantly different, but those of men 
and couples are different in risk1 (t(risk1men-risk1couples) = 3.18, t(risk2men-risk2couples) = 1.81). 
The finding that women are more risk averse than men in financial decisions is very wide-
spread in the literature (e.g. see Weber et al. (2002) or for a meta-analysis Byrnes et al. 
(1999)). Dohmen et al. (2010a) use a sample of 22,000 German individuals and also confirm 
that the willingness to take risks is negatively correlated with being female. Compared to the 
above data and studies, we believe that our sample is not unusual for a sample of advised 
clients. 
Table 4.3 shows financial knowledge and experience of the investors. For each asset type, the 
consumers are asked to state their knowledge and experience on a 5-point Likert scale (1: very 
low, 5: very high). The consumer center differentiates between nine different asset types: Sav-
ings accounts (also including call money and time deposits), savings bonds (savings with a 
higher (normally fixed) maturity), federal savings bonds (bonds issues by the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany), bonds (bonds except federal bonds), insurance (insurances with investment 
character, life insurance or annuity insurance), real estate (no differentiation between self oc-
cupancy or not), investment funds (all kinds of investment funds including stocks, bonds, 
money market etc.), stocks, and derivatives. 
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Table 4.3: Knowledge and experience 
The table reports knowledge and experience with different asset classes for women and men (self-
reported on a five-point Likert scale from 1: very low to 5: very high). The last column states t-statistics 
for differences in mean between women and men. 
Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max t(m-w)
Knowledge women Knowledge men
Savings accounts 581 3.51 4 1.11 1 5 482 3.71 4 1.06 1 5 3.02
Savings bonds 582 1.77 1 1.14 1 5 483 1.88 1 1.20 1 5 1.42
Federal savings bonds 580 1.66 1 1.02 1 5 482 1.83 1 1.11 1 5 2.50
Bonds 581 1.20 1 0.63 1 5 482 1.29 1 0.76 1 5 1.89
Insurances 581 2.26 2 0.98 1 5 481 2.52 3 1.00 1 5 4.21
Real estate 579 2.32 2 1.40 1 5 478 2.63 3 1.45 1 5 3.54
Investment funds 579 1.82 2 0.94 1 5 475 2.09 2 1.03 1 5 4.36
Stocks 578 1.48 1 0.88 1 5 477 1.83 1 1.08 1 5 5.68
Derivatives 168 1.10 1 0.37 1 3 142 1.27 1 0.75 1 5 2.38
Experience women Experience men
Savings accounts 583 3.72 4 1.22 1 5 482 3.88 4 1.13 1 5 2.12
Savings bonds 581 1.59 1 1.13 1 5 483 1.63 1 1.20 1 5 0.56
Federal savings bonds 581 1.39 1 0.93 1 5 483 1.51 1 1.07 1 5 1.96
Bonds 581 1.16 1 0.60 1 5 479 1.19 1 0.68 1 5 0.84
Insurances 581 2.23 2 1.10 1 5 482 2.50 3 1.18 1 5 3.85
Real estate 577 2.27 1 1.49 1 5 481 2.55 2 1.58 1 5 3.01
Investment funds 580 1.87 2 1.04 1 5 482 2.02 2 1.14 1 5 2.20
Stocks 575 1.49 1 0.96 1 5 480 1.75 1 1.15 1 5 4.03
Derivatives 164 1.04 1 0.23 1 3 138 1.23 1 0.82 1 5 2.74  
 
Both women and men are most experienced and knowledgeable in the area of savings ac-
counts, followed by real estate and insurances. Comparing the means of knowledge and expe-
rience, we find that men state higher knowledge and also higher experience in every asset 
category. This is on the one hand consistent to several studies about financial literacy finding 
that men are more financially literate than women20, but on the other hand men are also 
known to be more overconfident than women in assessing their own knowledge and abili-
ties.21 We will use the data of financial knowledge and experience in more detail in the fol-
lowing analysis. We also created the variables “general financial knowledge” and “general 
financial experience”, which is the average knowledge/experience over all asset types. Finan-
cial knowledge and financial experience tend to go hand in hand, thus they are highly corre-
lated.22
                                                 
20 See e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell (2008), OECD (2005). 
 For our further analysis, we therefore combine the two variables general knowledge 
and general experience and use this combined variable as a proxy for general financial litera-
cy (FL). For a couple, the financial knowledge/experience is again determined as half of the 
21 See e.g. Deaux and Farris (1977) or Prince (1993) for the financial domain. 
22 The Pearson correlation (Spearman rank correlation) coefficient is 0.8484 (0.8353). 
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sum of both partners. We generated our financial literacy score as half of the sum of general 
knowledge plus general experience; hence our resulting FL score also varies between 1 and 5. 
The results about knowledge and experience are also consistent with the statements of the 
consumers about which assets they hold. Figure 4.1 illustrates the holdings for all households 
as well as separately for single women, single men, and couples. Savings accounts are the 
most common investment with 87.42 percent of the households hold at least one. 59.49 per-
cent hold insurances, 46.80 percent hold investment funds, and 41.48 percent own real estate. 
21.04 percent of the households hold individual stocks. All other asset types are not very 
common, with about 10 percent or less of the households holding them. The percentage of 
owners of real estate is representative for Germany, where the overall proportion was 43.2 
percent in 2008.23 In contrast, the participation rates in the stock market as well as in the in-
vestment fund market are fairly high compared to the entire German population where only 
about 5.5 percent hold stocks and about 10.1 percent hold investment funds.24
                                                 
23 Figure from the Federal Statistical Office, last updated 2008. 
 A possible ex-
planation might be that these are households asking for investment advice; consequently they 
must own something of value to invest. Bluethgen et al. (2008) also find that advised people 
tend to be wealthier than non-advised people and wealth is known to be an explanatory varia-
ble for stock market participation. In addition, people soliciting advice, obviously show a 
higher interest and seem to care about their financial situation. This is comparable to a higher 
financial literacy or education, which are also prominent determinants for participation into 
risky asset markets (see e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006), Boersch-Supan and Essig (2002)). 
Furthermore, Van Rooij et al. (2007) consider the influence of financial literacy on the source 
of financial advice. They find that people with low financial literacy are more likely to consult 
family and friends in contrast to those with high financial literacy who are more likely to read 
newspapers, magazines, and books or rely on financial advisors. Our results are also compa-
rable to Sommer (2005) who analyses the German Income and Expenditure Survey (Ein-
kommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS). He finds a participation rate of about 55 percent 
for insurances, 21 percent for stocks and 30 percent for mutual funds in 2003.  
24 See Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2009). 
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Figure 4.1: Holdings  
The figure illustrates the percentage of households holding different asset classes for all households to-
gether, single women, single men, and couples. 
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For almost all asset types, couples have the highest participation rate, single men lie in the 
middle and single women have the lowest share of participation. This is especially true for 
stocks and investment funds. The influence of gender and marital status is also documented in 
the literature; our results are in line with e.g. Agnew et al. (2003) or Sunden and Surette 
(1998). However, Jianakoplos et al. (2003) find that it is not the marital status per se but the 
higher financial endowment that is responsible for the differences between single persons and 
couples. We will more closely examine these effects in the following. 
4.4.2 Bivariate Analyses 
First, we want to have a look at some important determinants that are widely discussed in the 
literature. We perform bivariate graphical analyses with the explanatory variables age, in-
come, and financial literacy. For each variable, we look at the influence on participation rates 
over asset types. As derivatives are very uncommon asset types and in addition were not con-
sidered in all interviews, we remove them from our further analysis, thus we are looking at 
eight asset types: savings accounts, savings bonds, federal savings bonds, bonds, insurance 
policies, real estate, investment funds, and stocks. 
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4.4.2.1 Age Effects  
Figure 4.2: Participation rates by age 
The figure shows percentage participation for different asset types by age. A household in the first age 
group is younger than 30 years, in the second group between 30 and 40 years and so on (see table). We 
generated groups with equal width (except the first and the last class). We believe that for age, these 
groups make more sense than would a quintile split. 
The table shows the results of mean comparison tests. We tested the participation in the different age 
groups against the mean participation of the whole sample. A significantly higher (lower) participation at 
the 10% level is denoted by + (-), at the 5% level by ++ (--), and at the 1% level by +++ (---). 
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Age group 1 2 3 4 5
Age ≥ 19 ≥ 30 ≥ 40 ≥ 50 ≥ 60
< 30 < 40 < 50 < 60 ≤ 89
Observations 64 257 222 149 132
Savings accounts - ++
Savings bonds -- ++ +
Federal bonds - +
Bonds --- - ++ +++
Insurance -- ++ +++ ---
Real estate --- --- -- +++ +++
Investment funds - - +++ ++
Stocks -- - - +++ +++  
 
Figure 4.2 shows household participation rates for different asset types by age. The vertical 
axis shows the fraction of households that participate in particular asset types. The horizontal 
axis shows different age groups. We split the data into 5 age groups (under 30, between 30 
and 40, between 40 and 50, between 50 and 60, and above 60, see the table under Figure 4.2). 
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We think classes with equal width for age make more sense than a quintile split as our obser-
vations for age cluster in the middle age groups. Consequently, most households belong to the 
second and third class as the middle ages are strongly represented. We have least observa-
tions, only 64, for the young households under 30. 
For bonds, stocks, and real estate we see that the share of households participating is increas-
ing with age. We tested the participation rates against the means of the entire sample (see 
Figure 4.1). For bonds, the participation rate in age groups 2 and 3 is significantly lower than 
the mean, whereas in age groups 4 and 5 it is significantly higher; see the table under Figure 
4.2 for all test results. The same is true for stocks and real estate; in addition the participation 
rate in group 1 is also significantly lower in each case. For insurances, the participation pro-
portion is increasing from age groups 1 to 4 but decreasing from group 4 to 5 (groups 1 and 5 
have significantly lower, groups 3 and 4 significantly higher participation rates compared to 
the entire sample). This can be explained by the fact that around age 60+, an increasing share 
of insurance contracts becomes due. Savings bonds, bonds, and federal savings bonds are in 
low demand at all age groups, nevertheless there are some significant deviations, e.g. for 
bonds, age groups 4 and 5 have a significantly higher participation rate and age groups 2 and 
3 have a significantly lower one. The participation in the investment fund market is higher in 
the last two age groups compared to the first three (deviation from the mean significant for 
groups 1 and 3 and for groups 4 and 5). The age effect is discussed with ambiguous results in 
the literature. Cole and Shastry (2009), for example, find an increase in stock market partici-
pation with higher age for U.S. census data for 2000. Contrarily, Campbell (2006) shows a 
weak negative effect for age for the SCF 2001 and Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) show a 
hump-shaped pattern for the SCF 1998. Concerning stock market participation of German 
households, Boersch-Supan and Essig (2002) also find a hump-shaped age profile for the 
years 1993 and 1998 (German Income and Expenditure Survey, EVS). Because of the differ-
ent study periods - our data is from 2006 to 2008 - these results are not necessarily incompati-
ble with each other.  
In general, we must be careful when interpreting our age results. It would be wrong to infer 
from Figure 4.2 that households sell their assets (e.g. savings account, insurances, investment 
funds) when they grow older. Instead, these households may have started with much lower 
participation rates at a younger age. Comparably, currently middle-aged households may 
show a higher future participation to specific asset types because they have grown up in 
another time. As we only have data for one point in time, we are not able to differentiate be-
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tween age and cohort effects. Sommer (2005) does so by using the cross-sectional German 
EVS and indeed finds mixed evidence for age and cohorts.  
4.4.2.2 Income Effects 
Figure 4.3: Participation rates by income 
The figure shows percentage participation for different asset types by income. A household in the first in-
come group has a monthly net income up to 1000 €, in the second group an income between 1,000 and 
1,499 € and so on (see table). A split of the dataset into quintiles is ineffective here because the data 
strongly clusters at round numbers like 1,500 or 2,000. 
The table also shows the results of mean comparison tests. We tested the participation in the different in-
come groups against the mean participation of the whole sample. A significantly higher (lower) participa-
tion at the 10% level is denoted by + (-), at the 5% level by ++ (--), and at the 1% level by +++ (---). 
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Income group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Income <1,000€ 1,000€- 1,500€- 2,000€- 2,500€- 3,000€- 3,500€- 4,000€- 4,500€- 5,000€- ≥6,000€
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Figure 4.3 illustrates participation decisions of households with different income levels. The 
vertical axis is the same as in Figure 4.2. The horizontal axis shows 11 income groups from 
lowest to highest. A household in the first income group has a monthly net income of up to 
1,000 Euro, in the second between 1,000 and 1,499 Euro and so on (see the table under Figure 
4.3). A split of the dataset into quintiles would be ineffective here because most observations 
are round numbers like 1,500 or 2,000. We have the most observations for middle-income 
households with a monthly net income between 1,500 Euro and 3,500 Euro. Only 38 house-
holds have an income below 1,000 Euro, and for households with an income higher than or 
equal to 4,500 Euro, we only have about 100 observations. 
Concerning savings accounts, savings bonds, federal bonds, and bonds, the income does not 
seem to matter much. Savings accounts are very popular in all income groups, just as savings 
bonds, federal bonds, and bonds in general are quite unpopular over all income groups. Real 
estate ownership increases from 18.42 percent in the lowest income group to 75.76 percent in 
the highest income group. Again, we tested the participation rate in the individual income 
groups against the mean of the entire sample (see significance levels in Figure 4.3). For in-
come groups 1 to 4, the participation rate in the housing market is significantly lower, for in-
come groups 6 to 11 significantly higher than the overall mean. The increase in insurances is 
also substantial. Groups 1, 2, 4, and 5 own significantly less insurance policies, and groups 6 
and 8 to 11 own significantly more. Stock market participation increases from 18.42 to 33.33 
percent (groups 2 and 3 significantly below, groups 9 to 11 significantly above the average). 
Investment funds are owned by 34.21 percent in the lowest and by 66.67 percent in the high-
est income group (groups 1 to 3 significantly below, groups 7, 8, and 11 significantly above 
the average). 
These results are in line with international findings. For the SCF, Bertaut and Starr-McCluer 
(2002) find that stock market participation (directly and indirectly) increases with income. 
Campell (2006) also finds strong positive effects of income and wealth. Boersch-Supan and 
Essig (2002) confirm these effects for direct as well as for indirect stockholdings in Germany. 
4.4.2.3 Financial Literacy Effects 
The measurement of financial literacy (FL) is difficult as it is not a natural attribute. Empirical 
studies therefore use different methods, which may be classified into objective financial lite-
racy indexes using questionnaires to measure financial literacy (e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2006)) and subjective self-evaluation indexes reporting people’s self-evaluation of their fi-
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nancial literacy (e.g. Graham et al. (2009)). In addition, there are also studies that use demo-
graphic variables such as wealth, occupation, gender, or age as a proxy for financial literacy 
(e.g. Dhar and Zhu (2006) or Feng and Seasholes (2005)). 
Figure 4.4: Participation rates by financial literacy 
The figure shows percentage participation for different asset types by financial literacy (FL). A household 
in the first FL group has a financial literacy score from 1 to 1.5, in the second group a score of 1.5 to 2 
and so on (see table). We generated groups with equal width (except the last one because of too few ob-
servations).  
The table also shows the results of mean comparison tests. We tested the participation in the different FL 
groups against the mean participation of the whole sample. A significantly higher (lower) participation at 
the 10% level is denoted by + (-), at the 5% level by ++ (--), and at the 1% level by +++ (---). 
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Van Rooij et al. (2007) use five basic (and in addition eleven advanced) financial questions to 
measure base and advanced financial literacy to construct two indexes. Moreover, they also 
ask for a self-evaluation. Fortunately, even if the measurement of financial literacy is very 
heterogeneous, the correlation between objective and subjective indexes is high (Van Rooij et 
al. (2007)). Mueller and Weber (2010) also find that self-assessed financial knowledge is 
highly positively related with an objective financial literacy index for a dataset with German 
households. 
For our analysis we use self-reported knowledge and experience with the asset types as a 
proxy for financial literacy. We generate our financial literacy score as the average of general 
knowledge and general experience; hence our resulting FL score also varies between 1 and 5. 
We divide the dataset into five groups with equal width for FL (except the last one) which we 
think is more suitable than a quintiles split.25
Participation rates in the high-risk asset types also increase strongly with financial literacy. In 
the highest FL group, half of the households participate in the stock market, and 71.79 percent 
own investment funds. Groups 1 and 2 have significantly lower, and groups 4 and 5 (for in-
vestment funds also group 3) have significantly higher participation rates than average. The 
increase in insurance ownership is highest from group 1 to 2 (group 1 is significantly below 
 Figure 4.4 illustrates the results. Most people 
evaluate their financial literacy at about 2. 144 households have a very low score under 1.5 
and only 78 households have a score higher or equal to 3. The influence of financial literacy is 
strongly positive for all asset types (see significance levels in Figure 4.4). Even the participa-
tion rate of unpopular asset types like bonds or federal savings bonds is increasing with higher 
financial literacy. In the lowest FL group, only 2.78 percent (1.39 percent) own bonds (federal 
savings bonds) compared to 19.23 percent (10.26 percent) in the highest FL group. The in-
crease in savings bonds is even higher, from 2.08 percent ownership to 24.36 percent. For all 
asset types, the participation rate of FL group 1 is significantly lower and for group 5 signifi-
cantly higher than the average, for most types, the effects are even stronger (significant results 
also for the other groups, see Figure 4.4). Ownership in savings accounts shows the smallest 
relative increase; the participation rate is over 80 percent in all FL groups; nevertheless, the 
participation rate increases from 82.64 to 97.44 percent.  
                                                 
25 For financial literacy we are also able to perform a reasonable quintile split (not reported) as, unlike for in-
come and age, there is not such a strong clustering of the data at round numbers. We use this quintile split as a 
robustness check for our splits into classes with equal width. We essentially observe the same results, so it seems 
that the exact split procedure does not matter very much. 
84  Chapter 4: German Household Portfolios 
the average, groups 3 and 5 above), for real estate from group 2 to 3 (groups 1 and 2 below 
the average, groups 3 to 5 above).  
The results are in line with the findings in the literature, evidence of the positive influence of 
financial literacy on the stock market participation decision is huge. For instance, Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2007) find a strong influence of financial literacy on stock market participation and, 
more generally, on the ability of planning for retirement. Malmendier and Nagel (2009) con-
firm a positive influence of experience of stock market returns on stock market participation. 
Our results are also in line with earlier German studies. For example, Boersch-Supan and Es-
sig (2002) find a strong positive influence of education on stockholdings for German house-
holds for the years 1993 and 1998. 
Cole and Shastry (2009) focus on discovering causal mechanisms. They find a positive effect 
for education (longer years of schooling) on FL but no significant difference whether students 
acquire financial literacy at school. Moreover, they find that cognitive ability is a determinant 
for market participation (stocks, bonds, mutual funds). It thereby seems that innate abilities 
are more important than acquired abilities, although both significantly affect market participa-
tion. 
4.4.3 Multivariate Analyses 
In the following we perform multiple regression analyses to test the persistence of the effects 
of marital status, age, income, and financial literacy to the inclusion of further explanatory 
variables. 
Tables 4.4 to 4.7 show the results of logit regression analyses; the quantitative importance of 
each potential explanatory variable is also illustrated. We report the participation probability 
for a reference household (employed couple with mean characteristics in the other variables), 
and the change in this probability caused by a change in the respective variable (for a dummy 
variable from zero to one, or a one-standard-deviation change in a continuous or discrete vari-
able). Note that the risk data in our dataset only accounts for the specific risk attitude concern-
ing the new investment and not for the existing portfolio. Nevertheless, we use the informa-
tion as a proxy for the general financial risk attitude. We think this is justifiable as the impact 
of the other dependent variables does not change considerably when including our risk meas-
ures in the analysis. 
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Table 4.4 shows the results for the two most popular asset types, savings accounts and insur-
ance policies. As already seen in the bivariate analyses, the influence of age and income on 
the likelihood of owning a savings account is insignificant. Couples are more likely to have a 
savings account compared to single women and men. Self-employed households (dummy 
variable which is equal to 1 for self-employed participants, for a couple equal to 1 if at least 
one of the partners is self-employed) have a 19 percent lower probability of saving money in a 
savings account. As seen in Figure 4.4, the influence of financial literacy is positive. The in-
fluence of our risk measures is ambiguous. Participants who tolerate a higher loss over the 
investment period are less likely, and those who tolerate a higher loss at the end of the in-
vestment period are more likely to own a savings account. Overall, the pseudo R-squared is 
rather low at only 0.0517. This might be due to the fact that there is little variation in the data 
(more than 87 percent of subjects own a savings account). A savings account is free of costs; 
customers have to pay neither for the account nor for transactions. 
Table 4.4: Market participation: savings account and insurance 
The table reports determinants of savings account and insurance ownership (logit regressions) for all 
households. Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients signifi-
cant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.  
The reference household is an occupied couple with mean characteristics in the other variables. The col-
umn headed “Probability Estimates” reports the probability of participation for the reference household, 
and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a one-standard-
deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable. 
Insurance
Dependant Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability 
variable (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%)
Female -0.7773 -8.15% -0.7416 -7.93% -0.0905 -2.17% -0.0604 -1.44%
(0.3510)** (0.3477)** (0.2101) (0.2090)
Male -0.6785 -7.53% -0.6790 -7.71% -0.3073 -7.44% -0.2933 -7.08%
(0.3705)* (0.3633)* (0.2232) (0.2195)
Age 0.0019 0.02% 0.0083 0.82% -0.0244 -0.58% -0.0233 -0.55%
(0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0067)*** (0.0064)***
Log income -0.0098 -0.09% -0.0075 -0.74% 0.4830 11.53% 0.4667 11.11%
(0.2509) (0.2462) (0.1681)*** (0.1654)***
Self-employed -1.3172 -18.99% -1.2516 -18.10% 0.6420 14.18% 0.6512 14.30%
(0.4172)*** (0.4130)*** (0.3371)* (0.3363)*
Financial literacy 0.5498 5.30% 0.4894 4.84% 0.5323 12.71% 0.5458 13.00%
(0.2151)** (0.2091)** (0.1370)*** (0.1345)***
Risk1 -0.0235 -0.23% -0.0039 -0.09%
(0.0082)*** (0.0064)
Risk2 0.0518 0.50% 0.0025 0.06%
(0.0244)** (0.0142)
Observations 778 786 778 786
Pseudo R2 0.0517 0.0354 0.0519 0.0514
Savings accounts
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The pseudo R-squared is also low for insurances. Age has a negative influence, which can be 
explained by looking at Figure 4.2: Many households with an average age over 60 years do 
not own insurance policies anymore as these policies have already become due. In contrast, 
the effect of income and self-employment is positive. This seems plausible as with higher 
income and self-employment, and thus more strongly varying income, there is more risk that 
can be insured. As with savings accounts, the effect of financial literacy is positive. 
Table 4.5 shows the results for investment funds and real estate. Again, the influence of fi-
nancial literacy is strongly significant. Higher income also leads to a higher probability of 
owning investment funds. In many cases there is a required minimum amount for the invest-
ment into investment funds. In addition, there are costs for the securities account and for 
transactions; it is thus usually not profitable to invest small amounts into these funds. There 
are no other significant variables for investment funds, which is not surprising as the asset 
type identifier is not very precise. Investment funds might include stocks, bonds, real estate, 
the money market, or even hedge funds.  
Table 4.5: Market participation: investment funds and real estate 
The table reports determinants of investment funds and real estate ownership (logit regressions) for all 
households. Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients signifi-
cant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.  
The reference household is an occupied couple with mean characteristics in the other variables. The col-
umn headed “Probability Estimates” reports the probability of participation for the reference household, 
and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a one-standard-
deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable. 
Investment funds Real estate
Dependant Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability 
variable (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%)
Female -0.0938 -2.34% -0.0906 -2.26% -0.7853 -18.09% -0.7754 -17.85%
(0.2097) (0.2077) (0.2481)*** (0.2452)***
Male -0.0432 -1.08% -0.0381 -0.95% -0.6739 -15.24% -0.6810 -15.37%
(0.2238) (0.2187) (0.2659)** (0.2697)***
Age 0.0094 0.23% 0.0070 0.18% 0.0642 1.53% 0.0670 1.60%
(0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0081)*** (0.0079)***
Log income 0.3978 9.92% 0.3623 9.04% 0.5973 14.22% 0.5930 14.11%
(0.1680)** (0.1642)** (0.2039)*** (0.1988)***
Self-employed -0.3421 -8.41% -0.3073 -7.57% -0.1579 -3.70% -0.1160 -2.73%
(0.2925) (0.2902) (0.3365) (0.3361)
Financial literacy 0.7836 19.54% 0.8236 20.54% 1.5069 35.89% 1.4782 35.17%
(0.1385)*** (0.1357)*** (0.1786)*** (0.1744)***
Risk1 0.0094 0.23% -0.0119 -0.28%
(0.0064) (0.0081)
Risk2 0.0042 0.10% 0.0353 0.84%
(0.0142) (0.0170)**
Observations 778 786 778 786
Pseudo R2 0.0678 0.0636 0.2892 0.2863  
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Note that for real estate, we have no information in our dataset whether the households really 
live in their own flat or house or whether they own it for investment purposes; we neverthe-
less find the highest R-squared for this asset type. Couples are much more likely to own real 
estate than single women or men. For the reference household, a shift from couple to single 
woman (single man) would reduce the probability of owning real estate by 19.14 (15.37) per-
cent. There is also a significant positive influence of age, income, and financial literacy on 
owning real estate.26
Table 4.6 shows the results for stocks and savings bonds. The probability of owning stocks 
increases with age and self-employed households are less likely to own stocks. The probabili-
ty for a self-employed household is 16.47 percent lower than for an employed household. This 
result is consistent with the normative theory. Self-employed households normally do not 
have a fixed income. If income from human capital is volatile, then it is rational to hedge 
these deviations with the financial capital and to prefer safer investments. Oftentimes, it is 
also the case that the own business ties up the main part of the investable wealth. For income, 
we again find a positive influence. The participation in the stock market goes along with some 
fixed costs of information etc. that are seen as one reason for the low participation rate. More-
over, there are costs for the securities account and for the transactions. If people do not reach 
the critical level of income or wealth, investing in stocks is not profitable. Financial literacy 
also has a significant positive influence. Surprisingly we do not find an influence of the risk 
attitude measures, which may be due to the special context of the risk questions. Individuals 
were asked to provide percentages of maximum accepted loss for their concrete planned in-
 These results seem plausible as a lot of people settle down and invest in 
real estate after having finished their education, having found a partner and planning to have a 
family etc. (see e.g. Diaz-Serrano (2005)). In addition, the minimum investment amount is 
quite high and the asset is highly illiquid compared to the other asset types. The second risk 
measure also turns out to have a positive influence; the existing literature, however, does not 
agree on this point. Housing is a long-term asset that delivers positive services to their owners 
(see e.g. Sinai and Souleles (2005), Pelizzon and Weber (2008)). People owning real estate 
can tolerate a higher loss at the end of the investment horizon because running expenses for 
housing are normally lower than comparable rent. However, real estate is also an illiquid as-
set, which might lead to higher risk aversion (see e.g. Cocco (2005), Yao and Zhang (2005)). 
                                                 
26 We do not include total wealth in the analysis because of the low data quality (many missing or incomplete 
observations). In case we include total wealth it is insignificant but we lose a lot of observations.  
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vestment, i.e. for the amount they plan to (re)invest. As stated before, this does not necessarily 
have to reflect the general financial risk attitude of the households. 
Table 4.6: Market participation: stocks and savings bonds  
The table reports determinants of stocks and savings bonds ownership (logit regressions) for all house-
holds. Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 
the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.  
The reference household is an occupied couple with mean characteristics in the other variables. The col-
umn headed “Probability Estimates” reports the probability of participation for the reference household, 
and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a one-standard-
deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable. 
Stocks Savings bonds
Dependant Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability 
variable (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%)
Female -0.2223 -3.25% -0.1819 -2.72% 0.0916 0.72% 0.0347 0.28%
(0.2515) (0.2483) (0.3195) (0.3162)
Male -0.3164 -4.46% -0.2110 -3.09% -0.7049 -4.80% -0.8032 -5.45%
(0.2663) (0.2583) (0.3841)* (0.3766)*
Age 0.0183 0.27% 0.0150 0.23% -0.0053 -0.04% -0.0041 -0.03%
(0.0081)** (0.0078)* (0.0110) (0.0106)
Log income 0.4034 5.99% 0.4326 6.56% 0.3788 2.97% 0.3601 2.86%
(0.1968)** (0.1930)** (0.2473) (0.2427)
Self-employed -1.2105 -12.93% -1.1292 -12.62% -0.0534 -0.41% -0.0987 -0.76%
(0.4011)*** (0.3929)*** (0.4095) (0.4064)
Financial literacy 0.8879 13.19% 0.9461 14.35% 1.0311 8.07% 0.9524 7.56%
(0.1525)*** (0.1496)*** (0.1870)*** (0.1810)***
Risk1 0.0104 0.15% -0.0078 -0.06%
(0.0075) (0.0107)
Risk2 0.0195 0.29% -0.0116 -0.09%
(0.0156) (0.0234)
Observations 778 786 778 786
Pseudo R2 0.1081 0.1022 0.0878 0.0818  
 
Table 4.7 shows the results for the two most unpopular asset types: bonds and federal savings 
bonds. As for all other asset types, higher financial literacy goes hand in hand with a higher 
probability of owning bonds and/or federal savings bonds. For bonds, as for stocks before, the 
influence of age is positive and the influence of self-employment negative. As there are fixed 
costs for investing, it is surprising that we do not find an influence of income; this might be 
due to the fact that this asset class is rather unpopular and thus even many high-income 
households do not invest into this asset type. 
For federal savings bonds, the second risk measure turns out to have a negative influence. 
State-issued savings bonds normally pay a lower interest rate than do industry bonds, which is 
compensated with a lower default risk. Moreover, federal savings bonds have no price risk 
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over the investment period. After a one-year holding period, they may be returned to the state 
at any time at a price of 100 percent. 
Table 4.7: Market participation: bonds and federal savings bonds 
The table reports determinants of bonds and federal savings bonds ownership (logit regressions) for all 
households. Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients signifi-
cant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.  
The reference household is an occupied couple with mean characteristics in the other variables. The col-
umn headed “Probability Estimates” reports the probability of participation for the reference household, 
and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a one-standard-
deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable. 
Bonds Federal savings bonds
Dependant Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability Coefficients Probability 
variable (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%) (Std. Errors) Estimates (%)
Female 0.7210 3.19% 0.6863 3.04% 0.1904 0.44% 0.1205 0.34%
(0.4056)* (0.3991)* (0.5191) (0.5161)
Male 0.4744 2.14% 0.4437 2.00% -0.4821 -0.97% -0.6595 -1.60%
(0.4314) (0.4207) (0.6318) (0.6245)
Age 0.0439 0.18% 0.0430 0.17% -0.0015 0.00% -0.0015 0.00%
(0.0126)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0177) (0.0172)
Log income -0.0356 -0.14% -0.0200 -0.17% 0.2847 0.64% 0.2049 0.57%
(0.2860) (0.2790) (0.3885) (0.3883)
Self-employed -1.7942 -4.02% -1.8269 -4.08% -0.0164 -0.04% -0.0885 -0.24%
(1.0853)* (1.0893)* (0.6887) (0.6826)
Financial literacy 1.0122 4.06% 1.0769 4.08% 0.8713 1.95% 0.8043 2.25%
(0.2109)*** (0.2062)*** (0.2766)*** (0.2717)***
Risk1 0.0029 0.01% -0.0046 -0.01%
(0.0133) (0.0175)
Risk2 0.0271 0.11% -0.1696 -0.38%
(0.0237) (0.1014)**
Observations 778 786 778 786
Pseudo R2 0.1447 0.1450 0.0794 0.0475  
 
To summarize, we can confirm our results from the previous bivariate analyses. Higher finan-
cial literacy leads to a higher probability of owning any particular asset type, which holds true 
for all eight asset types. Higher income also has a positive influence; it is significant for four 
asset types. Higher age leads to a higher participation for stocks, bonds, and real estate. As 
insurance policies mostly become due at the age of 60+, we find a decrease in participation 
rates for older people. For some asset types, couples have a significantly higher participation 
probability. Besides real estate, this is true for savings accounts and savings bonds. Self-
employment decreases the probability of owning savings accounts, stocks, and bonds. Note 
that our results for risk tolerance are not convincing, an issue we will discuss in further detail 
in Section 4.5. 
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4.4.4 Diversification 
We use two naive measures of diversification over asset types. With our data, we are not able 
to look at diversification within asset types. Our measures take into account the eight different 
asset types we have analyzed separately before: savings accounts, savings bonds, federal sav-
ings bonds, bonds, stocks, investment funds, insurance, and real estate. Naive diversification 
only takes into account the number of different asset types. It does not provide information on 
the exact securities, nor on the number of different securities or the exact quantities. Conse-
quently, according to our measures, a household owning stocks of only one company and sav-
ings bonds is equally well diversified as a household with stocks of ten different companies 
and a savings account.  
In the literature, there is no agreement on a single measure of diversification. There are stu-
dies that use the total number of securities in a portfolio as a measure of diversification (e.g. 
Blume and Friend (1975)), or others that also consider correlations among returns (e.g. 
Goetzmann et al. (2005)). To measure diversification over asset types, the studies oftentimes 
classify the assets into broader categories according to their riskiness. For instance, Eymann 
and Boersch-Supan (2002) look at “clearly safe”, “fairly safe”, and “risky” assets, whereas 
Barasinska et al. (2008) look at “safe”, “relatively risky”, and “risky” assets.   
Our first measure also classifies the eight asset types into broader classes. The first measure 
(diversification 1) is based on four categories (risk-free assets, risky assets, insurance, and real 
estate). We consider savings accounts, savings bonds, and federal savings bonds as risk-free 
assets. There is no interest rate risk or price risk, and only a very low default risk as the finan-
cial institution or the state guarantees the returns, respectively. In contrast, stocks, bonds, and 
investment funds are risky assets as their prices are volatile. Even if - for bonds - a fixed in-
terest rate is paid, the price of the bonds varies with changes in the interest level. In addition, 
the default risk is considerably higher than with savings accounts or (federal) savings bonds. 
Insurance policies constitute a special case and are thus considered as a separate investment 
category. A life insurance policy is a long-term contract; investors make high losses if they 
have to cancel the contract in the first years. The real return upon termination should be posi-
tive as insurance companies guarantee a minimum interest rate (on the contributions less 
charges) but, nevertheless, the expected profit participation is uncertain. We also consider real 
estate as a separate investment category. Besides the normal investment returns (increases in 
value, rental income), real estate also provides utility if the investor lives in his own house or 
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flat. As a robustness check, our second diversification measure (diversification 2) does not 
classify the asset types but considers all eight asset types separately. 
Table 4.8 shows the distribution of households by the number of asset categories/types in 
their portfolio. Diversification 1 is measured on a scale from 0 (0 asset categories in the port-
folio) to 4 (4 asset categories in the portfolio), diversification 2 on a scale from 0 to 8 (0 to 8 
asset types in the portfolio). 4 percent of the households do not have any assets in their portfo-
lio. About 16 percent hold assets of only one category in their portfolio. Most households are 
diversified to a certain degree with two (29 percent) or three asset categories (34 percent) in 
their portfolio. Only 17 percent of the households hold a fully diversified portfolio with all 
four categories.  
The results for diversification 2 are similar. 28 percent of the households hold four or more 
different asset types, but keep in mind that this does not necessarily imply full diversification. 
11 percent (28 percent minus 17 percent) hold four or more different asset types but these 
types do not cover all four asset categories.  
Table 4.8: Diversification, descriptive 
The table shows the distribution of households by the number of assets. Diversification 1 is based on 4 
asset categories (risk-free assets, risky assets, insurance, real estate), diversification 2 is based on 8 asset 
types (savings accounts, savings bonds, federal savings bonds, bonds, stocks, investment funds, insur-
ance, real estate). 
Diversification 1 Diversification 2
# Assets # Households Percentage # Households Percentage
0 31 3.75% 31 3.75%
1 135 16.32% 124 14.99%
2 243 29.38% 208 25.15%
3 280 33.86% 232 28.05%
4 138 16.69% 139 16.81%
5 66 7.98%
6 21 2.54%
7 4 0.48%
8 2 0.24%
827 100.00% 827 100.00%  
 
Table 4.9 shows the results of an ordered logit regression analysis for diversification measures 
1 and 2. The determinants of a higher diversification are similar to those of the participation 
decisions. Couples have better diversified portfolios compared to single households. This re-
sult is consistent with Figure 4.1 showing couples have the highest participation rate over all 
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asset types except bonds. Older households and those with higher income are also better di-
versified. The same is true for households with higher financial literacy. The results are in line 
with a wide variety of studies, even if those use more sophisticated diversification measures 
(see e.g. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), Campbell (2006), Dorn and Huberman (2005), or 
Eymann and Boersch-Supan (2002)).  
Table 4.9: Diversification 
The table reports determinants of the diversification measures (ordered logit regressions). Diversification 
1 is based on 4 asset categories (risk-free assets, risky assets, insurance, real estate), diversification 2 is 
based on 8 asset types (savings accounts, savings bonds, federal savings bonds, bonds, stocks, investment 
funds, insurance, real estate). Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. 
Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by 
***. 
Diversification 1 Diversification 2
Female -0.3650 -0.3900 -0.3293 -0.3378
(0.1869)* (0.1881)** (0.1820)* (0.1834)*
Male -0.4902 -0.5004 -0.5979 -0.5896
(0.1947)** (0.1978)** (0.1896)*** (0.1923)***
Age 0.0173 0.0160 0.0194 0.0187
(0.0057)*** (0.0058)*** (0.0056)*** (0.0058)***
Log income 0.7221 0.7395 0.6635 0.6839
(0.1469)*** (0.1496)*** (0.1443)*** (0.1467)***
Self-employed -0.2631 -0.2993 -0.4476 -0.4713
(0.2648) (0.2654) (0.2494)* (0.2504)*
Financial literacy 1.4023 1.3891 1.6481 1.6273
(0.1284)*** (0.1310)*** (0.1262)*** (0.1287)***
Risk1 -0.0049 -0.0030
(0.0057) (0.0056)
Risk2 0.0204 0.0153
(0.0123)* (0.0120)
Observations 786 778 786 778
Pseudo R2 0.1181 0.1185 0.1196 0.1193  
 
Self-employed households show a lower diversification only for measure 2. As self-employed 
households typically invest part of their wealth into the own business, this result is not sur-
prising. We only find a weak significant influence of risk. Again we use our risk data as a 
proxy for the general financial risk attitude. Households tolerating a higher loss at the end of 
the investment period are better diversified. This result is contradictory to the classical portfo-
lio theory: A highly risk averse household is expected to hold a highly diversified portfolio in 
order to minimize the variance of returns. Dorn and Huberman (2005) find evidence for this 
hypothesis with a German dataset. They find that investors with a greater risk tolerance hold 
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less diversified portfolios. Gomes and Michaelides (2005) also predict that households with 
low risk aversion accumulate only little wealth to buffer earnings shocks and, consequently, 
most of them do not invest into stocks. Households with a greater risk aversion accumulate 
more wealth and consequently acquire more assets. In contrast, King and Leape (1998) find 
that risk averse investors are less likely to invest into risky assets because they limit their port-
folio to safe assets. Barasinka et al. (2008) also find that higher risk aversion does not lead to 
a more diversified portfolio. Campbell (2006) finds that stock market participation is a hump-
shaped function of risk tolerance.  
4.5 Household Portfolios and Risk Tolerance 
We already mentioned that our risk measures only serve as proxies for the general financial 
risk attitude. Customers at the consumer center are explicitly asked about their risk prefe-
rences (tolerable loss) regarding their current investment; we thus hypothesize that the exist-
ing portfolio has an influence on the current investment decision. For instance, a household 
with a savings account and federal saving bonds is more likely to invest into riskier asset 
types than a household who already holds stocks and bonds (“diversification over asset 
types”). But it might also be the other way round: Some households might focus on safe asset 
types (see e.g. King and Leape (1998)) and thus will still show a high risk aversion even if 
there are already safe components in the portfolio. Likewise, those who already hold risky 
assets might also tolerate higher losses in the future (“constant risk tolerance”). Because of 
the exceptional time dimension in our dataset (existing portfolio given, risk preference ques-
tions regarding new investment) we analyze the risk preferences in further detail. 
Both practitioners and researchers make use of various methods to measure individuals’ risk 
attitudes, which can be classified in two groups - self-assessment tasks and choice tasks. Ask-
ing people to indicate their willingness to take risks on a subjective scale with a single state-
ment (like for example “Please evaluate your investor type” or “ Please state your willingness 
to take risks”) is certainly the simplest way of eliciting risk attitudes (see e.g. Dohmen et al. 
(2010a)). In addition, it is possible to ask subjects multiple questions instead of just a single 
one and to aggregate the answers to a single risk attitude measure.  
Unfortunately, there are several problems associated with these simple self-assessment tasks: 
First, customers might consciously or unconsciously misjudge their own willingness to take 
risks. Higbee (1971) shows that subjects exhibit the tendency to systematically either under- 
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or overestimate their aversion to risks in subjective self-assessment tasks. Analyzing data 
from the Socio-Economic Panel in Germany, Klos (2008) shows that subjects exhibit the ten-
dency to choose the middle of the scale in survey questions, leading to a biased measurement 
of risk preferences. The fact that consumers might be prone to misjudging their willingness to 
take risks in financial decisions calls into question the validity and reliability of these simple 
self-assessment tasks. Second, some surveys use a single self-assessment question and ask 
clients to state how risk averse they are in a general context. Amongst others, Slovic (1972a), 
Weber et al. (2002), and Rettinger and Hastie (2001) illustrate that risk taking behavior is 
strictly domain specific. As people are not consistently risk averse or risk seeking across all 
domains, it is not advisable to elicit their risk attitude in a general context. Third, practitioners 
sometimes use self-assessment tasks with a single question to elicit both the risk attitude and 
the product types a client wants to invest in. These mixed tasks typically advise highly risk 
averse customers to invest only into risk-free assets, moderately risk averse clients to invest 
into risk-free assets and bonds, and customers with a very small degree of risk aversion to 
invest into a mix of risk-free assets, bonds, and stocks. Those investors that would like to in-
vest in stocks automatically have to state that they are hardly risk averse at all and prefer a 
speculative investment strategy. This is contrary to the two-fund separation theorem (Tobin 
(1958)) wherein all subjects invest in a given mix of the market portfolio and a risk-free asset 
with the subjective risk attitude determining the exact ratio of risk-free to risky assets. Thus, 
while practitioners using this mixed method would advise moderately risk averse customers 
not to invest in stocks at all, researchers argue that these investors could be better off, i.e. earn 
higher returns with the same amount of risk, by investing into a mix of the market portfolio 
and a risk-free asset. Fourth, practitioners using questionnaires with multiple self-assessment 
tasks instead of a single one often combine questions asking for investment horizons, invest-
ment experience, investment goals, and risk aversion to calculate an aggregated risk attitude 
score. Again, the problem is that these multiple self-assessment tasks do not measure risk atti-
tude per se but a mix of related variables. For example, a very risk averse and highly expe-
rienced customer who has excessively optimistic expectations about future stock returns 
might end up, according to these questionnaires, with the same portfolio as a risk loving cus-
tomer who has rational expectations and no expertise in stock investments. Thus, instead of 
measuring individual risk preferences, these integrated methods also capture differences in 
beliefs and expertise. 
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Because of these shortcomings of self-assessment tasks, many researchers make use of more 
sophisticated choice tasks. The most common method used is the certainty equivalent method 
within the lottery domain (for an overview, see Clemen (1996)). Subjects are asked to state 
the sure amount that would make them indifferent between a risky lottery and a risk-free as-
set. In pair wise comparisons of lotteries, subjects have to repeatedly indicate their preference 
for one of two possible lotteries (see e.g. Holt and Laury (2002) and Klos and Weber (2003)). 
Closely related to these lottery tasks are choice dilemma decisions (see e.g. Kogan and Wal-
lach (1964)). In choice dilemma decisions, subjects are asked to judge two situations that are 
directly related to real life decisions and to choose which of the two situations they would 
prefer. In addition, researchers rely on hypothetical portfolio choice questions where subjects 
are asked to construct a portfolio that best suits their risk-return preferences (see e.g. Dohmen 
et al. (2010a)). However, choice tasks have several disadvantages as well: First, the illustra-
tion of many of these tasks is not very precise, requiring people to form their own beliefs 
about possible outcomes of a task. Hence, it is not clear whether differences in choices stem 
from differences in beliefs or differences in risk attitudes. Second, most choice tasks in prac-
tice are designed as lotteries and not as financial investment decisions. Nosic and Weber 
(2010) show that risk attitudes inferred from abstract lottery tasks do not necessarily coincide 
with risk taking behavior in investment decisions. Moreover, Baucells and Villasis (2010) 
argue that in these lottery tasks, there is a substantial error or noise, which may disguise sub-
jects’ true preferences. To overcome some of the problems recent studies present much more 
complex and time-consuming risk tools that rely on a graphical representation of outcomes 
(see e.g. Goldstein et al. (2006)). To sum up, all different methods used to elicit risk prefe-
rences of an individual have their respective pros and cons and there is no agreement on an 
optimal method thus far. 
The method used by the consumer center is directly related to the current investment. Fur-
thermore, they differentiate between losses “over the investment period” and “at the end of 
the investment period”. Consumers twice have to choose between two statements.  
O The assets should at least remain constant over the investment period.  
O The assets can decrease by at most xx % (worst case) over the investment period, if 
there is a good chance of revaluation.  
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Consumers can check the first statement or check and enter a percentage in the second state-
ment. Note that entering the percentage 0 in the second statement is the equivalent of check-
ing the first statement. 
O The assets should at least have remained constant at the end of the investment pe-
riod.  
O The assets can have decreased by at most xx % (worst case) at the end of the in-
vestment period. I know there are investments that cannot exclude losses, but also offer 
the chance of higher returns.  
Again consumers can check the first statement or check and enter a percentage in the second 
statement. The percentage 0 in the second statement is the equivalent of checking the first 
statement. 
Note that these measures are useless from an academic point of view; they are not compatible 
with rational decision making. The expected utility theory models preferences about risk and 
return. Thus, it is not possible to obtain a utility function by asking people about tolerable 
losses without stating corresponding expected returns and probabilities. In the normative 
theory, higher returns go along with higher risk. If the expected return is 10 percent, then pos-
sibly someone can tolerate a loss of 20 percent if the probability for such a loss is 10 percent. 
It is not clear ex ante that this person would tolerate the same loss if the expected return was 
only 5 percent.  
Nevertheless, the consumer center uses this more intuitive shortfall approach. Perhaps the 
method can at best be compared with the value function of prospect theory (see Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979)). If the investment amount serves as a reference point, the percentage of 
tolerable loss could be the asymptote for the function in the loss domain. Since all methods of 
eliciting risk preferences have their pros and cons, we are convinced that even the method of 
the consumer center may deliver further insight into risk preferences of German investors. As 
already mentioned, our data exhibits an exceptional time structure; we thus want to have a 
closer look at explanatory factors of the two measures as well as at existing differences.  
As gender typically is a driving factor of risk preferences, we split the couples and differen-
tiate between men and women in the following. This is not a problem as we typically have 
one female and one male observation for a couple. 
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Table 4.10: Risk preferences, influence of the investment horizon  
Part 1 of the table reports risk preferences for women and men: risk1 (maximum percentage of loss tole-
rated over the investment horizon), risk2 (maximum percentage of loss tolerated at the end of the invest-
ment horizon). 
Parts 2 and 3 report results of a median split according to the investment horizon. The median investment 
horizon is 12.125 years. The last column shows Pearson correlation coefficients between risk1 and risk2.  
Risk preferences Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Correlation
All observations (Risk1-Risk2)
Women
Risk1 597 10.82 10 13.11 0 100 0.3909
Risk2 600 2.13 0 5.60 0 50
Men
Risk1 495 12.95 10 14.17 0 100 0.3950
Risk2 502 2.68 0 5.97 0 40
Investment horizon < median (12.125 years)
Women
Risk1 298 9.86 10 11.95 0 90 0.5045
Risk2 300 2.38 0 5.76 0 40
Men
Risk1 242 12.28 10 13.63 0 90 0.4267
Risk2 246 3.00 0 6.49 0 40
Investment horizon > median (12.125 years)
Women
Risk1 299 11.77 10 14.12 0 100 0.3033
Risk2 300 1.88 0 5.43 0 50
Men
Risk1 252 13.55 10 14.68 0 100 0.3787
Risk2 255 2.38 0 5.44 0 25  
 
In the upper part, Table 4.10 shows the correlation for women and men between risk meas-
ures 1 and 2. The correlation between risk1 (over) and risk2 (end) is about 0.4 for both men 
and women - people really seem to differentiate between “over the investment period” and “at 
the end of the investment period”.27
                                                 
27 Unreported Spearman rank correlation coefficients show similar results. 
 We hypothesize that the investment horizon plays an im-
portant role. For a short horizon, we expect that risk1 and risk2 move together. This seems 
plausible because there is no long period between beginning and end of the investment period. 
To test this relationship, we conduct a median split of the data. The median investment period 
in our sample is 12.125 years, which is quite high but not surprisingly so, as about 83 percent 
of the people go to the consumer center to talk about retirement provisions (see Table 4.2).  
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In the lower part, Table 4.10 shows the results for the median split. For a short (below the 
median) investment horizon, the tolerated risk over the investment period (risk1) is lower than 
for a long horizon (above the median), with 9.86 percent compared to 11.77 percent for wom-
en (difference significant at 10 percent level) and 12.28 percent compared to 13.55 percent for 
men. On the contrary, the accepted loss is lower for a long horizon, 1.88 percent versus 2.38 
percent for woman and 2.38 percent versus 3.00 percent for men. 
At first glance, the hypothesized influence of the investment horizon can be found; the corre-
lation is higher for a short investment horizon (below the median), but the difference in corre-
lations is only significant for women. In the following, we analyze the coherence and deter-
mining factors of risk1 and risk2 in further detail. Besides the investment horizon, we analyze 
demographic variables, whether it is a one-time investment or regular savings, which assets 
the investor already holds and the reason for the counseling interview.  
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 show tobit regression analyses for risk measure 1 for women and men. 
The results are quite similar for women and men. In line with the literature, age has a strong 
negative influence on risk tolerance (see e.g. Guiso and Paiella (2008)). The older a person 
the lower the tolerated shortfall over the investment period. As women are on average more 
risk averse than men it is not surprising that men living in a relationship (married, engaged, 
cohabitation) are more risk averse than single men. Normally, both partners make decisions 
together and through the exchange of views, the partners influence each other. More surpri-
singly, the same is true for women, when in a relationship they are more risk averse as well. It 
seems that couples do not adapt their risk attitudes to their partner’s but independently from 
gender become more risk averse. Similar effects can be found in Dohmen et al. (2010a). They 
control for marital status (married or not) and find that married people are more risk averse 
than single people. They also control for existing children and find a stronger risk aversion, 
however the effect of marriage is persistent even after controlling for children. Financial lite-
racy influences the risk tolerance positively; the higher the overall literacy about asset types, 
the higher the accepted loss. These results are in line with the literature, (see e.g. Dohmen et 
al. (2010b)). We also find a positive influence of self-employment. Surprisingly, we find only 
a weak influence of monthly net income for men, and for women the influence is not signifi-
cant. Monthly expenses do not seem to have an impact. We also controlled for total wealth 
but found no significant impact either. Because of many missing observations for total wealth, 
we excluded the variable from the further analysis. For men, we find limited evidence that the 
risk tolerance is higher for one-time investments compared to savings rates and also higher for 
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longer investment horizons. This seems plausible as for longer horizons there is also more 
time for a revaluation after possible losses.  
Concerning the existing asset categories in the given portfolio, we find the following: If 
women already hold risky assets (stocks, bonds, investment funds) the risk tolerance for a 
new investment is higher, whereas the opposite is true for risk-free assets (savings accounts, 
(federal) savings bonds). The effect for risk-free assets for men is the same. The dummy for 
risky assets becomes significant only it we drop financial literacy, so the effect seems to be 
about general financial literacy and not in particular about risky assets. These results are in 
favor of the “constant risk tolerance hypothesis”, i.e. households that already hold safe assets 
have a higher tendency to choose a safe investment again and, vice versa, households already 
holding risky assets exhibit a higher risk tolerance for the current investment again. 
For women, the risk tolerance is higher when they want to save for retirement. For men, the 
risk tolerance is lower if they aim at receiving government aid. This might be due to the fact 
that government aid more concretely means to make use of the “Riester-aid” in the majority 
of the interviews. This aid is only granted when, among other requirements, the nominal pre-
servation of assets is guaranteed.  
We also tested the personal influence of the advisor. From 2006 to 2008, there were eight 
different advisors working at the consumer center. We hypothesized that the way of explain-
ing the risk statements and the specific style of the advisor could influence the answers; how-
ever, we do not find evidence for the advisor’s influence in our data. None of the advisor 
dummies is significant in any of the regressions we performed. 
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Table 4.11: Risk preference women (over the investment horizon)  
The table reports determinants of the risk preference over the investment horizon (tobit regressions) for 
women. Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 
the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Risk1: Risk preference women (over)
Age -0.4922 -0.4694 -0.4476 -0.4394 -0.4174
(0.0900)*** (0.0952)*** (0.0945)*** (0.1040)*** (0.1061)***
Couple -5.3570 -5.0109 -4.8797 -5.4969 -5.1435
(2.2327)** (2.2357)** (2.2176)** (2.2209)** (2.2216)**
Log income 3.2084 3.2248 3.0879 2.7403 2.6575
(2.8333) (2.8218) (2.8182) (2.9421) (2.9376)
Log expenses 3.5316 2.6269 2.8204 3.5343 2.7451
(2.9222) (2.9304) (2.8991) (2.9206) (2.9374)
Self-employed 4.4233 4.4166 4.8926 4.0065 3.8586
(2.6835)* (2.6521)* (2.6021)* (2.6924) (2.6634)
Financial literacy 5.4863 4.3038 5.3543 4.2451
(1.5295)*** (1.6498)*** (1.5259)*** (1.6498)***
One-time investment 2.1125 1.3998 1.3991 0.8743 0.5716
(2.2265) (2.2313) (2.2252) (2.3288) (2.3290)
Investment horizon 0.0066 0.0584 0.0850 0.1560 0.1957
(0.1431) (0.1424) (0.1420) (0.1589) (0.1589)
Risk-free assets -4.7226 -4.7812 -5.3996
(2.6938)* (2.6535)* (2.7156)**
Risky assets 6.3816 7.7586 6.1562
(1.9488)*** (1.8862)*** (1.9274)***
Real-estate 0.4604 2.4263 0.7509
(2.3368) (2.2397) (2.3434)
Insurance 1.1055 1.5904 0.5657
(1.8681) (1.8589) (1.8675)
Credit -1.7192 -1.0329 -1.4970
(2.3434) (2.3120) (2.3349)
Reason retirement 5.5771 6.1113
(2.9205)* (2.9420)**
Reason governmental aid -3.5377 -3.4642
(2.1415)* (2.1135)
Reason savings 2.1374 1.6418
(1.9309) (1.9195)
Reason real estate 3.7094 3.8723
(2.2833) (2.2781)*
Reason purchase 2.8170 2.7227
(2.4589) (2.4377)
Reason generate income 1.2737 0.8609
(2.9367) (2.9131)
Reason children 3.9964 3.4782
(3.0605) (3.0336)
Constant -34.6966 -27.0505 -22.4512 -39.8212 -31.7406
(15.9393)** (16.3651)* -16.1779 (16.5725)** (16.8750)*
Observations 498 498 512 498 498
Pseudo R2 0.0177 0.0231 0.0216 0.0221 0.0273  
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Table 4.12: Risk preference men (over the investment horizon)  
The table reports determinants of the risk preference over the investment horizon (tobit regressions) for 
men. Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 
the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Risk1: Risk preference men (over)
Age -0.4098 -0.3971 -0.3810 -0.4116 -0.3957
(0.0974)*** (0.1012)*** (0.1019)*** (0.1100)*** (0.1112)***
Couple -5.8924 -5.4094 -6.8200 -4.5556 -3.9987
(2.3929)** (2.3859)** (2.3972)*** (2.3955)* (2.3897)*
Log income 5.2176 5.6405 6.2993 4.5342 5.0153
(3.0852)* (3.1081)* (3.1377)** (3.1570) (3.1808)
Log expenses -2.6647 -2.6803 -2.2132 -2.7021 -2.7788
(3.0858) (3.1017) (3.1358) (3.0685) (3.0805)
Self-employed 4.7559 4.9532 4.7639 4.3955 4.5753
(2.5641)* (2.5724)* (2.6022)* (2.5708)* (2.5805)*
Financial literacy 6.9480 7.0762 7.0410 7.3469
(1.6585)*** (1.8233)*** (1.6634)*** (1.8158)***
One-time investment 4.2008 4.4992 5.6460 2.4199 3.0400
(2.4563)* (2.4950)* (2.5008)** (2.5839) (2.6120)
Investment horizon 0.1504 0.1588 0.1825 0.3242 0.3239
(0.1533) (0.1520) (0.1531) (0.1733)* (0.1720)*
Risk-free assets -6.9773 -5.7883 -6.9548
(3.3084)** (3.3035)* (3.2928)**
Risky assets 3.2109 4.7664 2.7293
(2.1326) (2.0937)** (2.1195)
Real-estate -1.8268 2.2021 -2.3361
(2.5574) (2.4406) (2.5915)
Insurance -2.3224 -2.0202 -2.6271
(2.1356) (2.1584) (2.1560)
Credit 0.4962 -6.9548 1.0506
(2.4986) (2.5053) (2.4806)
Reason retirement 3.9655 4.2198
(3.0374) (3.0288)
Reason governmental aid -5.2352 -5.3990
(2.3333)** (2.3128)**
Reason savings 3.8435 3.3416
(2.1648)* (2.1437)
Reason real estate 2.6281 2.6174
(2.4593) (2.4750)
Reason purchase 2.3401 2.2532
(2.8093) (2.7972)
Reason generate income 0.1911 -0.1620
(3.3479) (3.3079)
Reason children 3.9128 4.2902
(3.2132) (3.2045)
Constant -10.6927 -8.8316 -7.3205 -10.9263 -9.0163
(17.3711) (17.6376) (17.8455) (17.8240) (17.9229)
Observations 420 420 430 420 420
Pseudo R2 0.0190 0.0223 0.0168 0.0236 0.0269  
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The results for the second risk measure are not as strong as for the first. Tables 4.13 and 4.14 
show the results. For women, the only weakly significant explanatory variable is marital sta-
tus. Women living in a relationship are more risk averse than single women, the reason for 
this probably being that only about 16 percent of the women gave a percentage higher than 
zero; the rest chose the second statement. The variation for men is higher, with 21 percent 
tolerating a loss higher than zero. The results for men for the second risk measure are compa-
rable to the results for the first one. Age and living in a relationship have a negative influence 
on the risk tolerance. The higher the income and financial knowledge, the higher the risk to-
lerance. Self-employment also has a positive influence. If men already hold risky assets 
classes, their risk tolerance is higher. We again find a significant effect for government aid. If 
men aim at receiving government aid, they are more risk averse. We also find an influence of 
existing credit obligations; the risk tolerance is higher if credit obligations exist. We only con-
sidered obligations that exceed three times the monthly net income to exclude short-term ac-
count overcheckings. At first glance, this might be surprising, as with further obligations one 
would expect a higher risk aversion. But on closer inspection, this finding is in line with the 
literature on borrowing. Dahlbaeck (1991) shows that people with a greater risk aversion 
show a lower willingness to use credit. Individuals with debts accept a greater economic risk 
because debts go along with costs in the form of interest and repayments that decrease the 
liquid assets. Moreover, apart from these future financial restrictions, there are also psycho-
logical costs of credit use. Livingstone and Lunt (1993) find that people have different psy-
chological attitudes toward debts. Some see debts as a part of everyday life; others see it as a 
failure. Brown et al. (2005) analyze the relation between credit and psychological well-being 
and find that households with greater outstanding (non-mortgage) credit are less likely to re-
port total psychological well-being.  
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Table 4.13: Risk preference women (at the end of the investment horizon)  
The table reports determinants of the risk preference at the end of the investment horizon (tobit regres-
sions) for women. Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients 
significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Risk2: Risk preference women (end)
Age 0.1074 0.0447 0.0436 0.1142 0.0634
(0.1434) (0.1537) (0.1511) (0.1676) (0.1727)
Couple -5.5015 -6.3470 -7.0947 -5.5644 0.0634
(3.6796) (3.7241)* (3.6551)* (3.6604) (3.7054)*
Log income 4.1078 3.0178 2.8129 2.8898 1.6496
(4.4479) (4.4718) (4.4102) (4.7107) (4.7608)
Log expenses 2.2046 1.6255 1.9641 2.0180 1.5581
(4.5897) (4.6507) (4.5565) (4.6115) (4.6886)
Self-employed 1.8474 2.0490 2.5091 1.8536 2.1137
(4.3543) (4.3423) (4.2065) (4.3543) (4.3504)
Financial literacy 1.6043 -0.5332 1.6133 -0.5723
(2.4415) (2.6889) (2.4345) (2.6855)
One-time investment -0.1418 0.3349 0.3185 -0.8298 -0.4236
(3.6464) (3.6584) (3.6003) (3.8439) (3.8581)
Investment horizon -0.1225 -0.0517 -0.0471 0.0068 0.1151
(0.2385) (0.2399) (0.2365) (0.2647) (0.2679)
Risk-free assets 0.0961 0.6248 0.4570
(4.5920) (4.5148) (4.6483)
Risky assets 2.8180 2.9052 2.5335
(3.2591) (3.0965) (3.2289)
Real-estate 5.3188 5.6311 5.3158
(3.8006) (3.6032) (3.8369)
Insurance 0.1057 0.0882 0.1234
(3.1364) (3.0819) (3.1456)
Credit 2.8964 3.0526 3.3811
(3.7288) (3.6324) (3.7296)
Reason retirement 0.8545 0.2803
(4.5427) (4.6100)
Reason governmental aid -4.6283 -4.8341
(3.5145) (3.5087)
Reason savings -0.0058 0.7414
(3.1619) (3.1917)
Reason real estate 2.0728 2.3425
(3.7754) (3.7889)
Reason purchase 0.5289 1.3966
(4.0527) (4.0798)
Reason generate income -2.1337 -3.0894
(4.7384) (4.7656)
Reason children 6.7252 6.0798
(4.6953) (4.7020)
Constant -74.5280 -59.9997 -62.3511 -64.0260 -50.1450
(26.0960)*** (26.8644)** (26.3694)** (27.0549)** (27.6990)*
Observations 501 501 515 501 501
Pseudo R2 0.0073 0.0116 0.0135 0.0118 0.0163  
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Table 4.14: Risk preference men (at the end of the investment horizon)  
The table reports determinants of the risk preference at the end of the investment horizon (tobit regres-
sions) for men. Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients sig-
nificant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Risk2: Risk preference men (end)
Age -0.1783 -0.2111 -0.1992 -0.2797 -0.2938
(0.1279) (0.1326) (0.1307) (0.1425)** (0.1451)**
Couple -7.6394 -7.8439 -8.0937 -5.7991 -5.8840
(3.1318)** (3.1343)** (3.0740)*** (3.0877)* (3.0965)*
Log income 7.2210 5.5237 6.2348 7.9033 6.1318
(3.9305)* (3.9102) (3.8669) (3.9956)** (3.9877)
Log expenses -2.1463 -1.4633 -1.1824 -2.8616 -2.1899
(3.7989) (3.7811) (3.7416) (3.7270) (3.7204)
Self-employed 4.8421 5.5013 5.7492 5.0762 5.6161
(3.2838) (3.3138)* (3.2635)* (3.2602) (3.2981)*
Financial literacy 4.1214 1.7484 4.1022 2.0614
(2.1268)* (2.3416) (2.1003)* (2.3055)
One-time investment 3.3187 4.1664 4.3228 1.2521 2.3822
(3.2142) (3.2478) (3.1805) (3.3558) (3.3841)
Investment horizon -0.2920 -0.2294 -0.1572 -0.0229 0.0415
(0.2075) (0.2047) (0.1999) (0.2265) (0.2249)
Risk-free assets 3.5950 4.5737 3.8067
(4.7188) (4.6796) (4.7183)
Risky assets 5.4359 5.9415 4.2481
(2.8576)* (2.7549)** (2.8080)
Real-estate 1.8116 3.4713 1.1802
(3.3344) (3.0961) (3.3480)
Insurance -1.6690 -1.4569 -1.4318
(2.8545) (2.8307) (2.8691)
Credit 6.4894 6.1232 7.0180
(3.1319)** (3.0603)** (3.0870)**
Reason retirement -3.5552 -2.9266
(3.7265) (3.7043)
Reason governmental aid -6.3669 -6.3413
(3.0422)** (3.0194)**
Reason savings 2.8553 2.9658
(2.7886) (2.7693)
Reason real estate 3.2919 3.6422
(3.0821) (3.0944)
Reason purchase 0.5602 1.1044
(3.5042) (3.5073)
Reason generate income 3.8079 3.0385
(4.2043) (4.1959)
Reason children 6.3828 6.1378
(3.9332) (3.9051)
Constant -51.9895 -46.4071 -53.6841 -47.9702 -43.6220
(22.6727)** (23.0017)** (22.9383)** (22.8723)** (23.1111)*
Observations 426 426 437 426 426
Pseudo R2 0.0214 0.0301 0.0295 0.0334 0.0415  
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter adds to the literature by introducing a new dataset about German household port-
folios. So far, there is little empirical evidence for Germany. We analyze a unique dataset 
from the consumer center Baden-Wuerttemberg that stems from counseling interviews.  
Firstly, this dataset allows us to examine the determinants of asking for advice. We compare 
our dataset to the German population and to similar datasets. We confirm the results from 
Bluethgen et al. (2008) who find that people looking for advice are on average older and more 
likely to be female. Concerning income, our dataset is representative for the German popula-
tion.  
Concerning asset allocation, the results for Germany are in line with international datasets. In 
terms of participation rates, safe investments with banks, especially savings accounts, still 
play the most important role in private household portfolios, with more than 80 percent of the 
households owning at least one. About 60 percent hold some form of life insurance and about 
40 percent own real estate. The participation rate in the stock market is about 20 percent and 
about 45 percent hold investment funds. These participation rates are fairly high compared to 
the entire German population, with only about 5.5 percent holding stocks and about 10.1 per-
cent holding investment funds.28
We perform bivariate analyses for prominent determinants. Participation in different asset 
types is influenced by marital status, except for very unpopular asset types. Compared to sin-
gles, couples more often own savings accounts, insurances, investment funds, real estate, 
stocks, and savings bonds. The same is true for single men compared to single women (except 
for savings bonds). For age, we find a positive influence on participation rates for several as-
set types, except for the oldest group over or equal to 60. This decrease in the oldest group is 
especially strong for insurances, which however is to be expected as at age 60+, an increasing 
share of contracts becomes due. In general, the age results are to be interpreted carefully as 
 This is characteristic for our dataset. We only observe 
households that solicit investment advice at the consumer center. This requires a certain inter-
est in financial affairs, which goes along with higher financial knowledge or literacy. Numer-
ous studies confirm a positive influence of financial literacy on participation in risky markets. 
Moreover, Van Rooij et al. (2007) find that people with high financial literacy are more likely 
to read newspapers, magazines, books, and to rely on financial advisors.  
                                                 
28 See Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2009). 
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we are not able to differentiate between age and cohort effects. Except for unpopular asset 
types, income is also a determinant for participation rates. The higher the income, the higher 
the participation rate. This is especially true for the asset types real estate, stocks, bonds, and 
investment funds that typically require a minimum investment amount. We do not include 
total wealth in our analysis because of the low data quality (many missing or incomplete ob-
servations). The clearest determinant for participation in asset markets in our dataset is finan-
cial literacy (FL) which we measure by knowledge and experience over all asset types. We 
find increasing participation rates over all asset types; the highest FL group permanently 
shows the highest participation.  
The results from the bivariate analyses are confirmed by multivariate logit regression analyses 
for all asset types. Higher FL leads to a higher probability of holding an asset for all eight 
asset types. The influence of income, age, and living as a couple also remains significant for 
some asset types. The negative influence of age on the participation rate for insurance policies 
is also confirmed. Moreover, we find lower participation rates for self-employed households 
for savings accounts, stocks, and bonds.  
Most households hold two or three different asset types in their portfolio. The determinants 
for diversification are similar to our previous results: couples, older, high-income, and em-
ployed households on average hold better diversified portfolios compared to singles, young, 
low-income, and self-employed households. 
Our results about household portfolios are broadly in line with international findings as well 
as with earlier studies of German household portfolios. So far most evidence exists for U.S. 
households (see e.g. Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002), Campbell (2006), or Cole and Shastry 
(2009)). For non-U.S. countries, see e.g. Calvet et al. (2007), Guiso and Jappelli (2002), or 
Iwaisako (2003). The (so far) sparse evidence for German households (see e.g. Boersch-
Supan and Essig (2002), Eymann and Boersch-Supan (2002), or Sommer (2005)) is extended 
by our study. 
  
 
Chapter 5 
 
5 The Willingness to Follow Financial Advice 
5.1 Introduction 
Taking advice is a central component of our lives. When making decisions we oftentimes ask 
for advice, e.g. to improve the quality of our decisions or to share responsibility (see e.g. Har-
vey and Fischer (1997)). Favored advisors are normally those with higher knowledge of the 
decision domain, e.g. a doctor is consulted for a medical problem or an accountant for the tax 
return. In this chapter, we concentrate on advice in the financial domain. Financial assets of 
private households are increasing29
Regulation for investment services aims for an improvement of the quality of financial advice. 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) by the European Parliament and the 
; people have to save for old age on their own responsibili-
ty. In addition, people face a huge range of complex financial products and services including 
governmental aid programs (e.g. the German “Riesterfoerderung”). Further complicating the 
decision problem, private households have a low financial literacy on average (see e.g. Cole 
and Shastry (2009) or Lusardi and Mitchell (2006)); it is thus not surprising that the demand 
for financial advice is high. More than 60 percent of U.S. private investors rely on profession-
al investment advice as well as about 70 percent of Italian and more than 80 percent of Ger-
man investors consult an advisor before making an investment decision (see e.g. Allen (2001), 
Guiso and Jappelli (2007), and Bluethgen et al. (2008)).  
                                                 
29 See German Federal Bank, Time series CEB00I: Financial assets D: Total C: Private Households. 
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European Council (2004 and 2006) requires firms performing investment services and activi-
ties to elicit their customers’ financial situation (e.g. the purpose of the investment, risk pref-
erences) to guarantee the appropriateness of any investment advice (see Article 35 of the Mi-
FID). In addition, the customer has to be made aware of any conflicts of interest, e.g. com-
missions paid by product providers. In spite of the ongoing regulation, consumerists regularly 
complain about bad investment advice. For example, in 2009, Stiftung Warentest (a German 
test facility founded by the parliament) tested financial advisors, with a disappointing result: 
only three out of 21 banks received the mark “satisfactory” (the German mark 3 on a scale 
from 1 to 6), two the mark “poor” (5). The remaining 16 banks received the mark “adequate” 
(4). Stiftung Warentest reports that the banks fail to offer really safe investments such as gov-
ernment bonds. In general, bad investment advice may have several reasons, e.g. missing ex-
pertise of the advisor or missing incentives to provide good advice. A prominent subject of 
critique in Europe is the prevalence of commission-based advice. This leads to a conflict of 
interest between investor and advisor. Low-cost products, such as exchange-traded funds, are 
rarely offered to investors because these low-margin products do not pay a commission to 
distributors (see e.g. Dale (2009)). 
But besides this (admittedly important) problem of bad investment advice, the government, 
consumerists, and others do not pay much attention to another fundamental problem, namely 
the general acceptance of advice. This is a crucial factor, as the best advice and therefore fur-
ther regulation is useless if investors are not willing to follow the advice that they are given.  
We try to close this gap by analyzing a dataset about real financial decisions. We make use of 
data from counseling interviews by the consumer center Baden-Wuerttemberg (Verbraucher-
zentrale Baden-Wuerttemberg e. V.) plus an additional questionnaire to identify determinants 
of the acceptance of financial advice. All of our questionnaire participants had a counseling 
interview at the consumer center concerning financial investments and retirement provisions. 
After the interview, the clients receive a written recommendation consisting of one or more 
pieces of advice. Subsequently, they are left on their own to implement the strategy, i.e. to 
choose the concrete products. This is different from a traditional counseling interview at a 
bank where the advice and the purchase of a product are provided hand in hand. For our anal-
ysis we make use of the exceptional structure at the consumer center: in the questionnaire, we 
present respondents with the recommendation from the previous interviews and ask them 
whether they implemented the recommended strategy from the consumer center or not. This 
dataset makes our study quite unique as most existing studies in this domain make use of ex-
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perimental data to test the acceptance of advice in a controlled artificial environment (see e.g. 
Schotter and Sopher (2007) or Van Swol and Sniezek (2005)). 
We hypothesize that several factors influence the willingness to follow advice. We analyze 
person-related attributes of the household making the decision as well as of the advisor. We 
hypothesize that higher satisfaction with the advisor and the counseling interview increases 
the willingness to accept advice. As women, older people as well as people with a higher risk 
aversion are more likely to ask for advice, it might be that they also have a higher willingness 
to accept advice.  
Aside from person-related attributes we investigate the household’s motivation of asking for 
advice. For instance, we hypothesize that a concrete existing problem increases the willing-
ness to follow advice in contrast to a general need for information. Moreover, we investigate 
option-related attributes. Option-related attributes are those attributes concerning the advice 
itself, e.g. the investment amount, the specific asset type, and the number of alternatives. 
Our main findings in this chapter are as follows. We find that characteristics of the advisor 
(satisfaction with the advisor and the interview) influence the willingness to follow advice. 
Here, the likability of the advisor seems to be as important as his expertise. Person-related 
attributes of the decision maker are of only low significance. Moreover, the original motiva-
tion of asking for advice (concrete problem versus general need for information) plays a role. 
An already existing own investment strategy decreases the willingness to follow advice. We 
also find that the specific asset type considerably influences the probability of acceptance. 
Pieces of advice about call money, “Riester” savings plans, or insurance contracts are more 
likely to be followed. On the contrary, advice related to bonds or bond funds is less likely to 
be followed. In addition, one-time investments have a higher probability of implementation 
compared to regular savings plans. Our results partly confirm theoretical predictions and ex-
perimental results. To our best knowledge, our study is the first one analyzing a dataset about 
real financial decisions. Thus, we are able to provide new insights into real world decision 
making.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: First, we give an overview of the re-
lated literature and present our hypotheses in detail in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes our 
dataset as well as the design of the questionnaire. In addition, we give some descriptive statis-
tics of our sample and compare the completed questionnaires with the primary dataset. Re-
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sults of our analysis are presented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 deals with the robustness of the 
results. Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
While there is ample theoretical and experimental literature about the determinants of accep-
tance of advice, empirical studies in this field are certainly rare. In the general model of Jun-
germann (1999), the utilization of advice depends on the one hand on person-related 
attributes, i.e. confidence in the own judgment and the subjective credibility of the advisor, 
and on the other hand on option-related attributes, i.e. on the assessment of the quality of ad-
vice by both the advisor and the decision maker. Harvey et al. (2000) tested the model of Jun-
germann (1999) with the help of two experimental settings. The results support the predic-
tions from Jungermann. The use of advice is influenced by the own knowledge and by the 
perceived expertise of the advisor (which is also confirmed by Harvey and Fischer (1997)). In 
addition, the willingness to accept advice depends on the assessed quality of the advice by the 
advisor and by the decision maker. Kohlert’s (2009) description of general determinants in a 
decision process is similar to Jungermann’s model. Kohlert differentiates between personal 
and situational determinants, where personal determinants include the individual character of 
a person, the individual situation, and the social environment, whereas situational determi-
nants include the complexity of a decision situation and the presentation format. The model 
by Ottaviani (2000) explicitly considers financial advice. In his model, the acceptance of ad-
vice depends on whether the decision maker knows about the advisor’s objectives and the 
involved conflict of interest. The advisor possesses private information; he has two objectives, 
a professional (providing good advice) and a partisan objective (e.g. commissions paid by 
product providers). The client is uninformed and either naive or rational: A naive decision 
maker blindly follows the advisor’s recommendation (delegation) whereas a rational decision 
maker is aware of the objectives of the advisor and thus designs a subset of possible actions to 
constrain the advisor’s action (constraint delegation).  
Cain et al. (2005) experimentally analyze the effects of disclosing conflicts of interest to the 
decision maker. They find that decision makers do not care enough about conflicts of interest, 
in the sense that when receiving biased advice, they do not discount it as much as they should. 
Moreover, they show that the disclosure of a conflict of interest even increases the bias in 
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advice: in contrast to a situation with an undisclosed conflict of interest, advisors seem to feel 
morally licensed to exaggerate even further because the decision maker knows the conflict.  
In an experiment with multiple choice items on computer knowledge and operations, Van 
Swol and Sniezek (2005) find that the only significant predictor whether the decision matches 
the advisor‘s advice is the confidence of the advisor. All other tested factors (decision mak-
er’s trust in the advisor, advisor accuracy, decision maker’s prior relationship with the advi-
sor, and the power of the decision maker to set payment to the advisor) were insignificant.  
Receiving advice often exposes the decision maker to a potential conflict, namely having to 
combine several opinions - the received advice and the own initial opinion. In laboratory stu-
dies, Gardner and Berry (1995), Harvey and Fischer (1997), and Yaniv and Kleinberger 
(2000) find that people tend to overvalue their own opinion and to discount advice from other 
sources, although they would have been better of using the advice appropriately. People with 
higher knowledge discount the advice more than those with lower knowledge. In addition, the 
weighting of advice from others decreases with the distance from the own opinion (Yaniv 
(2004)). The overvaluation of the own opinion or signal seems to be quite robust.30
Gino and More (2007) examine in two studies the impact of task difficulty on the tendency to 
follow advice. They find that people tend to underweight advice only in easy tasks; in con-
trast, they tend to overweight advice if the task is difficult. 
 The same 
overweighting of the own opinion can also be found when multiple pieces of advice exist 
(Yaniv and Milyavsky (2007)). Weizsaecker (2008) does a meta-analysis of 13 cascade game 
experiments and finds similar results. The players only follow others and thereby contradict 
their own signals if the probability of the own signal being wrong is significant.  
In experiments the advice is generally provided for free. Outside the laboratory, how ever, 
this is oftentimes different. Bogle (2007) finds that people pay high fees to professional inves-
tors, even if the stock market can hardly be predicted (see e.g. Malkiel (1995, 2003b)). Based 
on professional advice people also invest into mutual funds (Freeman and Brown (2001), 
Freeman et al. (2008)), even if they would be better off buying broad index funds tracking the 
overall market (see e.g. Gruber (1996), Griese and Kempf (2003), or Malkiel (2003a)).  
                                                 
30 Also see the vast literature about overconfidence, e.g. Svenson (1981), Lichtenstein et al. (1982), or Glaser et 
al. (2005).  
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Gino (2008) explicitly looks at the influence of costs for advice. She finds that paid-for advice 
is used to a greater extent than free advice. Gino ascribes this effect to the same psychological 
forces that describe the sunk costs fallacy (see e.g. Knox and Inkster (1968) or Arkes and 
Blumer (1985)).  
Empirical evidence on the acceptance of advice is quite rare. Feng and MacGeorge (2006) 
investigate the receptiveness to advice (the extent to which the advice recipient is willing to 
receive advice, see e.g. Goldsmith and Fitch (1997), MacGeorge et al. (2004)) with the help 
of questionnaire data. Participants report about receiving advice regarding a personal problem. 
Feng and MacGeorge find that closeness of the advisor to the recipient has the strongest im-
pact. In addition, expertise and expressivity of the advisor influence the receptiveness, and 
women are more receptive to advice than men.  
We expect to find some of the above results in our dataset. The consumer center Baden-
Wuerttemberg offers advice regarding financial investments and retirement provisions, and 
our data set covers these interviews from 2006 to 2008. After the interview, the clients receive 
a written recommendation consisting of one or more pieces of advice; for instance, one piece 
of advice could be: “Open a call money account with 50,000 Euro”. As the consumer center is 
not a bank, it is not possible for the households to directly implement the recommendation. In 
addition, the consumer center does not recommend specific products but only asset types; 
following the interview, the households are left on their own to implement the suggested 
strategy. As assistance, households are provided with the latest test results relating to the rec-
ommended asset type from newspapers or similar sources.  
In addition to the interview data, we have data from a questionnaire study. In the question-
naire, we ask people about their financial decisions after the interview with the consumer cen-
ter. We explicitly state the recommendation given by the consumer center and ask the house-
holds whether they followed the advice for each individual element or not. Thus, all house-
holds in our sample are advised because they all previously had a counseling interview at the 
consumer center.  
In contrast to the laboratory, in a real decision situation it is not possible to isolate one factor 
that might influence the willingness to accept advice; we instead test multiple determinants. 
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Figure 5.1: Potential determinants of the willingness to follow advice 
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The different potential determinants are summarized in Figure 5.1. Following the model of 
Jungermann (1999), we consider person-related as well as option-related attributes. Concern-
ing the person-related attributes, we analyze characteristics of the decision maker (gender, 
financial knowledge, risk tolerance etc.) as well as characteristics of the advisor (expertise, 
reliability, likability etc.). The characteristics of the advisor (likability, expertise, reliability, 
and confidence) and the interview atmosphere (satisfaction, time for questions, consideration 
of the individual situation, and understandability of explanations) should have an influence on 
the willingness to follow the advice. The higher the satisfaction, expertise etc., the higher the 
willingness to follow the advice should be. In contrast, we hypothesize that higher own com-
petence of the decision maker should decrease the willingness to listen to an advisor. Being 
female, older, and more risk averse could increase the willingness to accept advice, as wom-
en, older, and more risk averse people more often take the necessary first step, i.e. ask for 
advice. 
Additionally, we consider the household’s initial motivation of asking for advice. A concrete 
problem as the motivation to ask for advice, e.g. what to do with an inheritance, is hypothe-
sized to increase the willingness to accept advice in contrast to a general information need. 
Furthermore, we hypothesize that an already existing own investment strategy decreases the 
willingness to follow the advice as this implies a deviation from the own strategy. 
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Finally, we investigate the option, i.e. the advice itself. We hypothesize that a higher com-
plexity (e.g. exchange-traded fund compared to call money) decreases the willingness to fol-
low advice. Sometimes, the consumer center provides alternative pieces of advice. Naturally, 
this should lead to a lower acceptance rate of any single piece of advice. We also asked the 
participants whether they consulted another advisor since the interview with the consumer 
center. We hypothesize that the consultation of another advisor decreases the willingness to 
follow the initial advice by the consumer center. 
We expect to find confirmative evidence for some effects that have been found in the lab be-
fore. Furthermore, as to our best knowledge, there is no study comparable to our analysis; we 
also hope to provide new insights into the process of financial decision making with advice.  
We do not consider the potential influence of conflicts of interest between the decision maker 
and the advisor at the consumer center as the typical conflict is not given here. The counseling 
interview costs 140 Euro and lasts approximately two hours. The consumer center does not 
sell the recommended products; this means there is no conflict of interest through commis-
sions paid by product providers and we thus assume the advisor to act in the best interest of 
the household asking for advice. 
As all households paid a fixed fee, we are not in a position to study the difference between 
paying and not paying for advice. Instead, we think that in principle the willingness to follow 
advice must exist for otherwise people would not be prepared to pay 140 Euro for it. 
5.3 Dataset and Descriptive Statistics 
5.3.1 Dataset 
The Federation of German Consumer Organisations is the umbrella organisation of consumer 
centers. Member organisations include the consumer centers in the 16 federal states and 25 
other associations dealing with consumer policy. The consumer centers exist in all German 
federal states and deal with all kinds of consumer affairs. They are non-profit organisations 
whose work is supported by federal state funding, municipal, and district support for the indi-
vidual advice centers and by project funding from the national government. 
Our basic dataset is provided by the consumer center Baden-Wuerttemberg e. V. In the finan-
cial sector, the consumer center Baden-Wuerttemberg offers general insurance advice, con-
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struction loan advice, and a general counseling interview dealing with financial investments 
and old-age provisions. We use written protocols of these interviews to generate the basic 
dataset. For a detailed description of the dataset and the role of the consumer centers in Ger-
many, see Section 4.3. At the end of the interview, the household receives the protocol, which 
includes a recommendation of an investment strategy. The proposal specifies the asset types, 
e.g. call money or federal savings bonds, investment amounts, and further notes if necessary. 
In addition, the households are provided with the latest test results relating to the recommend-
ed asset types from (for example) “Finanztest” or other journals. After the interview, the 
households are left on their own concerning the responsibility of implementing the strategy. 
This procedure is different from a typical counseling interview at a bank. During the inter-
view, the bank normally offers its products directly and thus advice might coincide with a 
purchasing decision. The clear separation of advice at the consumer center and the later pur-
chase of the assets somewhere else afford us a unique opportunity. We use the recommended 
strategy by the consumer center to set up a personalized questionnaire.  
Because of data privacy reasons, we could not match the basic original dataset to the res-
ponses of the questionnaire and we thus also have to elicit personal data within the question-
naire. It is organized as follows: In Part A of the questionnaire, we are interested in the gener-
al reasons for the interview and for the choice of the consumer center. Second, we elicit the 
satisfaction with the interview and the advisor with the help of several items. Moreover, we 
ask households about the (perceived) benefits of the interview. For comparison, we also ask if 
the household had a second interview with another advisor since the one with the consumer 
center. For the satisfaction and benefit questions, we use a 7-point Likert scale with appropri-
ate endpoints in each case (see Appendix A).31 In Part B, we collect data about gender, age, 
education, income, financial knowledge, risk tolerance32
                                                 
31 Amongst others Weng (2004), Preston and Colman (2000), and Cicchetti et al. (1985) show that reliability, 
validity, and discriminating power increases up to 7-point scales. After that additional effects can hardly be ob-
served. In addition, too many scales might overburden subjects (see Viswanathan et al. (2004)). 
, and investor type. We also ask for 
overconfidence, i.e. we include one question for “better-than-average” and one for “miscali-
bration” (for the different forms of overconfidence see e.g. Svenson (1981), Lichtenstein et al. 
(1982), or Glaser et al. (2005)).  
32 We use a single self-assessment question to elicit the risk attitude. Amongst others Nosic and Weber (2010), 
Kapteyn and Teppa (2002), and Weber and Hsee (1998) show that intuitive subjective risk measures are better 
able to explain risk taking behavior (e.g. portfolio choices) than objective measures such as historical volatilities 
or more sophisticated measures such as lottery questions.  
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Part C includes the recommended investment strategy. We ask whether the households totally, 
partly, or not at all followed the advice provided by the consumer center. Moreover, we ask 
for the reason(s) not to follow the advice and offer room for suggestions on how to improve 
the advice offer of the consumer center. See Appendix A for the complete questionnaire.  
From the consumer center we received protocols from 824 interviews, which took place from 
2006 to 2008. Address data was available for 779 households. Of these 779 households, 212 
returned the questionnaire to the consumer center, yielding a return rate of 27.21 percent. This 
rate is surprisingly high as we did not pay the participants but only included a prepaid 
envelope and information about the financial crisis as a little “thank-you” for filling in and 
returning the questionnaire.  
5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics of our dataset. Out dataset consists of 212 household 
observations; to be more precise, we have interview notes from 94 women, 47 men, 70 
couples, and one observation with missing gender. The mean age in our sample is 46.62 years 
(median 45 years). The age of a couple is determined as the average of both partners. If we 
count every individual (regardless of marital status) the mean age is 46.72 (median 45). This 
composition is not unusual for an advised sample. All households in our sample are advised 
because questionnaires were sent only to those who previously had a counseling interview at 
the consumer center. Bluethgen et al. (2008) study a dataset with advised and non-advised 
individuals from a large German retail bank. They find that advised clients tend to be older, 
wealthier, more risk averse, and more likely to be female.  
Income (gross income per year) is divided into 5 categories, with 1: less than 25,000 Euro, 2: 
between 25,000 and 50,000 Euro, 3: between 50,000 and 75,000 Euro, 4: between 75,000 and 
100,000 Euro, and 5: more than 100,000 Euro. The mean income category for single women 
is 2.09 and for men it is 2.52. Naturally, couples have a higher household income with a mean 
of 3.15.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
The table reports descriptive statistics of our dataset. We report age, income class (scale from 1 (lowest) 
to 5 (highest), with 1: less than 25,000 Euro, 2: between 25,000 and 50,000 Euro, 3: between 50,000 and 
75,000 Euro, 4: between 75,000 and 100,000 Euro, and 5: more than 100,000 Euro), education class 
(scale from 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest), with 1: still in school, 2: Hauptschul-graduation (Lower secondary 
education), 3: Realschul-graduation (Intermediate secondary education), 4: Abitur (University qualifica-
tion exam), 5: University degree, and 6: Doctorate degree), financial knowledge (scale from 1 (very low) 
to 7 (very high)), and financial risk tolerance (scale from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high)) for single women, 
single men, couples, and for all households together. 
Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Women
Age 93 47.58 48 11.69 21 75
Income class 88 2.09 2 0.87 1 5
Education 93 4.31 5 0.97 2 6
Fin. knowledge 94 4.08 4 1.24 1 6
Risk tolerance 94 2.28 2 1.12 1 5
Men
Age 46 44.07 43 13.58 21 75
Income class 43 2.51 2 1.10 1 5
Education 47 4.64 5 1.07 1 6
Fin. knowledge 47 4.88 5 1.06 1 7
Risk tolerance 47 3.36 3 1.58 1 7
Couples
Age 68 47.03 42.75 13.50 26 75
Income class 65 3.15 3 1.08 1 5
Education 69 4.45 5 1.02 2 6
Fin. knowledge 70 4.41 5 0.91 2 6
Risk tolerance 70 2.73 2 1.52 1 6
Other
Age 0 . . . . .
Income class 0 . . . . .
Education 1 3.00 3 . 3 3
Fin. knowledge 1 5.00 5 . 5 5
Risk tolerance 1 1.00 1 . 1 1
Total
Age 207 46.62 45 12.75 21 75
Income class 196 2.54 2 1.09 1 5
Education 210 4.42 5 1.01 1 6
Fin. knowledge 212 4.37 5 1.14 1 7
Risk tolerance 212 2.66 2 1.43 1 7  
 
Education is divided into 6 categories, with 1: still in school, 2: Hauptschul-graduation (lower 
secondary education), 3: Realschul-graduation (intermediate secondary education), 4: Abitur 
(university qualification exam), 5: University degree, and 6: Doctorate degree. Our partici-
pants are highly educated; the median household holds a university degree. Women state a 
mean financial knowledge of 4.08 (on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 7 (very good)), men of 
4.88. Couples lie in between with a mean of 4.41. These relatively high means for education 
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and knowledge can again be explained by the fact that our sample is advised. Van Rooij et al. 
(2007) find that financial literacy has an influence on the preferred source of financial advice: 
people with low financial literacy are more likely to consult family and friends in contrast to 
those with high financial literacy who are more likely to read newspapers, magazines, books, 
and rely on financial advisors. A two-hour interview at the consumer center costs 140 Euro; in 
two experiments Godek and Murray (2008) analyze the willingness to pay for advice and find 
that people who process information rationally (in contrast to processing information expe-
rientially) are willing to pay substantially more for advice. 
In line with the literature (e.g. see Dohmen et al. (2010a), Weber et al. (2002), or for a meta-
analysis Byrnes et al. (1999)) women state a lower risk tolerance (mean of 2.28 on a scale 
from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high)) than men (mean of 3.36); couples again lie in between 
(mean of 2.73).  
As stated before, we could not match the questionnaire data with the original dataset. Never-
theless, the observations vary in the recommended asset types, amounts, and notes, which we 
included from the original dataset, thereby enabling us to identify 207 of the 212 returned 
questionnaires. We do not use this information to match the dataset but for a small check if 
our dataset might be biased. We create a dummy variable in the original dataset that takes the 
value one if the household subsequently participates in the questionnaire analysis.  
Table 5.2: Comparison of groups 
The table compares descriptive statistics of the original dataset for two groups, those who returned the 
questionnaire (Questionnaire +) and those who did not (Questionnaire -). Age is measured in years, 
monthly income and expenditures in Euro. Risk1 (risk2) is the maximum loss in percent of the investment 
amount that could be tolerated over (at the end of) the investment period. Financial knowledge and expe-
rience are measured on a scale from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). The last column states z-statistics of 
the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. 
Questionnaire - Questionnaire + Wilcoxon rank-sum test
z-value
Observations 620 207
Age 45.03 45.49 -0.423
Risk1 12.12 11.81 -0.133
Risk2 2.45 2.70 -1.229
Income 2803.66 2960.78 -0.511
Expenditures 2081.12 2192.38 0.189
Financial knowledge 2.06 2.15 -1.423
Financial experience 1.99 2.12 -2.309  
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About 27 percent of the women returned the questionnaire, compared to about 24 percent of 
the men and couples. When comparing these figures to our questionnaire data (94 women, 47 
men, 70 couples) we conclude that there must be some women who were part of a couple in 
the original dataset but responded as single women. There are several possible explanations 
for this; perhaps the couple has since separated or the women simply filled in the question-
naire on her own. Overall, the proportions of returned questionnaires are similar for women, 
men, and couples and the proportions of the whole sample compared to the subsamples are 
not significantly different either. 
In addition, we find no differences in age, monthly income, expenses, or risk tolerance be-
tween the households that participated and those that did not (see Table 5.2). However, we 
find that questionnaire participants on average have a higher knowledge of financial products 
(mean of 2.15 compared to 2.06, significant at the 10 percent level) and also more experience 
with financial products (mean of 2.12 compared to 1.99, significant at the 1 percent level).33
The respondents overall seem representative for the whole dataset, with the possible excep-
tion of a small bias regarding financial knowledge and experience. We already mentioned that 
our sample is highly educated as the median household holds a university degree (see Table 
5.1) and we will have a more detailed look at the influence of financial knowledge later on in 
the analysis. 
 
5.4 Results and Discussion 
5.4.1 Advice Acceptance 
We break down our dataset on the level of a single piece of advice, meaning we treat one 
piece of advice as one single observation; consequently, there are several observations per 
household if the recommendation consists of more than one piece of advice. We asked the 
households whether they followed the advice or not and participants could check yes, partly, 
                                                 
33 Financial knowledge (experience) is the average knowledge (experience) of eight asset types. The consumer 
center differentiates between savings accounts (also including call money and time deposits), savings bonds 
(savings with a higher (normally fixed) maturity), federal savings bonds (bonds issues by the Federal Republic 
of Germany), bonds (bonds except federal bonds), insurance (insurances with investment character, life insur-
ance or annuity insurance), real estate (no differentiation between self occupancy or not), investment funds (all 
kinds of investment funds including stocks, bonds, money market etc.), and stocks. 
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or no for every piece of advice they received. With this method, we are able to include option-
related effects (e.g. the recommended asset type) in our analysis.  
Altogether, the households received 636 pieces of advice; this means on average 3 pieces of 
advice per household. Figure 5.2 shows how many pieces of advice were given to the house-
holds. 3 respondents did not return the complete questionnaire, thus we have 3 households 
with 0 pieces of advice. The vast majority (172 households) receives 1 to 4 pieces of advice. 
23 households receive 5 pieces of advice; twelve receive 6 or 7 pieces, and only two house-
holds 9 or 10 pieces of advice. 
Figure 5.2: Number of pieces of advice 
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All in all, about half of the advice from the consumer center is followed. Figure 5.3 shows the 
acceptance: 250 pieces of advice were followed, 243 pieces were rejected. Acceptance in 
parts is not that common, with only 91 pieces that were followed to some extent. We have 52 
missing observations because participants did not always report if they followed the advice or 
not. There are no figures available for comparable decisions, e.g. from a traditional bank. The 
figures however indicate that there is indeed variation in the willingness to follow advice.  
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Figure 5.3: Individual advice acceptance 
The figure shows the individual advice acceptance (one piece of advice = one observation). 
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5.4.2 Influence of Person-Related Attributes of the Decision Maker 
In the following, we perform a regression analysis with advice acceptance as the dependent 
variable to find potential determinants. As our dependent variable has only three ordinal out-
comes (1 = fully accepted, 2 = partly accepted, 3 = not at all accepted), we perform ordered 
logistic regressions. We control the standard errors for clustering in households.34
In addition, if we find significant effects, we perform binary logistic regressions for a better 
understanding of the magnitude of the determinants; for this, we pool observations by “fully 
accepted” and “partly accepted”. We think “partly accepted” is nearer to “fully accepted” than 
to ”not at all accepted” because people in both cases took action due to the advice. Thus, we 
can code our dependent variable as a binary variable with 0 = (partly) accepted and 1 = not 
accepted. The results of the binary regression analyses are displayed in Appendix B. 
 
                                                 
34 With clustering we relax the assumption that error terms are independent. Clustering provides consistent esti-
mates across a broad range of possible forms of correlations within households (see e.g. Wooldridge (2008)).  
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Table 5.3: Individual advice acceptance, decision maker 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (ordered logistic regressions with clus-
tering) for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 1 = fully accepted, 2 = partly accepted, 3 = 
not at all accepted. Standard errors are adjusted for 186 (186, 188) household clusters. They are reported 
underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at 
the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
Women -0.0079 -0.0254 0.0082
(0.2234) (0.2229) (0.2189)
Men -0.0178 0.0060 0.0307
(0.2814) (0.2847) (0.2754)
Age -0.0179 -0.0169 -0.0190
(0.0074)** (0.0074)** (0.0071)***
Income 0.0315 0.0396 0.0623
(0.1081) (0.1110) (0.1063)
Education 0.0935 0.0795
(0.0923) (0.0951)
Knowledge 0.0665 0.0553
(0.0949) (0.0951)
Risk tolerance -0.0770 -0.0704 -0.0786
(0.0695) (0.0696) (0.0696)
Observations 527 527 532
Wald Chi2(#) 9.28 8.24 9.59
p > Chi2 0.2329 0.2214 0.1431
Pseudo R2 0.0074 0.0068 0.0076  
 
Table 5.3 shows the results of the ordered logistic regression with demographic variables. As 
women and older people are more likely to ask for advice (see Bluethgen et al. (2008) and 
Chapter 4) it may also be that their willingness to follow advice is higher. Bluethgen et al. 
(2008) additionally state that women and older people are more likely to rely on the received 
advice, but in their dataset receiving and relaying on advice cannot be distinguished from 
each other. The advised group consists of customers placing orders with prior recommenda-
tions from their advisors. We must keep in mind that our base sample (see Section 5.3 or 
Chapter 4) is already biased toward more women and older people because all these people 
primarily asked for advice. This bias is inevitable but also natural in our analysis as the ques-
tion of whether to follow advice or not can only occur if the decision maker received advice in 
advance.  
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Figure 5.4: Acceptance by age 
The figure shows mean acceptance for five age groups. A household in the first group is younger than 30 
years, in the second group between 30 and 40 years and so on (see table). 
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Age group 1 2 3 4 5
Age ≥ 21 ≥ 30 ≥ 40 ≥ 50 ≥ 60
< 30 < 40 < 50 < 60 ≤ 75
Observations 50 153 136 119 112
Mean 2.04 2.14 1.87 2.03 1.85
Std. Dev. 0.95 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.92  
 
With regards to our data, we find that older people have a higher willingness to follow advice. 
Figure 5.4 shows the mean acceptance for different age groups. The relation does not seem to 
be strictly linear but, on average, the mean acceptance of older age groups is higher. This 
points in the direction of Bluethgen et al. (2008) but our result is even stronger; with our data-
set, we are able to differentiate between the first step that is “asking for advice” and the 
second one that is “following the advice given”. We do not only find that older people are 
more likely to ask for advice (see Chapter 4) but that they are also more likely to follow the 
advice they receive. We cannot find this second effect for gender or for risk aversion. Blueth-
gen et al. (2008) also find that advised people tend to be wealthier - which we cannot com-
ment on as we do not have information about total wealth; when looking at income instead, 
we do not find an effect regarding the willingness to follow advice. 
In line with the experimental literature about acceptance of advice (see e.g. Harvey and 
Fischer (1997) or Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000)) we hypothesized that we would find an ef-
fect of own competence. The existing studies widely agree that people tend to discount advice 
(except for very difficult tasks) when compared to their own opinion. We do not find this ef-
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fect with our data, regardless of whether we used education or financial knowledge as a proxy 
for own competence; this might be due to the fact that our sample is quite homogenous. Van 
Rooij et al. (2007) find that people with low financial literacy prefer to ask family and friends 
for investment advice whereas those with a high financial literacy are more likely to read 
newspapers, magazines, books, and to rely on financial advisors. Additionally, the households 
frequenting the consumer center are prepared to pay a fixed fee of 140 Euro for the advice, 
implying that they not only rely on professional advice but also seem to be aware of the con-
flict of interest that goes along with commission-based advice, which they could receive for 
free (at least it would seem so) elsewhere. Moreover, our sample is again biased in the sense 
that the questionnaire participants have greater knowledge and experience compared to those 
who did not participate (see Section 5.3) - for instance, the median household in our sample 
holds a university degree. The differences in financial knowledge might thus be too small to 
generate a significant difference in the willingness to follow advice. Besides the homogeneity 
problem, we cannot compare the advice to the initial asset allocation (corresponding to the 
“own” opinion in the above-mentioned experimental studies) and we hence do not know how 
much the advice deviates from the own opinion, resulting in a limited comparability of our 
study with the existing experimental evidence.  
The binary logistic regression for the same dependent variables is displayed in Appendix B. 
The independent variable is 1 if the advice is not accepted and 0 if the advice is at least partly 
accepted. The probability of the reference household (a couple with mean characteristics in 
the other dependent variables) for refusal of the advice is 40.95 percent. A one-standard-
deviation increase in age decreases this probability by 0.54 percent. Thus, as the standard dev-
iation in age is about 13 years, the effect of age on the willingness to follow advice is statisti-
cally significant but economically of no great importance. 
With the binary logistic model, we find a weakly significant effect of risk tolerance. House-
holds with a higher risk tolerance are more willing to accept advice - at least to some extent. 
As we do not find this effect with the ordered logistic model, the pooling of observations must 
cause it. Of the 91 decisions to partly accept the advice, 53 were made by households with a 
risk tolerance above the mean (3 to 7) and only 38 by households with a risk tolerance below 
the mean (1 or 2). There is no comparable evidence for this result in the literature about ad-
vice taking; however, Bluethgen et al. (2008) find that people are more likely to ask for ad-
vice if their risk aversion is higher. One possible explanation for our finding might be the sta-
tus quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)). People with a higher risk aversion might 
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prefer not to follow the advice and to remain at the status quo because the disadvantages loom 
larger than the advantages of a new strategy (Kahneman et al. (1991)). 
Please note that the Wald’s chi-squared statistics for both models are not significant, indicat-
ing that the overall explanatory power is low. We will include the demographic variables as 
control variables in the following analyses and see whether the effects are persisting. 
5.4.3 Influence of Person-Related Attributes of the Advisor 
All in all, the households rate the advice offer of the consumer center positively. Panel A of 
Table 5.4 shows the satisfaction with the interview and the advisor at the consumer center. On 
a 7-point Likert scale (from 1 = very satisfied to 7 = very unsatisfied), people state a mean 
satisfaction of 2.20. The assessments of the nine items (see Appendix A for the exact word-
ing) are very similar; the median answer for all items is 2. Reliability is assessed highest with 
a mean of 1.82. Weak points, if any, are the explanations of the asset types (mean 2.37) and 
the time (mean 2.34).  
Table 5.4: Satisfaction with the interview and the advisor 
The table reports the results of the questions about the interview and the advisor. Subjects should check 
on a 7-point Likert scale (from 1 (very satisfied, very likable …) to 7 (very unsatisfied, very dislikable 
…)). 
Obs. Mean Median Std.dev. Min. Max.
       Panel A: Consumer center
Satisfaction 211 2.20 2 1.06 1 6
Likability 211 2.17 2 0.99 1 6
Competence 212 2.05 2 1.00 1 6
Reliability 212 1.82 2 0.82 1 5
Individual situation 212 2.12 2 1.06 1 6
Explanations 212 2.37 2 1.17 1 7
Time 212 2.34 2 1.18 1 7
Understandability 212 2.04 2 0.90 1 6
Confidence 208 2.03 2 0.93 1 6
       Panel B: Other advisor
Satisfaction 36 3.19 3 1.62 1 7  
 
To compare the results, we also ask the households about other interviews (see Panel B of 
Table 5.4). 39 of the respondents had another interview since the consultation of the consumer 
center. These households are less satisfied with the advice of the consumer center (mean 2.51) 
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than those without another interview (mean 2.13). This difference is significant at the 5 per-
cent level (z = 1.801 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)). Still, on average, these households rate the 
other interview worse (mean 3.19, median 3) than the one with the consumer center. This dif-
ference is significant at the 5 percent level (z = 2.062 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test)). To meas-
ure the influence of satisfaction on the willingness to follow advice, we first perform a factor 
analysis with the 9 items in Table 5.4. If we drop all components with eigenvalues under 1.0 
(Kaiser criterion, see Guttman (1954) and Kaiser (1960)) we obtain only one principal factor. 
The Cattell scree test (see Cattell (1966)) also clearly detects only one factor (see Figure 5.5).  
Figure 5.5: Cattell scree test 
The figure shows the scree plot of eigenvalues after a principal component analysis. 
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We conclude that the households either evaluate all aspects positively or negatively. They are 
not able to differentiate between the single items, so for instance likability seems to be as im-
portant as expertise of the advisor for the decision maker. To put it differently, people might 
have difficulties with evaluating the competence of the advisor correctly and thus use 
attributes that are easier to evaluate, e.g. likability of the advisor or the interview atmosphere, 
to evaluate the quality of the advice. This is in line with empirical evidence suggesting that 
the satisfaction of the investor may not necessarily be related to the quality of advice but ra-
ther to the likability of the advisor (see e.g. Oehler and Kohlert (2009)). Apparently, all of our 
9 items measure a part of the same construct. The average interitem covariance is 0.5384. 
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Cronbach’s Alpha (see Cronbach (1951)) is 0.9068, which denotes a very high reliability.35
Table 5.5: Individual advice acceptance, advisor 
 
Hence, for our further analyses, we generated the variable “Satisfaction9” which is simply the 
average of the 9 items. “Satisfaction9” measures the overall perception of the advisor and the 
interview by the decision maker.  
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (ordered logistic regressions with clus-
tering) for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 1 = fully accepted, 2 = partly accepted, 3 = 
not at all accepted. Standard errors are adjusted for 186 household clusters. They are reported underneath 
the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level 
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients
(Std. Errors)
Women 0.0179
(0.2234)
Men -0.0546
(0.2748)
Age -0.0180
(0.0071)**
Income 0.0708
(0.1033)
Education 0.0656
(0.0887)
Knowledge 0.0726
(0.0944)
Risk tolerance -0.0956
(0.0654)
Satisfaction9 0.3879
(0.1155)***
Observations 527
Wald Chi2(8) 20.8200
p > Chi2 0.0076
Pseudo R2 0.0199  
 
Table 5.5 shows the results if we include “Satisfaction9” in our analysis (ordered logistic re-
gression). In line with the theoretical (e.g. see Jungermann (1999)), experimental (e.g. see 
Harvey et al. (2000) or Van Swol and Sniezek (2005)), and empirical literature (e.g. see Feng 
and MacGeorge (2006)), we find that the characteristics of the advisor influence the willing-
                                                 
35 For early stages of research (predictor tests, hypothesized measures of a construct) Nunnally (1978) considers 
a reliability of 0.7 or higher as sufficient. For basic research it is oftentimes not necessary to increase reliability 
beyond 0.8 as correlations change very little by measurement error. However, for applied settings he recom-
mends a minimum reliability of 0.9. As our reliability coefficient is 0.9068, we do not have to worry. 
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ness of the decision maker to follow the advice. As stated before, we are not able to separate 
single effects of e.g. expertise, likability, or confidence, as these items are highly correlated 
and mutually dependent, but the effect of “Satisfaction9” is highly significant. The more posi-
tive the advisor and the whole interview are perceived, the higher the willingness to subse-
quently follow the advice. Again, we find the effect of age; older people have a higher wil-
lingness to follow advice. 
Appendix B shows the results of the binary logistic regression. The impact of age and risk 
aversion is similar to the previous regressions. The influence of “Satisfaction9” is highly sig-
nificant in this model as well. The base probability of 40.78 percent of completely rejecting 
the advice increases by 9.33 percent if the satisfaction decreases by one standard deviation (= 
0.7916). In contrast to the previous two models, the explanatory power is significant now (see 
Wald’s chi-squared statistics). 
Besides satisfaction, we also asked households about the benefits of the interview; Table 5.6 
displays the results. We measure the benefits of the interview with the help of three state-
ments (see Appendix A for the exact wording). On average, people believe that they did bene-
fit from the interview with the consumer center - most households agree with the statement 
that their knowledge about pros and cons has improved through the interview. The median 
answer is 2 (mean 2.55) on a 7-point Likert scale (from 1 = strongly agree to 7 = strongly dis-
agree). Households also state a higher level of confidence concerning financial issues (median 
3, mean 2.95). However, on average, the households do not feel confident enough to do with-
out advice in the future. Their median answer is 4 (mean 3.94), implying that the households 
on average neither agree nor disagree. We also included the results of the benefit questions in 
the regression model (results not reported) but they do not influence the decision to follow 
advice or not. 
Table 5.6: Benefits of the interview 
The table reports the results of the benefit questions. Subjects should check on a 7-point Likert scale 
(from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree)). 
Obs. Mean Median Std.dev. Min. Max.
Know pros and cons 210 2.55 2 1.21 1 6
Higher confidence 211 2.95 3 1.30 1 7
Ability to self advise 209 3.94 4 1.54 1 7  
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5.4.4 Influence of Motivation 
Table 5.7: Motivation of asking for advice 
The table reports reasons for the counseling interview at the consumer centre. Panel A reports the general 
interview reasons. Panel B reports the reasons for the choice of the consumer center. Multiple answers 
were allowed. 
Reasons Obs. Percentage
       Panel A: General interview reason 
General information need 131 61.79%
Uncertainty 86 40.57%
Improvement of current allocation 73 34.43%
First interview 60 28.30%
Reassurance of current allocation 45 21.23%
Concrete reason 42 19.81%
Other advisors unsatisfying 30 14.15%
Other 27 12.74%
       Panel B: Reason to consult the consumer center
Independent advice 186 87.74%
Fixed fee, no commision 86 40.57%
Checkup 53 25.00%
Recommendation of friends 40 18.87%
Print media, TV, Radio 35 16.51%
Comparison to current allocation 33 15.57%
Comparison to other advisors 28 13.21%
Internet 26 12.26%
Other 14 6.60%
Recommendation of consumer center 9 4.25%  
 
Panel A of Table 5.7 shows the reasons why people ask for advice, with multiple answers 
being possible here. About 62 percent state a general need for information concerning invest-
ing and retirement savings. 41 percent are unsure about their asset allocation, 34 percent want 
to improve their current strategy. For 28 percent, the interview is the first detailed interview 
about investing. 21 percent want their current strategy to be confirmed. 20 percent have a 
concrete reason for the interview, e.g. an inheritance. 14 percent are unsatisfied with other 
advisors and 12 percent state other reasons.  
In Panel B of Table 5.7 we list the reasons of the households to consult the consumer center 
for advice. The vast majority (88 percent) expects independent advice, 41 percent explicitly 
state that they prefer the fixed fee to the commission-based system of other advisors; all other 
reasons are less common.  
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Table 5.8: Individual advice acceptance, motivation 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (ordered logistic regressions with clus-
tering) for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 1 = fully accepted, 2 = partly accepted, 3 = 
not at all accepted. Standard errors are adjusted for 186 household clusters. They are reported underneath 
the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level 
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients
(Std. Errors)
Women 0.0639
(0.2206)
Men -0.0323
(0.2747)
Age -0.0175
(0.0085)**
Income 0.0006
(0.1045)
Education 0.1399
(0.0893)
Knowledge 0.0740
(0.0995)
Risk tolerance -0.0886
(0.0719)
General information need 0.0878
(0.1786)
Uncertainty -0.1451
(0.1974)
Improvement of current allocation 0.3201
(0.1943)*
First interview -0.1511
(0.2242)
Reassurance of current allocation 0.5080
(0.1907)***
Concrete reason -0.3826
(0.1976)*
Other advisors unsatisfying 0.1787
(0.2029)
Observations 527
Wald Chi2(14) 30.7400
p > Chi2 0.0006
Pseudo R2 0.0210  
 
If we include the motivation of asking for advice (see Table 5.8) in our analysis, we find that 
people who came for reassurance or to improve their strategy are less likely to follow the ad-
vice. This is consistent with explanations regarding the competence of the decision maker (see 
Subsection 5.4.2). As mentioned before, people tend to overvalue the own opinion compared 
to advice from other sources (see e.g. Harvey and Fischer (1997), or Yaniv and Kleinberger 
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(2000)). The reasons “reassurance” and “improvement” imply that the households already had 
an investment strategy before the interview, implying that to follow the advice by the con-
sumer center would not only mean to accept the advice but moreover to deviate from their 
original own strategy.  
Households giving a concrete reason for the consultation show a higher willingness to accept 
the recommendation. This seems plausible as a concrete problem needs direct attention while 
the reason “general information need” implies no urgent need for action. This result is also in 
line with the “concreteness principle” by Slovic (1972b). He posits that people prefer explicit-
ly given information over information that has to be transformed in some way. It may thus be 
that people also prefer to solve a concrete problem compared to an imprecise one as solving 
an imprecise problem would require more mental work. 
We also included the reasons to consult the consumer center as an advisor to the regression 
model but they do not influence the decision to follow advice or not; this is most likely be-
cause the reasons for consulting the consumer center are too homogenous (88 percent state the 
reason “independency of the consumer center”). 
In order to obtain an idea of the magnitude of the influence of the motivation, Appendix B 
presents the results of the binary logistic regression. The base probability of 40.67 percent of 
completely rejecting the advice increases by 13.13 percent if the households state the reason 
“reassurance”. On the other hand, a concrete reason decreases the probability of rejecting the 
advice by 13.07 percent. The coefficient of the reason “improvement of the current alloca-
tion” is no longer significant. In addition, the estimated magnitude is lower than for the other 
two reasons, about 6 percent. 
5.4.5 Influence of Option-Related Attributes 
In the following we consider the advice itself. We look at the number of pieces of advice (see 
Figure 5.2) and at alternative (conflicting) pieces of advice. This can be either alternative 
pieces of advice provided by the consumer center for single pieces of advice (see Figure 5.6) 
or it can be an alternative to the whole recommendation provided by another advisor (dummy 
variable which is 1 if the household consulted another advisor since the interview with the 
consumer center).  
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Figure 5.6: Alternative pieces of advice 
The figure shows the number of alternative pieces of advice per piece of advice. 
 
 
Table 5.9 shows the results of the regression analysis. There are several experimental studies 
indicating that the number and form of alternative options can influence the preferences for a 
given alternative (see e.g. Huber et al. (1982) or Tversky and Shafir (1992)). For our data, we 
expected a lower overall acceptance if the pieces of advice provided by the consumer center 
are conflicting instead of complementary or if households had another interview. However, 
we do not find an effect of alternative pieces of advice, nor do we find one for the total num-
ber of pieces of advice in the recommendation. With regard to the alternatives, we believe that 
most likely we did not find an effect because of too few observations, with only 39 house-
holds stating that they had another counseling interview. Their mean acceptance is 2.02, com-
pared to a mean acceptance of 1.98 of the other households; this difference is too small to be 
significant. The recommendation of alternative pieces of advice by the consumer center is 
also not very common, see Figure 5.6. We use the number of pieces of advice as a proxy for 
the complexity of advice. As we do not find a significant effect, maybe this proxy is too sim-
ple. In the further analyses, we will consider the exact asset types. The results of the binary 
logistic regression (not reported) confirm these results; we do not find any significant effects 
of the number of pieces of advice nor of alternative pieces of advice. 
Concerning the asset types, we differentiate between call money, savings accounts/bonds, 
(federal) bonds or bond funds, stocks or stock funds, “Riester” savings plans, insurance con-
tracts, and outstanding debts (see Table 5.10). All in all, 148 pieces of advice are about call 
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money accounts, 133 about savings, 122 about stocks or stock funds, 110 about bonds or bond 
funds, 106 about savings in a “Riester” plan (a private pension plan that is state-aided by fi-
nancial and tax benefits, the labeling “Riester” goes back to the German politician Walter 
Riester), 30 about insurance contracts, and 11 about outstanding debts. If one piece of advice 
includes an alternative (e.g. purchase of a bond fund or bank savings bonds instead), more 
than one type might be correct. 
Table 5.9: Individual advice acceptance, number of pieces of advice and alternative pieces of 
advice 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (ordered logistic regressions with clus-
tering) for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 1 = fully accepted, 2 = partly accepted, 3 = 
not at all accepted. Standard errors are adjusted for 186 (186, 185, 185) household clusters. They are re-
ported underneath the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by 
*, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
Women 0.0101 -0.0079 -0.0099 0.0101
(0.2264) (0.2235) -0.223 (0.2261)
Men 0.0056 -0.0178 0.0030 0.0282
(0.2787) (0.2814) -0.2835 (0.2794)
Age -0.0164 -0.0179 -0.0175 -0.0159
(0.0075)** (0.0073)** (0.0074)** (0.0074)**
Income 0.0290 0.0315 0.0417 0.0404
(0.1074) (0.1081) -0.1096 (0.1086)
Education 0.0832 0.0934 0.0886 0.0795
(0.0928) (0.0938) -0.093 (0.0946)
Knowledge 0.0681 0.0665 0.0628 0.0636
(0.0946) (0.0951) -0.0953 (0.0949)
Risk tolerance -0.0689 -0.0770 -0.0838 -0.0773
(0.0685) (0.0697) -0.0704 (0.0695)
Pieces of advice 0.0684 0.0728
(0.0568) (0.0589)
Alternatives 0.0001 -0.0284
(0.1953) (0.1945)
Other interview 0.073 0.0915
(0.2433) (0.2441)
Observations 527 527 524 524
Wald Chi2(#) 10.36 9.62 9.31 10.92
p > Chi2 0.2410 0.2928 0.3165 0.3640
Pseudo R2 0.0089 0.0074 0.0076 0.0092  
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Table 5.10: Asset types 
The table reports which asset types the pieces of advice can be assigned to. Multiple types are possible. 
Asset type Obs. Percentage
Call money 148 21.64%
Savings 133 19.44%
Stocks, stock funds 122 17.84%
Bonds, bond funds 110 16.08%
Riester 106 15.50%
Insurance 30 4.39%
Outstanding debts 11 1.61%
Other 24 3.51%  
 
Table 5.11 shows the results of the regression analysis with dummy variables included for the 
different asset types. We find that advice about call money is significantly more likely to be 
followed, which may be due to the fact that call money is an easy product. It is easy to under-
stand and the account is quickly opened. Moreover, it is sensible to have a financial buffer for 
unforeseen events in form of a call money account. In contrast, for the asset type of bonds or 
bond funds we find a negative influence. If the advice concerns bonds, the acceptance rate is 
significantly lower. Bonds or bond funds are a more complex asset type and require a special 
securities account on part of the individual wishing to trade in them. Additionally, the advan-
tages over bank savings bonds or a simple call money account might be unclear. For “Riester” 
savings plans, the probability that the advice is followed is higher. Despite the complicated 
structure of “Riester” products, people seem to follow the advice significantly more often, 
which might be due to the features of the product itself; “Riester” is a state-aided private 
pension. About 83 percent of the households in the original dataset (see Table 4.2) stated “re-
tirement provisions” as the purpose of their investment and about 52 percent wanted to be 
informed about governmental aid. Thus, as “Riester” provides governmental aid by financial 
and tax benefits, the acceptance is quite high. For advice about insurance contracts, the wil-
lingness to follow the advice is also significantly higher. From the 30 pieces of advice about 
insurance, only 7 are about starting a new contract, the other 23 pieces are about modifica-
tions or the termination of the contract. In most cases, the households are advised to stop fur-
ther payments because the performance after charges is simply too low compared to other 
direct investments. This argument is easy to understand and in addition, the advice is easy to 
implement. 
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Table 5.11: Individual advice acceptance, asset types 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (ordered logistic regressions with clus-
tering) for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 1 = fully accepted, 2 = partly accepted, 3 = 
not at all accepted. Standard errors are adjusted for 186 household clusters. They are reported underneath 
the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level 
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients
(Std. Errors)
Women -0.1533
(0.2738)
Men -0.0344
(0.3340)
Age -0.0249
(0.0087)***
Income -0.0482
(0.1338)
Education 0.1058
(0.1103)
Knowledge 0.0003
(0.1016)
Risk tolerance -0.0930
(0.0823)
Call money -1.3868
(0.3158)***
Savings 0.0129
(0.2584)
Stocks, stock funds 0.2480
(0.3009)
Bonds, bond funds 0.8362
(0.3012)***
Riester -1.0272
(0.3548)***
Insurance -1.5755
(0.4829)***
Outstanding debts -0.8477
(0.7372)
Observations 527
Wald Chi2(14) 74.63
p > Chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0912  
 
The magnitude of the specific asset type is considerably high. Appendix B shows the results 
of the binary logistic regression analysis. If the advice is about call money, the probability of 
rejecting the advice is by 30.37 percent lower. If it is about “Riester”, the probability is lower 
by 16.89 percent and the type “insurance” decreases the probability by 31.39 percent. On the 
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contrary, the probability of rejection is higher by 22.13 percent if the advice is about bonds or 
bond funds. 
The contract form, i.e. purchase or sale of an asset type, freezing or modification of a contract, 
may also be used to categorize the pieces of advice. We do not find an effect of the contract 
form, which might be due to the insufficient variation in our data; 566 pieces of advice are 
about the purchase of an asset type and all other forms are not very common. The main reason 
for this is that the recommendations of the consumer center tend to focus on a new strategy, 
i.e. purchases, and do not state explicitly that existing investments should be sold or modified 
in exchange. 
Table 5.12: Individual advice acceptance, one-time investments 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (ordered logistic regressions with clus-
tering) for one-time investments.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 1 = fully accepted, 2 = partly accepted, 3 = 
not at all accepted. Standard errors are adjusted for 99 household clusters. They are reported underneath 
the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level 
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients
(Std. Errors)
Women 0.0510
(0.3282)
Men -0.0928
(0.3863)
Age -0.0187
(0.0142)
Income 0.0261
(0.1537)
Education 0.0408
(0.1067)
Knowledge 0.1238
(0.1412)
Risk tolerance 0.0062
(0.1117)
Log_amount 0.2742
(0.1043)***
Observations 230
Wald Chi2(8) 11.94
p > Chi2 0.1538
Pseudo R2 0.0160  
 
We also want to consider the investment amount. We have one-time investments and savings 
rates. As we do not have the investment horizon of the savings plans, we are not able to calcu-
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late standardized values such as the net present value; we thus use two separate models. For 
the first, we look at one-time investments, of which there are 291 with the minimum amount 
of 600 Euro and the maximum of 670,000 Euro.  
Table 5.12 shows the results for one-time investments only. The higher the investment 
amount, the lower the willingness to accept the advice. If we include the amount, we no long-
er find an influence of age, which may be due to the fact that investment amount and age are 
correlated: older households have (on average) higher investment amounts. In the binary 
model, we again find an effect of age, which runs contrary to the influence of the investment 
amount. Note that both models have low explanatory power, as evidenced by the Wald’s chi-
squared statistics that are not significant.  
If we look at regular savings instead of one-time investments, we do not find an effect of the 
amount. The only noticeable result from the previous analyses is the high difference in the 
base probabilities in the binary models (see Appendix B). For one-time investments this prob-
ability is 33.00 percent, compared to 45.21 percent for regular savings. We conclude that the 
willingness to accept advice is considerably higher for one-time investments. For the next 
analysis, we thus introduce a dummy variable, which is set to one if the advice is about a one-
time investment.  
The results are shown in Table 5.13. We indeed find a significant influence of one-time in-
vestments but do not find an effect of age in this model. This is not surprising as one-time 
investments and age are positively correlated; the mean age of one-time investments is 53.28 
years compared to 40.59 years for regular investments.36
                                                 
36 Note that there are 19 pieces of advice that include a one-time investment plus a regular investment. In this 
case our dummy variable is also 1. The results do not change if we use a “one-time investment only” dummy. If 
we use two dummies, the coefficient of the “one-time investment only” dummy is significant. The separate “one-
time plus regular investments” dummy is also positive but not significant. 
 Appendix B shows that the probabil-
ity of rejecting the advice is by 10.51 percent lower for a one-time investment. The effect can 
be explained with the help of the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis (Shefrin and Thaler (1988)). 
According to the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis, households divide their wealth into three 
mental accounts: current income, current assets, and future income. The probability of spend-
ing is highest for current income and lowest for future income; it is the other way round with 
the propensity to save. One-time investments normally relate to existing assets, i.e. the 
amount has already accrued. In contrast, regular savings are related to current income. Regu-
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lar savings thus lead to a reduction of consumption possibilities which is painful for the 
household.  
Table 5.13: Individual advice acceptance, one-time investments (dummy) 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (ordered logistic regressions with clus-
tering) for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 1 = fully accepted, 2 = partly accepted, 3 = 
not at all accepted. Standard errors are adjusted for 186 household clusters. They are reported underneath 
the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level 
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients
(Std. Errors)
Women -0.0653
(0.2268)
Men -0.0667
(0.2831)
Age -0.0107
(0.0086)
Income 0.0109
(0.1071)
Education 0.0983
(0.0938)
Knowledge 0.0711
(0.0954)
Risk tolerance -0.0697
(0.0703)
One-time investment -0.3279
(0.1903)*
Observations 527
Wald Chi2(8) 11.57
p > Chi2 0.1715
Pseudo R2 0.0100  
 
For most of the dependent variables, the results also persist if we include all dependent va-
riables in a single regression model; Table 5.14 presents the results of the ordered logistic 
regression. As in Table 5.13, we no longer find an effect of demographic variables of the de-
cision maker. The higher the general satisfaction with the advisor and the interview, the high-
er the willingness to follow the advice. A concrete reason for the interview increases the 
probability that the advice is followed. On the contrary, the intention of reassuring oneself of 
the own strategy decreases the willingness to follow advice. Again, for call money accounts, 
“Riester” savings plans, and insurances the acceptance rate is higher while it is lower for 
bonds or bond funds. A recommendation concerning a one-time investment is more likely to 
be followed in contrast to regular investments. 
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Table 5.14: Individual advice acceptance, all variables 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (ordered logistic regressions with clus-
tering) for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 1 = fully accepted, 2 = partly accepted, 3 = 
not at all accepted. Standard errors are adjusted for 185 household clusters. They are reported underneath 
the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level 
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients Coefficients
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
Women -0.1667 Pieces of advice 0.0984
(0.2757) (0.0741)
Men -0.0897 Alternatives -0.1044
(0.3329) (0.3017)
Age -0.0062 Other interview 0.0497
(0.0112) 0.2642
Income -0.0687 Call money -1.2089
(0.1222) (0.3409)***
Education 0.1099 Savings 0.1638
(0.1090) (0.2870)
Knowledge 0.0280 Stocks, stock funds 0.4649
(0.1067) (0.3338)
Risk tolerance -0.1129 Bonds, bond funds 0.9954
(0.0839) (0.3271)***
Satisfaction9 0.2763 Riester -1.0163
(0.1389)** (0.3941)***
General information need 0.1629 Insurance -1.4818
(0.2215) (0.4769)***
Uncertainty -0.2184 Outstanding debts -0.4517
(0.2195) (0.9339)
Improvement of current allocation 0.3398 One-time investment -0.6980
(0.2136) (0.2517)***
First interview -0.1543 Observations 524
(0.2544) Wald Chi2(26) 97.93
Reassurance of current allocation 0.4260 p > Chi2 0.0000
(0.2191)* Pseudo R2 0.1204
Concrete reason -0.4936
(0.2320)**
Other advisors unsatisfying 0.1511
(0.2461)  
 
Appendix B shows the magnitude of changes in the dependent variables with the help of the 
binary logistic model. The base probability of totally rejecting the advice (38.56 percent) is 
decreased by 6.71 percent if the satisfaction increases by one standard deviation. A concrete 
reason for asking for advice decreases the probability of rejecting the advice by 13.62 percent. 
The intention of reassure oneself of the own strategy is no longer significant in this model, but 
the magnitude is around a 10 percent increase. The influence of the specific asset type is still 
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very high. If the advice is about call money, the probability of rejecting the advice is lower by 
26.25 percent. If it is about “Riester”, the probability is lower by 15.98 percent lower and the 
type ”insurance” decreases the probability by 30.14 percent. On the contrary, the probability 
of rejecting is higher by 28.29 percent if the advice is about bonds or bond funds. A one-time 
investment decreases the probability by 18.94 percent. Overall, we find that the changes in the 
probabilities due to option-related attributes are much higher than those caused by person-
related attributes. 
As we do not find any effects of demographic variables of the decision maker, we perform the 
same regression without including these variables. As some participants refused to state pri-
vate information (e.g. income) we hope to benefit from more observations in this case.  
Appendix B shows the results. Contrary to previous results, we find that with more pieces of 
advice the willingness to follow advice decreases. This is consistent with our hypothesis that 
higher complexity decreases the willingness to follow advice. Certainly, it is more complex to 
implement a strategy consisting of several pieces of advice compared to a single piece of ad-
vice. An increase in the number of pieces of advice by one standard deviation (= 1.8189) 
leads to an increase in the rejection probability by 3.80 percent. In addition, we find that the 
willingness to accept advice is lower by 14.66 percent if the advice is about stocks or stock 
funds. This result is comparable to the asset type bonds or bond funds. Stocks or stock funds 
are a more complex asset type and a special securities account is needed.  
5.5 Robustness Checks 
If households replied at least once that they did not - or only partly - follow a piece of advice, 
we ask them for the reason. Using this additional information, we would now like to check 
our hypotheses and detect further determinants of the willingness to follow advice. 
Table 5.15 reports the results. The answers are heterogeneous, with 32 households stating that 
their situation had changed since the interview, 25 having had a competing offer from the 
house bank (surprisingly, only 10 of these 25 stated that they had had another interview when 
previously asked in the questionnaire), 24 did not have time so far, 23 considered the recom-
mendation too difficult to implement, and 20 households could not make sufficient sense of 
the recommendation. 75 households specified other reasons, e.g. the financial crisis, a change 
in legislation (final withholding tax), other preferences because of planned self-employment, 
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or simply too little money to invest. Some households also claimed that the recommended 
index funds were not available at their bank. At the end of the questionnaire we added extra 
space for further suggestions. Many households would prefer concrete product recommenda-
tions instead of advice on broad asset types and would welcome a second interview for further 
queries. Jungermann et al. (2005) summarize the influence of the information presentation in 
a decision problem. Decision makers prefer to use information given explicitly while implicit-
ly given information is hardly used at all. Information should be complete and clearly ar-
ranged; otherwise it is not taken into account. At the consumer center, the households receive 
a strategy specifying only the asset types but the recommendation does not include concrete 
products. Although the households are provided with the latest test results relating to the rec-
ommended asset types from, for example, “Finanztest” or other journals, they still need to 
expend some effort on the implementation process. 
Table 5.15: Reasons not to follow 
The table reports the households’ reasons not to follow the advice. Multiple answers were allowed. 
Reason Obs. Percentage
Situation changed 32 15.31%
House bank offer 25 11.96%
No time 24 11.48%
Too difficult, general 23 11.00%
Sense unclear 20 9.57%
Too complex 19 9.09%
Incomprehensible 10 4.78%
Advantages unclear 5 2.39%
Other 75 35.89%  
 
The self-reported reasons confirm our findings concerning the advice itself. Some households 
state that it is too difficult to follow the advice, either because they do not understand the ad-
vice itself or because they are not able to implement it. We find low acceptance for advice 
concerning bonds or bund funds and concerning stocks or stock funds; the complexity is es-
pecially high for these asset types. In addition, the decision for a concrete product is difficult 
as there exist big differences between the single products (e.g. funds invest in different re-
gions). If the decision for a concrete product is made, an order has to be placed, and a special 
securities account is needed. We also detect further reasons we cannot control for in our anal-
ysis, for example a change in the financial situation. 
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We also test our applied models for robustness. In addition to the analysis on the level of a 
single piece of advice, we repeat the same analysis on the household level, meaning we treat 
one household as one observation. The overall acceptance per household is calculated as fol-
lows: as mentioned before, a “yes” receives the value 1, a “partly” the value 2, and a “no” the 
value 3. If a household received more than one piece of advice, we take the average accep-
tance. 
Figure 5.7 shows the distribution of the overall advice acceptance in our dataset. 45 house-
holds completely followed the advice given by the consumer center, 26 did not follow the 
advice at all. Most households do something in between by following the advice only partly. 
Figure 5.7: Overall advice acceptance 
The figure shows the overall advice acceptance (one household = one observation, overall acceptance is 
the average acceptance if several pieces of advice were provided). 
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Table 5.16 shows the results for the overall advice acceptance, which are very similar to the 
analysis on the individual level. As in the binary models, we find weak evidence for a higher 
risk tolerance increasing the willingness to accept advice (see models 2 and 5). Again, the 
more positive the perception of the advisor and the whole interview, the higher the subsequent 
willingness to follow the advice (models 2 and 5). Instead of the positive influence of a con-
crete reason on the acceptance of advice, we find a weak negative influence of a general need 
for information. Again, households coming to reassure their own strategy are less likely to 
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follow the advice (models 3 and 5). We do not find an influence of the total number of pieces 
of advice nor of alternative advice (models 4 and 5). 
Table 5.16: Overall advice acceptance, all variables 
The table reports determinants of the overall advice acceptance (tobit regressions) for all households. 
Standard errors are reported underneath the coefficients in parentheses.  
Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by 
***. 
Overall advice acceptance Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
(Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Women -0.0518 -0.0293 0.0029 -0.0475 0.0176
(0.1876) (0.1816) (0.1804) (0.1877) (0.1755)
Men 0.1330 0.1063 0.1348 0.1409 0.1066
(0.2147) (0.2080) (0.2075) (0.2146) (0.2022)
Age -0.0086 -0.0091 -0.0080 -0.0080 -0.0069
(0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0063)
Income -0.0094 0.0149 -0.0326 -0.0142 -0.0159
(0.0779) (0.0758) (0.0751) (0.0781) (0.0739)
Education 0.0295 0.0218 0.0833 0.0270 0.0717
(0.0786) (0.0760) (0.0769) (0.0791) (0.0752)
Knowledge 0.0246 -0.0091 -0.0316 -0.0228 -0.0143
(0.0694) (0.0672) (0.0682) (0.0695) (0.0668)
Risk tolerance -0.0878 -0.1118 -0.0855 -0.0862 -0.0980
(0.0571) (0.0558)** (0.0563) (0.0574) (0.0556)*
Satisfaction9 0.3218 0.2831
(0.0933)*** (0.0932)***
General information need 0.2172 0.2763
(0.1534) (0.1515)*
Uncertainty -0.1516 -0.1198
(0.1571) (0.1528)
Improvement of current allocation 0.2418 0.1734
(0.1585) (0.1569)
First interview -0.1460 -0.0792
(0.1678) (0.1639)
Reassurance of current allocation 0.4342 0.4226
(0.1760)** (0.1729)**
Concrete reason -0.2412 -0.2002
(0.1945) (0.1916)
Other advisors unsatisfying 0.1273 0.1107
(0.2067) (0.2033)
Pieces of advice 0.0414 0.0561
(0.0476) (0.0457)
Alternatives -0.0241 -0.0308
(0.1637) (0.1553)
Other interview 0.0670 -0.0066
(0.1891) (0.1809)
Constant 2.3147 1.8135 2.1076 2.3526 1.2054
(0.5877)*** (0.6069)*** (0.6422)*** (0.6195)*** (0.6878)*
Observations 186 186 186 186 186
LR Chi2(#) 4.27 16.15 19.66 5.13 30.95
p > Chi2 0.7485 0.0402 0.1413 0.8822 0.0292
Pseudo R2 0.0090 0.0340 0.0413 0.0108 0.0651  
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On the individual level - in addition to our ordered logistic regression analyses with clustering 
- we also estimated ordered logistic regression models with random effects (see Rabe-Hesketh 
et al. (2004)). A model with random effects provides more efficient estimates in case the exact 
form of the correlation is known. Our basic results, i.e. the significant coefficients, do not 
change from the model with clustering to the model with random effects (we tried with differ-
ent assumptions concerning the form of the correlation). The specific form of the correlation 
of the error terms within households thus does not seem to have a big impact on our results. 
We conclude that our model is efficient and the results are robust to the precise functional 
form of the model. A model with fixed effects is not applicable here because explanatory va-
riables like age and risk tolerance only change between households but not within the house-
hold. A model with fixed effects would eliminate the effects at the level of the cluster (see e.g. 
Wooldridge (2008)).  
Besides the binary logistic regressions models, we also estimated probit models; again, the 
results do not change considerably. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter adds to the literature on advice taking. We analyze determinants influencing the 
willingness to follow advice. In spite of the high relevance in everyday life, there is very little 
empirical evidence on the acceptance of advice - so far, the efforts have concentrated mostly 
on improving the quality of advice. But if there is a lack of willingness to accept advice, all 
attempts to improve the quality are of course in vain. For proper regulation of financial ad-
vice, a deeper understanding of how people make use of the advice they receive is of the 
greatest importance. We analyze a unique dataset about real financial decisions using data 
from counseling interviews by the consumer center Baden-Wuerttemberg plus questionnaire 
data. With the help of the original dataset, we can analyze determinants for people asking for 
advice in a first step. We find that people asking for advice are on average older, more highly 
educated, and more likely to be female (see Chapter 4). With the help of the questionnaire, we 
analyze the second step - the willingness to follow the advice. We investigate different steps 
in the decision process.  
First, we consider person-related attribute of the decision maker, finding only weak evidence. 
Older people tend to have a higher willingness to follow advice, but the age effect is eco-
nomically of no great importance and not persistent to the inclusion of other variables. If we 
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include a dummy for one-time investments, the coefficient for age is in fact no longer signifi-
cant. In addition, we find weak evidence for an influence of risk tolerance: in the binary mod-
els, more risk averse households have a higher probability to completely refuse the advice. 
We do not find an influence of financial knowledge on the willingness to follow advice, 
which might be due to the fact that our sample is fairly homogenous in this aspect: most of the 
households are highly educated; the median household holds a university degree.  
Second, we consider person-related attributes of the advisor. We find that the overall satisfac-
tion with the advisor and the interview of the decision maker (based on nine single attributes) 
positively influences the willingness to follow advice. The higher the overall satisfaction, the 
higher the probability that the advice is followed. As the single attributes are highly correlated 
with each other, disentangling the effects is not possible (with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.9068). 
We assume that people have difficulties in correctly evaluating the quality of advice; they 
evaluate attributes such as likability and interview atmosphere (e.g. enough time for ques-
tions) instead.  
We find that households benefit from the interview with the consumer center. However, on 
average, the households do not feel confident enough to do without advice in the future. This 
result is even more striking if we consider the high education of our sample. Along with our 
assumption that people have difficulties correctly evaluating the quality of advice, this implies 
a need of protection for investors seeking for advice.  
Besides person-related attributes we also analyze the motivation of asking for advice, i.e. the 
reason why the household initially asked for advice. We find that a concrete reason increases 
the probability that the advice is followed, in contrast to a general need for information. Peo-
ple who came to improve or to reassure themselves of their own existing strategy show a 
lower willingness to follow the recommendation of the consumer center. 
We also investigate option-related attributes of the advice itself and find strong differences 
between the specific asset types that are recommended. It is more likely that people follow the 
advice if it concerns call money, a “Riester” savings plan, or an insurance contract. On the 
contrary, if the advice concerns bonds or bond funds (less pronounced also for stocks and 
stock funds) it is less likely to be followed. For one-time investments, the acceptance rate is 
higher than for regular investments. The impact of the advice itself is surprisingly high and 
option-related attributes seem to be more important than person-related attributes, but this 
might be due to too little variation in the data with respect to person-related attributes. On the 
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one hand, most of our participants are highly educated, yielding little variation in person-
related attributes of the decision maker. On the other hand, the interviews at the consumer 
center all proceed in a similar way and advisors do not face the typical conflict of interest 
caused by commission-based advice, correspondingly yielding little variation in the evalua-
tion of person-related attributes of the advisor. Further studies of this issue are required to 
further investigate the impact of person-related versus option-related attributes. This is espe-
cially important given that the Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection plans on taking fur-
ther action to achieve a high standard of financial advice. 
Our results are only partly in line with the existing literature. To our best knowledge, there is 
so far no study concerned with the acceptance of financial advice with real world data. The 
effects confirm parts of the model of Jungermann (1999) and the experimental evidence (e.g. 
Harvey and Fischer (1997), Harvey et al. (2000), or Van Swol and Sniezek (2005)).  
Our analysis shows that about half of the advice from the consumer center is accepted. We do 
not have figures for comparable decisions, e.g. from a traditional bank and can thus, not say 
whether this is a good acceptance rate for financial advice or not. However, our study gives 
some details about how to improve the acceptance of advice. Difficulties occur particularly 
with complex products like bond or stock funds. According to the comments given by the 
participants of the questionnaire, the acceptance rate could be increased by a second interview 
intended to clarify further questions and check the status of the implementation. This, howev-
er, would simultaneously also increase the effort required and subsequently the costs of the 
advice offer. Another weak point is the form of the recommendation: the households require 
more explicit advice, i.e. the recommendation of concrete products. At the moment, some of 
them are overwhelmed with too much imprecise information - and thus with the implementa-
tion of the recommendation. It is easier for them to receive the advice and the product in a 
single step, as is the rule when they go to a bank. This convenience of traditional banks’ offer 
can thus be seen as competing against the product independence of the consumer center.  
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5.7 Appendix A: Cover Letter and Questionnaire 
The following section provides a translation of the cover letter and the questionnaire. Cover 
letter and questionnaire were originally in German. 
 
 
 
 
 
Please help us to improve our advice concept! 
 
Dear..., 
 
Some time ago you had a counseling interview about financial investments 
and retirement provisions. 
To improve our advice concept, we commissioned a study to the University 
of Mannheim. This study is based on an anonymous survey of those who 
asked the consumer center for advice.   
If you fill in and send back the attached questionnaire, you help us a lot!  
With your answers we can get important insights to improve the quality of 
our service.  
As a little thank-you for your efforts, please find enclosed some frequently 
asked questions and answers about the financial crisis.  
 
Kind regards 
 
Niels Nauhauser  
Product manager financial services  
Verbraucherzentrale Baden-Württemberg e. V. · Paulinenstraße 47 · 70178 Stuttgart 
 
Ihr Zeichen  Unser Zeichen Telefon Datum  
 FDL -48  
Beratungsstelle Stuttgart 
Paulinenstraße 47 
70178 Stuttgart 
Fax (07 11) 66 91-50  
www.vz-bw.de 
InfoTelefon / Terminvereinbarung 
0180-5-50 59 99 
Mo bis Do 10-18 Uhr, Fr 10-14 Uhr 
0,14 EUR/Min. aus dem deutschen 
Festnetz, aus den Mobilfunknetzen 
höhere Preise möglich. 
 
 
 
Telefonische Beratung 
Telekommunikation, Freizeit, 
Haushalt 
Mo-Do 10-18 Uhr 0900-1-77 444-1 
Ernährung, Kosmetik, Hygiene  
Mo-Do 15-18 Uhr 0900-1-77 444-2 
Versicherungen  
Mo-Do 10-18 Uhr 0900-1-77 444-3 
Altersvorsorge, Banken, Kredite 
Mo-Do 10-18 Uhr 0900-1-77 444-4 
Bauen und Wohnen  
Mo-Do 10-18 Uhr 0900-1-77 444-5 
Energie  
Mo-Do 15-18 Uhr 0900-1-77 444-6 
1,75 EUR/Min. aus dem deutschen 
Festnetz, aus den Mobilfunknetzen 
höhere Preise möglich. 
Patienten UPD 0180-3-11 77 22 
Mo-Fr 10-18 Uhr 
0,09 EUR/Min. aus dem deutschen 
Festnetz, aus den Mobilfunknetzen 
höhere Preise möglich. 
 
 
 
 
Bank für Sozialwirtschaft 
BLZ 601 205 00 
Konto 87 201 00 
Steuer-Nr. 99018/06485 
Anerkennung als gemeinnützige 
Körperschaft durch Finanzamt  
Körperschaften Stuttgart. 
Eingetragen im Vereinsregister  
Nr. VR 1259 Amtsgericht Stuttgart. 
Vorsitzende des  
Verwaltungsrates Bärbl Maushart 
Vorstand Beate Weiser 
 
 
Verbraucherzentrale  
Baden-Württemberg e. V. 
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Part A:   Questions concerning the counseling interview  
What was the reason for the interview? (Please check, multiple answers are allowed) 
 
□ Specific reason (e.g. heritage) 
□ General information needs concerning financial investment and retirement provisions  
□ First detailed counseling interview about retirement provisions  
□ Uncertainty regarding current financial investments 
□ Show improvement potential for current financial investments  
□ Need for reassurance of personal investment strategy 
□ Previous counseling interviews have been unsatisfactory 
□ Further reasons (please specify): 
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Why did you seek advice from the Verbraucherzentrale (consumer center)? (Please check, 
multiple answers are allowed) 
 
□ Recommendation from friends  
□ Recommendation from the consumer center during another counseling interview  
□ Press, radio, television 
□ Online search  
□ I expect independent advice  
□ Other providers do only intend to earn a commission with me, here I pay a lump sum  
□ To compare the offer with other counseling interviews  
□ For checking purposes, show room for improvement  
□ As a comparison to my present strategy  
□ Further reasons (please specify): 
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Overall, how satisfied were you with the counseling interview? (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
How likeable was the advisor from the consumer center? (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please assess the expertise of your advisor. (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please assess the reliability of your advisor. (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
How satisfied were you with the consideration of your personal situation? (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
How satisfied were you with the explanation of the asset types? (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
Very good     Very poor 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Very reliable Very unreliable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Very satisfied Very dissatisfied 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Very satisfied Very dissatisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Very satisfied Very dissatisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Very likeable Very dislikable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
150                                                        Chapter 5: The Willingness to Follow Financial Advice 
Was there enough time to ask questions and to resolve ambiguities? (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
Were the advisor’s answers understandable? (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
How confident appeared the advisor that the suggested investment strategy was the right one for you? 
(Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What were the benefits of the interview? Please state how far you agree/ disagree with the following 
statements! 
 
Now, I know the advantages and disadvantages of financial products much better. (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
I now feel more confident regarding financial issues. (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, I can counsel myself and don’t need to ask for advice anymore. (Please check) 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Very confident Not confident at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Plenty of time  No time at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Very understandable Not understandable at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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Did you have a further counseling interview since your interview with the consumer center? (Please 
check) 
 
yes         no 
 
If yes, where did the interview take place? (Please name it): 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
If yes, when did the interview take place? (Month, year):       _________________   ________ 
 
Overall, how satisfied were you with this counseling interview? (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
Would you make use of the advisory service of commercial and saving banks regarding your financial 
investments and retirement provisions again? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
yes          no 
 
Statement: 
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Part B:   General information about the household 
 
Gender (Please check):     Age: 
□ female       She: _______ years 
□ male       He:   _______ years 
□ couple       
Very satisfied Very dissatisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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Highest educational attainment (Please check): 
□ Still in school 
□ Hauptschul-graduation (Lower secondary education) 
□ Realschul-graduation (Intermediate secondary education) 
□ Abitur (University qualification exam) 
□ University degree 
□ Doctorate degree 
 
 
How much gross income did your household achieve last year (income before taxes and social 
contributions)? (Please check) 
□ Less than 25,000 € 
□ Between 25,000 and 50,000 € 
□ Between 50,000 and 75,000 € 
□ Between 75,000 and 100,000 € 
□ More than 100,000 € 
□ N/A 
 
 
How do you assess your knowledge regarding financial investments in general? (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How do you assess your willingness to take risks regarding financial investments? (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
Very good Very poor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Very low Very high 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
Chapter 5: The Willingness to Follow Financial Advice 153 
 
Please state if you agree or disagree with the following statements! 
 
If I don’t understand a financial product, I am glad if someone else decides for me. (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
I would never invest in a financial product which I haven’t fully understood. (Please check) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What percentage of German private investors do you think have superior abilities (e.g. expertise, skills 
interpreting information) than you to select those stocks which will develop above-average in the future?  
Please state a number between 0 and 100 (0 e.g. means that nobody has superior abilities than you. 50 means 
you’re exactly average. 100 means that everybody has superior abilities than you) : 
 
                      % of the German private investors have superior abilities than me. 
 
 Don’t know 
          
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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The German stock index DAX combines the 30 most important German corporations. On November 21, 
2008 the DAX level was 4,127.41 points. Where do you expect the DAX level in 12 months (one year)?  
We would like you to clarify your estimation by stating three numbers: An estimated value, a lower 
bound and an upper bound.  
The best estimate (estimated value) for the actual value should be made such that the true value of the DAX should 
equally likely be above respectively below the estimate (i.e. with a probability of 50% it should not be below your 
estimate and respectively with a probability of 50% it should not be above your estimate).  
With a high probability (95%) the true value of the DAX should not fall short of the lower bound, and with a high 
probability (95%) not exceed the upper bound. 
 
 
 
 
Estimated value 
 
 
With 90% probability, the true value of the DAX will be between the following bounds: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Don’t know 
          
Upper bound 
The true value of the DAX should not exceed  
the upper bound with a probability of 95%. 
                    
Lower bound 
The true value of the DAX should not fall short 
of the lower bound with a probability of 95%. 
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Part C:   Statements regarding the implementation of the proposed strategy 
At your counseling interview on (date) the consumer center recommended the following investment 
strategy to you: 
 
Product Amount in € Remark 
Call money /fixed deposits  55(rate) Pay attention to deposit insurance. If you saved a large amount of money 
in an account that you can do without, an investment in fixed deposits 
might be considered.  
Riester fund investment 
plan 
 95(rate) To receive the whole bonus in 2008, you will have to pay in at least 
1,142 € 
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Please state which products you bought (respectively sold, changed) upon the recommendation of the 
consumer center in the following table and which pieces of advice you did not follow at all or followed 
only partly. The last column might be used for further comments (e.g. bought another fund than the 
recommended one, changed the amount). 
 
Product Amount in € 
Implemented? 
(please check) 
Do you remember 
which product you 
chose? (please specify)  
Comment 
Call money /fixed 
deposits 
 55(rate) yes O   no O   
partly O 
  
Riester fund investment 
plan 
 95(rate) yes O   no O   
partly O 
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If you once or several times checked “no” or “partly” in the above table, please explain why you did not 
follow the advice? (Please check, multiple answers are allowed) 
□ I did not have the time for the implementation  
□ My financial situation has changed  
□ The implementation has been too complex 
□ The recommendation was incomprehensible 
□ Another advisor (e.g. local bank) recommended something else  
□ The recommendation did not seem reasonable 
□ The advantages over the prior investment were not evident  
□ The implementation has been too difficult, the recommendation should have been more precise (many 
alternatives on the lists of recommendation, products still have to be negotiated with several providers)  
□ Further reasons (please specify): 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Do you have further helpful suggestions to improve the advice concept of the consumer center? 
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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5.8 Appendix B: Regression Analysis 
Individual advice acceptance, decision maker 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (logistic regressions with clustering) 
for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 0 = (partly) accepted, 1 = not accepted. 
Standard errors are adjusted for 186 household clusters. They are reported underneath the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 
1% level by ***.  
The reference household is a couple with mean characteristics in the other dependent variables. The col-
umn headed “Probability Estimates” reports the probability of not accepting the advice for the reference 
household, and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a one-
standard-deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable. 
 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients Prob. Est.
(Std. Errors) (p = 40.95%)
Women -0.1225 -3.00%
(0.2601)
Men 0.0783 1.90%
(0.2947)
Age -0.0224 -0.54%
(0.0082)***
Income 0.0495 1.20%
(0.1173)
Education 0.1173 2.84%
(0.1104)
Knowledge 0.0500 1.21%
(0.0989)
Risk tolerance -0.1461 -3.53%
(0.0797)*
Constant 0.2119
(0.7939)
Observations 527
Wald Chi2(7) 9.28
p > Chi2 0.2329
Pseudo R2 0.0074  
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Individual advice acceptance, advisor 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (logistic regressions with clustering) 
for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 0 = (partly) accepted, 1 = not accepted. 
Standard errors are adjusted for 186 household clusters. They are reported underneath the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 
1% level by ***.  
The reference household is a couple with mean characteristics in the other dependent variables. The col-
umn headed “Probability Estimates” reports the probability of not accepting the advice for the reference 
household, and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a one-
standard-deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable.  
 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients Prob. Est.
(Std. Errors) (p = 40.78%)
Women -0.0911 -2.20%
(0.2639)
Men 0.0592 1.43%
(0.2901)
Age -0.0226 -0.55%
(0.0079)***
Income 0.0922 2.23%
(0.1155)
Education 0.1005 2.43%
(0.1060)
Knowledge 0.0543 1.31%
(0.0994)
Risk tolerance -0.1688 -4.08%
(0.0757)**
Satisfaction9 0.3864 9.33%
(0.1252)***
Constant -0.6260
(0.8164)
Observations 527
Wald Chi2(8) 20.62
p > Chi2 0.0082
Pseudo R2 0.0337  
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Individual advice acceptance, motivation 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (logistic regressions with clustering) 
for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 0 = (partly) accepted, 1 = not accepted. 
Standard errors are adjusted for 186 household clusters. They are reported underneath the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 
1% level by ***.  
The reference household is a couple with mean characteristics in the other variables. The column headed 
“Probability Estimates” reports the probability of not accepting the advice for the reference household, 
and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a one-standard-
deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable. 
 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients Prob. Est.
(Std. Errors) (p = 40.67%)
Women -0.0687 -1.66%
(0.2500)
Men 0.0382 0.92%
(0.2785)
Age -0.0215 -0.52%
(0.0094)**
Income 0.0087 0.21%
(0.1132)
Education 0.1648 3.98%
(0.1071)
Knowledge 0.0539 1.30%
(0.1046)
Risk tolerance -0.1624 -3.92%
(0.0813)**
General information need 0.0052 0.13%
(0.2126)
Uncertainty -0.2217 -5.32%
(0.2272)
Improvement of current allocation 0.2589 6.27%
(0.2218)
First interview -0.2434 -5.80%
(0.2539)
Reassurance of current allocation 0.5350 13.13%
(0.2023)***
Concrete reason -0.5646 -13.07%
(0.2556)**
Other advisors unsatisfying 0.1474 3.59%
(0.2367)
Constant 0.0918
-0.9814
Observations 527
Wald Chi2(14) 30.1900
p > Chi2 0.0072
Pseudo R2 0.0367  
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Individual advice acceptance, asset types 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (logistic regressions with clustering) 
for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 0 = (partly) accepted, 1 = not accepted. 
Standard errors are adjusted for 186 household clusters. They are reported underneath the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 
1% level by ***.  
The reference household is a couple with mean characteristics in the other variables. The column headed 
“Probability Estimates” reports the probability of not accepting the advice for the reference household, 
and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a one-standard-
deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable.  
 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients Prob. Est.
(Std. Errors) (p = 39.37%)
Women -0.2088 -4.97%
(0.3115)
Men 0.0829 1.99%
(0.3568)
Age -0.0263 -0.63%
(0.0096)***
Income -0.0326 -0.78%
(0.1404)
Education 0.1356 3.24%
(0.1309)
Knowledge -0.0009 -0.02%
(0.1064)
Risk tolerance -0.1604 -3.83%
(0.0944)*
Call money -1.4720 -30.37%
(0.3538)***
Savings 0.0087 0.21%
(0.2793)
Stocks, stock funds 0.1435 3.45%
(0.3273)
Bonds, bond funds 0.9040 22.13%
(0.2950)***
Riester -0.7632 -16.89%
(0.3616)**
Insurance -1.8330 -31.39%
(0.6188)***
Outstanding debts -1.0451 -20.93%
(0.9113)
Constant 1.1597
(0.9697)
Observations 527
Wald Chi2(14) 69.91
p > Chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1245
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Individual advice acceptance, one-time investments 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (logistic regressions with clustering) 
for one-time investments.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 0 = (partly) accepted, 1 = not accepted. 
Standard errors are adjusted for 99 household clusters. They are reported underneath the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 
1% level by ***.  
The reference household is a couple with mean characteristics in the other variables. The column headed 
“Probability Estimates” reports the probability of not accepting the advice for the reference household, 
and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a one-standard-
deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable. 
 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients Prob. Est.
(Std. Errors) (p = 33.00%)
Women -0.0241 -0.53%
(0.4191)
Men 0.1863 4.20%
(0.4260)
Age -0.0282 -0.62%
(0.0154)*
Income 0.0933 2.06%
(0.1765)
Education 0.1033 2.28%
(0.1567)
Knowledge -0.0077 -0.17%
(0.1576)
Risk tolerance -0.9340 -2.07%
(0.1333)
Log_amount 0.2507 5.54%
(0.1329)*
Constant -2.2761
(1.4205)
Observations 230
Wald Chi2(8) 7.48
p > Chi2 0.4860
Pseudo R2 0.0224  
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Individual advice acceptance, one-time investments (dummy) 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (logistic regressions with clustering) 
for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 0 = (partly) accepted, 1 = not accepted. 
Standard errors are adjusted for 186 household clusters. They are reported underneath the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 
1% level by ***.  
The reference household is a couple with mean characteristics in the other variables. The column headed 
“Probability Estimates” reports the probability of not accepting the advice for the reference household, 
and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a one-standard-
deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable. 
 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients Prob. Est.
(Std. Errors) (p = 40.88%)
Women -0.1942 -4.68%
(0.2603)
Men 0.0222 0.54%
(0.2959)
Age -0.0131 -0.32%
(0.0094)
Income 0.0247 0.60%
(0.1153)
Education 0.1266 2.82%
(0.1115)
Knowledge 0.0541 1.31%
(0.0995)
Risk tolerance -0.1384 -3.35%
(0.0805)*
One-time investment -0.4383 -10.51%
(0.2056)**
Constant 0.0567
(0.7938)
Observations 527
Wald Chi2(8) 15.59
p > Chi2 0.0487
Pseudo R2 0.0231  
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Individual advice acceptance, all variables 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (logistic regressions with clustering) 
for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 0 = (partly) accepted, 1 = not accepted. 
Standard errors are adjusted for 185 household clusters. They are reported underneath the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 
1% level by ***.  
The reference household is a couple with mean characteristics in the other variables. The column headed 
“Probability Estimates” reports the probability of not accepting the advice for the reference household, 
and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a one-standard-
deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable. 
 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients Prob. Est. Coefficients Prob. Est.
(Std. Errors) (p = 38.56%) (Std. Errors) (p = 38.56%)
Women -0.2302 -5.43% Pieces of advice 0.1472 3.49%
(0.3096) (0.0792)*
Men 0.0782 1.86% Alternatives -0.0894 -2.12%
(0.3486) (0.2671)
Age -0.0057 -0.13% Other interview -0.0510 -1.20%
(0.0120) 0.2868
Income -0.0419 -0.99% Call money -1.2467 -26.15%
(0.1306) (0.3797)***
Education 0.1171 2.78% Savings 0.1352 3.23%
(0.1296) (0.3030)
Knowledge 0.0116 0.27% Stocks, stock funds 0.4231 10.25%
(0.1146) (0.3685)
Risk tolerance -0.2046 -4.85% Bonds, bond funds 1.1652 28.29%
(0.0974)** (0.3309)***
Satisfaction9 0.2831 6.71% Riester 0.7265 -15.98%
(0.1431)** (0.3879)*
General information need 0.0838 1.98% Insurance -1.7633 -30.14%
(0.2680) (0.6203)***
Uncertainty -0.2331 -5.48% Outstanding debts -0.7029 -14.92%
(0.2543) (1.1405)
Improvement of current allocation 0.3117 7.42 One-time investment -0.8168 -18.94%
(0.2433) (0.2754)***
First interview -0.2072 -4.85% Constant -0.6002
(0.2992) (1.3653)
Reassurance of current allocation 0.4161 10.06% Observations 524
(0.2618) Wald Chi2(26) 90.44
Concrete reason -0.6053 -13.62% p > Chi2 0.0000
(0.3234)* Pseudo R2 0.1694
Other advisors unsatisfying 0.0257 0.61%
(0.3037)  
 
Chapter 5: The Willingness to Follow Financial Advice 165 
 
Individual advice acceptance, all except for demographic variables 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (ordered logistic regressions with clus-
tering) for all pieces of advice.  
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 1 = fully accepted, 2 = partly accepted, 3 = 
not at all accepted. Standard errors are adjusted for 205 household clusters. They are reported underneath 
the coefficients in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level 
by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients
(Std. Errors)
Satisfaction9 0.2545
(0.1335)*
General information need 0.2372
(0.1910)
Uncertainty -0.1895
(0.1997)
Improvement of current allocation 0.2960
(0.1909)
First interview -0.1501
(0.2428)
Reassurance of current allocation 0.3267
(0.2071)
Concrete reason -0.5387
(0.2181)**
Other advisors unsatisfying 0.1718
(0.2179)
Pieces of advice 0.1251
(0.0516)**
Alternatives -0.0630
(0.2862)
Other interview 0.0450
(0.2559)
Call money -1.0599
(0.3184)***
Savings 0.2628
(0.2697)
Stocks, stock funds 0.6694
(0.3050)**
Bonds, bond funds 1.0421
(0.3032)***
Riester -0.8956
(0.3483)***
Insurance -1.2178
(0.4615)***
Outstanding debts -0.4554
(0.8091)
One-time investment -0.5805
(0.2171)***
Observations 581
Wald Chi2(19) 110.80
p > Chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1148  
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Individual advice acceptance, all except for demographic variables 
The table reports determinants of the individual advice acceptance (logistic regressions with clustering) 
for all pieces of advice. 
Coding of dependent variable (individual advice acceptance): 0 = (partly) accepted, 1 = not accepted. 
Standard errors are adjusted for 205 household clusters. They are reported underneath the coefficients in 
parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are denoted by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 
1% level by ***. 
The column headed “Probability Estimates” reports the probability of not accepting the advice for the ref-
erence household, and the change in this probability caused by a unit change in a binary variable and a 
one-standard-deviation change in a continuous or discrete variable. 
Individual advice acceptance Coefficients Prob. Est.
(Std. Errors) (p = 39.11%)
Satisfaction9 0.2597 6.18%
(0.1412)*
General information need 0.2053 4.86%
(0.2346)
Uncertainty -0.2391 -5.65%
(0.2304)
Improvement of current allocation 0.2507 6.00%
(0.2252)
First interview -0.2086 -4.91%
(0.2794)
Reassurance of current allocation 0.3417 8.28%
(0.2388)
Concrete reason -0.7028 -15.73%
(0.3072)**
Other advisors unsatisfying 0.0926 2.22%
(0.2720)
Pieces of advice 0.1597 3.80%
(0.0613)***
Alternatives -0.0161 -0.38%
(0.2685)
Other interview -0.1265 -2.98%
(0.2744)
Call money -1.1624 -24.84%
(0.3492)***
Savings 0.2307 5.56%
(0.2779)
Stocks, stock funds 0.6003 14.66%
(0.3225)*
Bonds, bond funds 1.1487 27.93%
(0.2963)***
Riester -0.7044 -15.64%
(0.3429***
Insurance -1.3800 -25.95%
(0.5636)**
Outstanding debts -0.9551 -19.43%
(1.0228)
One-time investment -0.6315 -14.82%
(0.2443)***
Constant -1.2062
(0.5819)**
Observations 581
Wald Chi2(19) 96.28
p > Chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1594  
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